Information Management and Market Engineering. Vol. II by Dreier, Thomas et al.


Thomas Dreier / Jan Krämer / Rudi Studer / Christof Weinhardt (Eds.)
Information Management and Market Engineering
Vol. II
Studies on eOrganisation and Market Engineering    11
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie
Herausgeber:
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt
Prof. Dr. Thomas Dreier
Prof. Dr. Rudi Studer
Information Management












Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
KIT Scientific Publishing
Straße am Forum 2
D-76131 Karlsruhe
www.ksp.kit.edu
KIT – Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und nationales
Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft
Diese Veröffentlichung ist im Internet unter folgender Creative Commons-Lizenz 
publiziert: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/
Preface
At the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), the Graduate School Information
Management and Market Engineering (IME) which is financed by the German
Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG), offers an inter-
disciplinary doctoral program on the economic, technological and legal design of
institutions, services, systems and business models for electronic markets. The
expressed aim of the Graduate School is to endow its doctoral students with a
profound interdisciplinary understanding of electronic markets and information
management that enables them to pursue an outstanding career in academia as
well as industry. Since its foundation in April 2004, sixteen graduates have very
successfully completed the doctoral program of the Graduate School and went on
to become professors themselves or hold key management positions in the industry
today, providing proof for the Graduate School’s success in achieving its aim.
The research that is conducted in the Graduate School is directly applicable to
the large domain of electronic markets and information management and has to
steadily keep pace with technological progress. In 2006 the first volume of this
book was published, which assembled an overview of the research that was and
still is ongoing in the Graduate School. The present and second volume shows the
advancements since then, but also points at new research fields that have recently
been explored. Altogether, sixteen research papers have been selected, refereed
and compiled for this volume. They cover almost all relevant aspects of the field
Information Management and Market Engineering and demonstrate the intellectual
challenges in this domain.
In short, Information Management and Market Engineering comprises the structured,
systematic and theoretically founded procedure of analyzing, designing, introducing
and also quality assuring of electronic market platforms as well as their legal
framework regarding simultaneously their market mechanisms and trading rules,
systems, platforms and media, and their business models. This book is structured
in four parts, which reflect the different levels of this Market Engineering process.
Electronic markets often generate a tremendous amount of transactional data
and, on the other hand, react sensitively to exogenous informational influences. In
order to analyze electronic markets, it is therefore indispensable to develop proper
methods and tools which facilitate the (i) processing and structuring of this data,
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(ii) extraction of the information content of this data, and (iii) analysis of the impact
of this information on the market. The research papers in the first part of this book
are all concerned with this task of Market Information Processing and Analysis.
The second part comprises research papers on the Design of Market Mechanisms
and Systems. In this core task of the Market Engineering process, new theoretical
designs are proposed that are believed to improve the performance of electronic
markets. The market design can either influence market behavior directly, for
example through appropriate incentive mechanisms, or indirectly, for example
through new means of communication or interaction.
The influence of different theoretical designs on actual Market Interaction and
Behavior is considered in the next level of the Market Engineering process, and
exemplified by the research papers in the third part of this volume. In particular
the emotional processes of market participants, such as auction fever, are still not
fully understood today. Some of the research papers in this part demonstrate how
these emotional processes can be measured and evaluate their influence on market
behavior and design. The other papers evaluate theoretical market designs on the
basis of actually observed market behavior.
Finally, the papers in the fourth part consider various aspects of Electronic
Market Regulation, i.e. the ongoing normative evaluation of present market designs.
More specifically, market regulation seeks to ensure the long run functioning and
effectiveness of electronic markets. The regulatory issues that are covered in this
part range from the protection of intellectual property rights and personal data to
the stimulation and facilitation of information sharing.
However, these different perspectives on Market Engineering and Information
Management are not treated separately. Each level of the market analysis is input
to and output of the Market Engineering process at the same time, and thereby
contributes to the perennial effort of improving market design.
This advancements in Market Engineering and Information Management, which
are compiled in this book, have only been possible because the professors and
students of the Graduate School have showed great effort and enthusiasm while
working for a common goal. In doing so, old-fashioned boundaries between differ-
ent departments and disciplines were broken-up, making the research and teaching
program of the Graduate School truly interdisciplinary. While interdisciplinary
research also bears many challenges, this book is ample evidence that it can also
provide the researchers with great rewards.
Karlsruhe, Thomas Dreier
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Market Information Processing and Analysis

New Event Detection in Financial News Analysis
Uta Lösch1, Rudi Studer1, and Christof Weinhardt2
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{uta.loesch, rudi.studer}@kit.edu
2 Institute of Information Systems and Management, KIT
weinhardt@kit.edu
Summary. Traders in financial markets commonly have to face an information overload,
which is partly due to a continuously arriving stream of news which contains information
on events which may influence the markets. In this paper, we present a news processing
framework which allows to collect news from various sources and to present them to
the user in an aggregated form. An important aspect of this framework is a New Event
Detection component, which is responsible for recognizing new events and for clustering
news dealing with the same event. The design of this component will be studied in more
detail: a general framework for New Event Detection will be presented which can be
configured to implement a broad variety of concrete systems, including most state-of-the-art
systems along with a detailed study of the state of the art in this field.
1 Introduction
Traders and investors in financial markets are confronted with the problem that too
much information is available from various, heterogenuous sources like newswires,
forums, blogs, and collaborative tools. In order to make accurate trading decisions,
traders have to be supported in finding and assessing relevant information efficiently
such that they can react to new information in a timely manner.
In contrast to other domains, information and especially the possibility to make
profit based on it are extremly transient in financial markets. In fact, it is doubted
whether there is at all a possibility of profiting from having information that others
do not have: The Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama (1970)) states that it should not
be possible to outperform the market, as the stock prices always reflect all the
information which is currently available. However, the Efficient Market Hypothesis
is a theoretical model which has been doubted by behavioural economists over the
last years. Still, it seems intuitive that chances of profiting from new information
are the higher the faster it is reacted upon after its publication.
User support in this context may include:
• Collection of news from various sources: News are published on a multitude of web
sites, which not only include news sites such as Financial Times, Reuters, or
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the Wall Street Journal, but also personal and collaborative websites, especially
blogs, and message boards. Support in the collection of news can be provided
by crawling a set of relevant sites for new information.
• Clustering/aggregation of news: The same events will be reported by several
sources, and the same source may publish several messages on the same event.
The goal is to identify clusters of news which report on the same event. This
is particularly important as traders are especially interested in events that they
have not read about before.
• Ranking of news: Once, the news have been aggregated, they should be ranked
such that those which are most important to the trader are made more prominent.
Relevance and importance of a piece of information for the user depends on
several aspects: Does the information concern some company that the user is
interested in? Does the user already know about the event that occured? How
much is the information expected to influence the price of stocks held by the
user?
A lot of research has already been carried out on these aspects. In the following,
we will present a framework for news analysis in a financial context. In the
subsequent sections we will then focus on some specific aspects of this framework.
2 A Framework for Financial News Analysis
The goal of analysis of financial news is to help traders make informed trading
decisions. Therefore, methods of finding the information that is important for a
user in a specific situation are needed. Identifying the important information is
carried out in a set of analysis steps, which are presented in Figure 1.
Given input data, which consists of textual – news – data on the one hand and of
stock data on the other hand, the goal is to predict the further development of the
stock market and to assess whether a specific user might be interested in a specific
news item that has been published.
The system thus has to combine the numeric stock data and the news data
and make predictions based on this combination. In order to make this kind of
prediction, preprocessing is needed to obtain suitable representations of the data
and to aggregate and filter the data. Useful preprocessing steps for the textual data
might include filtering stories that report information that has not been available
before or stories that concern topics which the user is interested in.
This kind of process requires many design decisions. The first step is to choose
the data on which the system should operate. This means focusing on a specific set
of stocks and on a specific set of news sources. Possible news sources include news
tickers (e.g. Reuters), news portals (e.g. Google news), blogs, message boards and
collaborative tools. For the financial data, some kind of stock data is needed. This
can be available in form of order book data, but also as time series of stock prices.







































Figure 1: Our financial news analysis framework
After choosing the data, various filtering and aggregation steps may be taken.
Depending on the kind of raw data that is available, these may include aggregating
order book data to time series or aggregating time series to trends. For the news
data, filtering relevant data for the specific application or aggregating news to events
(i.e. clustering news such that news in one cluster report on the same event) are
some possible preprocessing steps.
Once the data has been preprocessed, it has to be transformed into a represen-
tation that is suitable for the prediction task. The classical way of representing
text data, is the bag-of-words model – some extensions to that will be presented in
Section 3.1.
In the next step, the data has to be aligned, which means that the text is associated
with the corresponding part of the stock data. E.g. if we are interested in trends
following the publication of the news, the trend that follows each news item has
to be identified and a data instance consisting of the representation of the text and
the representation of the prediction variable has to be created. The set of all these
aligned instances can then be used for learning prediction models on the stock data.
In our research, we focus on the use of New Event Detection as a pre-processing
step. New Event Detection focuses on detecting the first story on an event in
a stream of news. The motivation for this is, that, as already discussed before,
information should only be presented to the user once and as promptly as possible.
A framework for New Event Detection and an overview of previous approaches
to the problem will be presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we will detail on the
evaluation procedure and corpora in the field before concluding in Section 5.
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3 New Event Detection
The problem of New Event Detection (NED) – also known as First-Story Detection
(FSD) – is defined in the Topic Detection and Tracking (TDT) challenge Fiscus and
Doddington (2002): Given a stream of news arriving in chronological order, a TDT
system must group or cluster articles that discuss the same event in the news stream.
NED is one of the sub-tasks of TDT and deals with identifying those stories in a
news stream which discuss novel news events. The decision whether a text reports
on a new event or not is made by considering only documents which have arrived
prior to the current document. Thus, the system has to adhere to the temporal
constraints of a real-time news stream. A first study on this topic has been done by
Allan et al. (1998).
Basically, the problem of New Event Detection can be seen as an outlier detection
task. In general, the goal of outlier detection is to find points in a dataset which
have a huge distance to the rest of the data. In New Event Detection, if the new
document is identified to be different from the older documents, it should be marked
as new, otherwise as old. Outlier Detection can be described as a supervised or an
unsupervised learning task. The same holds for New Event Detection.
The description of the New Event Detection task as an unsupervised learning
task is as an incremental clustering problem. For a stream of training documents
x1, . . . , xn ∈ D,where D is the document space, and the clusters yi ∈ Y , where Y
is the set of clusters that correspond to topics, to which they belong, the goal is to
determine a clustering function c : D → Y that accurately clusters the data. In order
to achieve an incremental clustering, c has to be defined such that c(xi) = φ(xi, Mi−1)
where Mi is the model after clustering documents x1, . . . , xi.
An alternative formulation of the New Event Detection problem is as a classifica-
tion problem, i.e. as a supervised learning task. For a stream of training documents
x1, . . . , xn ∈ D, the goal is to find a function f : D → {new, old} that accurately
labels the data.
A New Event Detection system has several parameters (see Figure 2). These
include the document representation, i.e. the choice of features that define the
document space, the similarity measure between documents, and the detection
procedure, i.e. the way the output (old, new) is determined for a given document
x. These three aspects are interlinked: the similarity measures that are applicable
depend on the document representation, each algorithm requires a specific type of
input, i.e. it has requirements for the document representations that may be used.
In the following sections, we will present an overview of previous approaches
to defining suitable document representations, similarity measures and outlier
detection algorithms for New Event Detection.
3.1 Document representation and similarity measure
The classical approach for representing documents in a metric space is the bag-of-
words model. In this kind of model, each document is regarded as a set of words.







Text representation {new, old}
Figure 2: New Event Detection Framework
Each term that occurs in the document set defines a dimension in the document
space. Common preprocessing steps are stemming (unifying different forms of
the same term, e.g. singular and plural) and stopword removal (eliminating very
common words with little meaning, like and or or). Additional features may be
defined; one example is introducing additional features for named entity types
(e.g. a feature company which has a positive feature weight, if a company name is
contained in the text). Other approaches try to combine synonyms in one dimension
or to disambiguate between different senses of the same term.
Once the dimensions of the feature space are defined, a weight has to be associ-
ated with each dimension. Each document is thus represented as a vector in the
document space. There are different approaches for defining the weight of a feature
in a document:
• Boolean weighting. A feature has weight 1 if the term it represents is present in
the text, 0 otherwise: weightwd = 1 if term w occurs in document d, weightwd = 0
otherwise.
• Term frequency. The weight of each feature is determined by the number of times




where T is the set of all terms in the document set.
• Term frequency inverse document frequency (TFIDF). Term frequency is normal-
ized by document frequency in this approach, where document frequency is
the number of documents which contain the term:weightwd = t fwd ∗ id fw =
f reqwd
∑k∈T f reqw,d
log |D|nw where D is the set of documents and nw is the set of docu-
ments containing w. The idea of this adaptation is that terms that occur in
many documents are less meaningful and distinctive than terms which are only
contained in a few documents.
Various similarity measures have been defined on bag-of-word vectors. The most
prominent one is cosine similarity, which defines the similarity of two documents
by the cosine of the angle between the feature vectors of the documents. Thus,









However, for New Event Detection it seems that the Hellinger distance yields
better results Brants et al. (2003):








Several extensions to these basic models have been considered in New Event
Detection. These will be presented in the following paragraphs.
Incremental TFIDF
The TFIDF measure is commonly used in text mining and information retrieval,
however, it is not directly applicable in New Event Detection. The problem is that
inverse document frequencies (IDF) would have to be recalculated every time a new
document is looked at. This recalculation would be by far too expensive. Therefore,
an estimate of the overall DF measure is generated based on the documents that
have already been published. To increase efficiency, IDF measures are not updated
after every document, but only after each k documents. The following incremental
IDF measure is obtained for each word w:
d ft(w) = d ft−1(w) + d fDt(w) (1)
where Dt represents the set of documents received at time t, d fDt(w) is the number
of documents in Dt in which w occurs and d ft(w) is the number of documents in
which w occurs before time t (Brants et al. (2003), citeyang1998.
Time decay models
News on a specific event usually occur close in time. This means that if a message
that is similar to a previous one, is released long after release of the earlier message,
the probability of the two texts reporting on the same event is small. Therefore,
many approaches adapt the similarity of two documents over time. That means that
the similarity of two documents is smaller if more time has passed between their
publication. There are different approaches for this kind of decay:
The simplest model is that of using a time window, which has e.g. been used by
Yang et al. (1999):
simwin(d1, d2) =
{
sim(d1, d2) age < m
0 else
Thereby, age is the period that has passed between publication of d1 and publication
of d2 and m is the size of the time window.
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An alternative time decay model is a linear model as proposed by Yang et al.
(1998). In their model, time decay is modeled as:
simlin(d1, d2) = (1−
age
m
) ∗ sim(d1, d2)
An exponential model has been proposed by Franz et al. (2001):
simexp(d1, d2) = sim(d1, d2)(1 + 2−age/hal f time)
However, time-decay models do not necessarily improve performance. E.g.,
Brants et al. (2003) have reported that time-decay did not improve their results.
Source-specific TFIDF model
Another aspect to be considered is the specific writing style of different news
providers. To address this, Brants et al. (2003) have studied the use of a specific
ÌDF weight for each news source. The intuition behind that approach is that news
stories by the same provider are written using a specific set of words and a specific
style. Therefore, terms which might be used to distinguish between two events in
one source may just be common terms in another source. The IDF weights for each
source are updated using incremental IDF, but instead of using all documents only
those issued by a specific source are considered.
Obviously, the similarity measure has to be adapted to this source-specific model.
The intuition is that documents that are issued by the same source are per se
more similar among each other than two documents issued from a different source.
Therefore, the average similarity of documents from the regarded sources is used to
normalize the actual similarity between a set of documents. Additionally, Brants et
al. argue that it makes a difference whether a story is on a broad topic with many
documents or on a narrow and specific topic: therefore, the average similarity of
documents on the considered topic is subtracted from the original similarity value.
We thus obtain the overall similarity measure:
simsourceSpeci f ic(d1, d2) = (sim(d1, d2)− sim(d2))− Es1,s2
with dn the new document, sim(dn) the average similarity of dn to all previous
documents and Esisn the average similarity of two stories on the same event issued
by the source si of di and the source sn of dn respectively.
Combined document representations
Named entities are an important part of news and seem helpful in discriminating
between different events. Therefore, various authors have tried to use named entities
as special features in New Event Detection. The assumption is that named entities
contain much of the information on an important event.
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Kumaran and Allan (2004) have studied a text representation consisting of three
vectors: the classical term vector, a second vector containing only the named entities
and one vector containing only the non-named entities terms. For the actual
classification they use the vector consisting of all terms. Additionally they could
show that depending on the topic category in which the document falls, the vector
of named entities resp. the vector of non-named entities are useful as additional
evidence for whether a story reports on a new event or not.
Zhang et al. (2007) have shown that depending on the topic class in which a
news item falls, different named entity types are useful for discriminating between
events. According to their results, location name is the most useful term type for the
three classes Natural Disasters, Violence or War, and Finances. In contrast to that,
person names are very useful for discriminating between Elections, Legal/Criminal
Cases, Science and Discovery. For Scandals/Hearings, date is the most important
information. Legal/Criminal Cases and Finance topics have high correlation with
money terms, while Science and Discovery have high correlation with percentage
terms. The influence of non-name terms does not depend on the class to which a
news item belongs. They thus adapt the weights of a term dependent on whether it
is a named entity and on the class to which the news item belongs.
Makkonen et al. (2002) have taken a similar approach as Pons-Porrata et al. (2002)
concerning document representation. However, they have introduced two additional
subvectors - one representing locations and one representing proper names. Each
document is thus represented by four vectors.
A new similarity measure is deviced on this document representation. They
adapt the measures that rely on the intersection of the occurrence of features by a
ranking which depends on the position of a feature in the considered document.
The idea is that in news, the earlier some information is mentioned, the more
important it is. The overall similarity measure is calculated as a weighted sum over
the four individual similarities.
Pons-Porrata et al. (2002) have proposed to introduce a second feature vector
for each document. The features of the first vector are terms weighted using term
frequency. The second vector’s features are mentions of dates or time intervals
that are automatically extracted from the texts. These features, too, are weighted
according to the frequency of occurrence in the text.
Similarity is measured using cosine similarity on the term vectors. For the time
entities vectors of di and dj distance is defined as the pair of time entities (ti, tj)
with ti ∈ di and tj ∈ dj, for which the time interval between ti and tj is minimal.
The overall similarity is then defined using a threshold on the time distance. If the
distance between the time vectors exceeds a certain threshold, the overall similarity
between the two documents is 0, if the distance is below the threshold, similarity
is defined as the similarity of term vectors. For example, if document di contains
the date 6th July, 2010 and document dj contains the dates 05th July, 2010 and 27th
June, 2009, then the time distance between these two documents is one day, as this
is the minimal distance between time entities mentioned in the two documents.
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Event frequencies
Texts on the same kind of event will probably share some common vocabulary. The
expectation thus is that events on a similar topic are more likely to be confused
than events of different types. The idea for overcoming this problem is to give less
weight to topic-specific vocabulary and has been proposed by Brants et al. (2003).
The event frequency of a term is defined as:
e f (w) = max
r∈ROI
e f (r, w)
where e f (r, w) is the number of events in rule of interpretation ROI (rules of
interpretation, i.e topic categories) that contain w. Inverse event frequencies are
used to adapt the feature weights.
Lexical chains
Stokes and Carthy (2001b) have analyzed the idea of representing documents by
the terms that best describe the story of the text. They propose to obtain such a
representation using lexical chains. Chains of semantically related terms are formed
using WordNet. Each term in the text is processed in the order of appearance in
the text. It is then checked whether the current term is related to the currently
built lexical chain. If this is not the case, the current chain is closed and a new
one is started. In the end all the lexical chains consisting of more than one term
are merged together. This set of terms is used to complement the traditional term
frequency vector.
However, the lexical chains alone are not sufficient for obtaining a satisfying
result. Therefore, Stokes and Carthy (2001a) combine lexical chains with a second
document vector which contains all the named entities occuring in the text. This
additional representation is useful as WordNet is not capable of making relations
between proper nouns and other nouns in its taxonomy.
3.2 Learning algorithms
As explained above, the scenario of New Event Detection requires an outlier detec-
tion algorithm, more specifically an incremental outlier detection algorithm. It has
already been explained that outlier detection can be formulated as a supervised or
an unsupervised learning problem. In New Event Detection, some training data is
available, that may be used for tuning the learning component.
Most systems formalize New Event Detection as a clustering problem: Each news
item may either report on a known event and thus belong to an existing cluster or it
may form a new cluster and thus report on a new event. Two properties of the New
Event Detection problem heavily restrict the choice of clustering algorithm: The
first is that the problem is an incremental one, which requires each document to be
clustered before the next ones are known, and the second one is that the number of
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clusters is not fixed. Therefore, all algorithms that take the number of clusters as
parameter can not be applied in New Event Detection.
Single-pass clustering
The most prominent algorithm for New Event Detection problem is Single-pass
clustering, which has been proposed by Papka and Allan (1998). The algorithm
proceeds as follows: For each new document the nearest cluster is searched. If
the similarity of the document to this cluster exceeds a threshold θ the document
is clustered with the nearest cluster, otherwise it will form a new cluster. This
algorithm is closely related to Nearest-Neighbour-Classification, in the sense that if
the method for defining the nearest cluster is chosen such that only the closest
document is considered, we obtain 1-nearest-neighbour-classification.
Single-pass clustering is not very adaptive: the definition of the nearest cluster
has to be chosen: single-link, average-link, or complete-link. Based on the link-
ing strategy and an initial set of documents the optimal parameter value for the
threshold θ has to be learned.
Incremental β0-Compact Algorithm
Pons-Porrata et al. (2002) have proposed to reallocate documents between clusters
upon the arrival of new documents. The idea is to use the maximum-similarity
graph of all documents for finding the clusters. A cluster is formed by a set of
nodes which are connected among each other, but not to other documents in the
graph of maximum similarity.
For a new document dn the similarity to all previous documents di is determined
and for each document the information on the nearest document is updated. Using
the information on the most similar document, the graph of maximum similarities
can be constructed. It is defined over all documents, and contains an edge (di, dj) if
the most similar document for di is dj. Clusters are extracted from this graph by
searching for sets of nodes which are connected among each other but not to other
nodes outside the set.
Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines have been proposed for solving the New Event Detection
problem modeled as a classification problem. The idea is to find a hyper-ball with
minimal diameter which contains all the training data (i.e. the texts that already
have been published). Thus, the following objective has to be minimized:





subject to the constraints
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0 ≤ ξi
(xi − c)>(xi − c) ≤ R2 + ξi
where c is the center of the hyperball, R is its radius, and the ξi are slack variables
that measure how far the data point is from the hyperball’s surface.
A text is classified as novel if its distance from the center of the hyper-ball exceeds
a certain threshold. As in classical SVMs, kernel functions may be used for calcu-
lating similarities, thus projecting the data into a high-dimensional feature space
and determining the hyper-ball there. A detailed description of the optimization
problem can be found in Zhang et al. (2004). At first glance the use of SVMs may
seem very inefficient in the context of New Event Detection. However, retraining
only becomes necessary when a text is classified as being novel - therefore, less
training effort than one might expect is needed.
Kernel Regression
Zhang et al. (2004) have used Kernel Regression for solving New Event Detection.
In Kernel regression the predicted variable is calculated as a weighted average of
the available data where the weights are determined using a kernel function. The
estimation can thus be phrased as r(y, x1, . . . , xN) = ∑Ni=1 wi(y)s(xi, y) where K is a





Apart from the methods that have been presented in the previous paragraphs,
probabilistic methods have been studied as alternative models for New Event
Detection. Zhang et al. (2005) have used language models and stochastic processes
as their approach to the problem. The development of clusters is modeled using
a Dirichlet process and a multinominal language model is used for modeling the





where the prior probabilities of each cluster are determined by
p(cn = Cj) =
card(Cj)
λ + ∑mk=1 card(Ck)
(j = 1, . . . , m) (2)
p(cn = Cm+1) =
λ
λ + ∑mk=1 card(Ck)
(3)
with C1, . . . , Cm being the clusters obtained by processing x1, . . . , xn−1, Cm+1 being a
possible new cluster whose probability of being generated depends on the parameter
λ, card(Cj) describing the number of documents that have been clustered into Cj,
and




p(xi|C) decribes the probability of a document xi being generated by cluster CJ . θCj
is the parameter vector of cluster Cj.
Zhang and Li (2009) have proposed an alternative probabilistic model which is
based on an incremental version of probabilistic latent semantic analysis (IPLSA).
The idea of probabilistic latent semantic analysis is to introduce concepts, which
are variables linking terms to documents and to estimate the parameters P(w|z)
and P(z|d) in a way to describe the available data as good as possible, where w
are the words occuring in the dataset, d are the documents in the dataset and z
are the latent concepts. Zhang et al. have proposed an incremental version of this
algorithm, which allows to add documents to the model in an online manner.
3.3 Complexity and efficiency
The basic New Event Detection approach which uses Single-pass Clustering with
single linkage and a bag-of-words model with TFIDF weights has quadratic com-
plexity in the number of documents, as each document is compared to all the
previous documents. This complexity results in very low processing speed, leading
to systems that are not able to analyze data streams in a real-time manner.
To the best of our knowledge, little work has been done to improve processing
speed of New Event Detection systems. The most important approach to improving
run-time efficiency is reducing the number of comparisons. Zhang et al. (2007)
have used indexing-trees for the search for the most similar document. The idea is
to reduce the number of necessary comparisons from linear to logarithmic in the
number of documents. Their approach consists in building hierarchical clusters of
documents such that the search for the closest document can be done by performing
a search in this tree.
The time-decay models presented in Section 3.1 are a possibility of reducing the
number of documents with which each document has to be compared.
Further methods for reducing the number of comparisons and the complexity of
each comparison have been proposed by Luo et al. (2007). Additionally to a sliding
window in which news are considered for comparison, in their approach only the
first story for each event is considered for comparison, thus significantly reducing
the number of documents to be considered. Additionally, only the terms which are
the most important ones for a document, i.e. those with the highest feature weights
are used for similarity calculation. Luo et al. could show that it is sufficient to use
the top 100 features for comparison. For a further speed-up, the similarity between
two documents is only calculated if there is an overlap in the top 10 features of both
documents - otherwise the documents are considered to be reporting on different
events.
A further improvement that Luo et al. proposed is parallelizing the New Event
Detection process by splitting the set of candidate documents into several subsets
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and by processing each subset on a different machine. If one of the machines
returns a classification of the document as reporting on a new event, the document
is classified as new, otherwise as old.
4 Evaluation and performance
4.1 Corpora
Five TDT corpora have been developed and are maintained by the Linguistic Data
Consortium1. These corpora vary in size, the number and kind of sources they use,
and in language Cieri et al. (2002)
The TDT Pilot study corpus was used in the pilot study, it consists of textual news
from newswires (Reuters) and transcriptions of broadcast news speech (CNN). All
news are available in English. The corpus covers one year of data – from July 1,
1994 to June 30, 1995, and consists of approximately 16000 stories. On these, a total
of 25 events were defined, which defines a subset of the events covered in the data.
TDT-2 consists of English and Chinese news, both in textual as well as in audio
form. Data was collected from nine sources over a period of six months from
January 1998 to June 1998. Transcripts of the audio data and translations of the
Chinese data are available. The corpus consists of a total of approximately 53600
Englisch and 18800 Chinese stories. A total of 200 events were defined on the
English data, 20 of them have also been annotated on the Chinese data. This corpus
was used for the TDT evaluations in the year 1998.
TDT-3 was used in the evaluations from 1999 to 2001. It contains news collected
from October to December 1998 in English, Chinese and Arabic. 120 topics have
been annotated for the English and the Chinese data, only a subset of them has
been annotated in Arabic.
The TDT-4 corpus was used for the official evaluations in 2002 and 2003. It also
contains English, Chinese and Arabic data. In this corpus a total of 80 topics have
been annotated in each language. The corpus consists of data that has been collected
between October 2000 to January 2001.
The last corpus that was developed was TDT-5, the corpus which has been used
for the 2004 evaluation. It contains English, Chinese and Arabic data that has been
published between April and September 2003. A total of 250 topics have been
annotated on this corpus, 25% of which are annotated in all three languages, the
rest is annotated in only one language, distributed equally across languages.
4.2 Evaluation measure
The goal of New Event detection is to mark the first story on an event as new, all
the other stories are to be marked as old. Therefore, the system may make different
mistakes:
1 http://www.ldc.upenn.edu/
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tagged as new tagged as old
real new true positive (TP) false negative (FN)
real old false positive (FP) true negative (TN)
The first kind of mistake occurs when a message that should be tagged as new is
tagged as old. In that case we talk of a miss. In the second case, where a message
that does not report on a new event, is tagged as new by the system, we talk of false
alarms. The miss rate is defined as FNTP+FN . The false alarm rate is defined as
FP
FP+TN .
There is a trade-off between these two kinds of errors (similar to the trade-
off between precision and recall in classical IR systems), which depends on the
threshold of how big the distance between two news may be before they are not
considered to report on the same event anymore.
In the official TDT evaluations, the overall performance of a system is therefore
calculated as a weighted average between its miss rate PM and its false alarm rate
PFA:
CDET = CM ∗ PM ∗ Ptarget + CFA ∗ PFA ∗ Pnon−target
Here, CM and CFA describe the cost of a miss resp. a false alarm. As false alarms are
much more likely to occur, their cost is set lower than the cost of a miss. Therefore,
in the official evaluations CM = 1 and CFA = 0.1. Ptarget and Pnon−target describe
a priori probabilities for a document being new (resp. old). In the evaluations,
Ptarget = 0.02 and Pnon−target = 1− Ptarget = 0.98.
This measure is then normalized using the following formula:
(CDET)norm =
CDET
min(Cmiss ∗ Ptarget, CFA ∗ Pnon−target)
Additional measures that are reported as result of some evaluations are the usual
Information Retrieval measures precision and recall. Precision is defined as TPTP+FP ,
recall is defined as TPTP+FN . These two measures are often combined into a single
one, the so-called F1-measure, which is defined as 2∗Recall∗PrecisionRecall+Precision .
4.3 Overview of results
In Table 1 we present an overview of the results that have been achieved by the
presented New Event Detection systems. In most papers only a subset of the
evaluation measures that were defined in 4.2 are presented. Combined with the
different corpora that were used by the different authors, this makes a comparison
of the systems difficult.
Discussion of performance
As discussed above, New Event Detection systems consist of three components:
document representation, similarity measure and outlier detection. All the presented
systems try to optimize the overall performance and change more than one of the
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Authors Corpus (CDET)norm Recall Precision Miss F/A F1
Papka and Al-
lan (1998)
TDT 0.4315 0.64 0.5 0.36 0.0146 0.56
Yang et al.
(1999)




















0.5144 – – – – –
Zhang et al.
(2005)












TDT-3 0.7546 – – – – –
Zhang et al.
(2007)
TDT-2, TDT-3 0.5089 – – – – –
Luo et al. (2007) TDT-5 0.758 – – – – –
Zhang and Li
(2009)
TDT-4 (only on-topic) 0.1275 0.88 0.85 0.12 0.00157 0.86
Table 1: Overview of evaluation results for the presented approaches
components (or one component in more than one way). Therefore, the influence of
a single change is often not known. However, some conclusions are possible.
Looking at the document representation, what seems to help is the separate
consideration of named entities and other terms. The reduction of the numbers of
features as proposed by Luo et al. (2007) and Zhang and Li (2009) not only seems to
increase efficiency but also performance of the New Event Detection systems.
Regarding the similarity measure, Brants et al. (2003) have shown that the
Hellinger similarity outperforms the cosine similarity. The use of time-decay
approaches is strongly discussed: while some authors (e.g. Zhang and Li (2009)
and Yang et al. (1999) report improvements, Brants et al. (2003) reports that no
improvements where possible by this means. Models that distinguish between
different news sources for calculating similarities (Brants et al. (2003), Zhang et al.
(2007)) seem to outperform models that do not make this distinction.
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Zhang et al. (2004) have shown that the single-pass clustering approach outper-
forms Support Vector Machines and Kernel Regression. They argue that kernel
methods seem to perform quite poorly in unsupervised learning tasks with a high
number of features. The authors’ explanation for this phenomenon is the lack of
information on which features are important in the learning task (in contrast to
supervised learning tasks where this kind of information can be derived). An inter-
esting alternative approach is the IPLSA method that has been proposed by Zhang
and Li (2009) and which clearly outperforms the other systems. Here, learning is
based on an incremental maximum likelihood estimation of the probability of a
word w occuring in document d.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a framework for stock price analysis and prediction
based on news that are published. We have presented the idea of using New Event
Detection as a pre-processing step in this context – the motivation being that New
Event Detection should be essential for enabling accurate predictions (as ”old”
information is already reflected in the prices).
The problem of New Event Detection has been studied extensively in the liter-
ature. Different algorithms, different text representations and different similarity
measures have been applied to the problem. Still, the problem remains hard and
state-of-the-art systems still have high error rates in their predictions.
Therefore, we think that this problem is still interesting for further analyses. In
our work we focus on refining the document representation and suitable similarity
measures for New Event Detection. We use OpenCalais2 to obtain annotations of
named entities and events in the documents. As explained above, named entities
have been used before in New Event Detection. Using event annotations, i.e.
relations between the entities mentioned in a document, is however going beyond
the state of the art.
As the text annotations are obtained in an automatic manner, they can not be
assumed to be correct and complete. Additionally, only a limited number of event
types can be annotated by OpenCalais. Therefore, it is likely that a combined
document representation that relies on both the annotations and the bag-of-words
yields better results.
Concerning the use of event annotations as document features, it is not clear
what the most promising way of using them is. We are evaluating different methods:
Either each concrete relation can be used as a feature. Alternatively, relation type
and the involved entities can be regarded separately. The latter may better reflect the
similarity between the annotated events. OpenCalais annotations are represented as
graphs. Therefore, a third alternative is to calculate similarities between document
2 http://www.opencalais.com
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annotations as graph similarities instead of extracting features from the graphs,
which are then used for similarity calculation.
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Summary. Different data mining methods for financial texts and various sentiment mea-
sures are described in the existing literature, without common benchmarks for comparing
these approaches. The framework proposed in this paper and the corresponding imple-
mented system facilitate combining more sources of financial data into comprehensive
integral dataset. The use of the dataset is then illustrated by analyzing the candidate
measures by estimating parameters of regression on different returns and other financial
indicators that can be defined using system’s novel data transformation approach.
1 Introduction
Different data mining methods for financial texts are described in the literature,
and systems that apply these particular methods have been implemented. For an
evaluation of the proposed methods authors use different approaches, some of them
incorporating assumptions that do not conform to real financial markets’ conditions.
This paper presents the current status of a project attempting to offer a possibility
to compare performance of these systems by offering a framework, a base dataset,
and an implementation of the system according to design science guidelines from
Hevner et al. (2004).
The research is a part of the project FINDS (Financial News and Data Services)
initiated within Information Management and Market Engineering Graduate School
at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Project FINDS has the goal to conduct
innovative research on the analysis of quantitative and qualitative information
related to financial markets and to provide services that can help both researchers
in financial field, and also professional traders (Bozic, 2009).
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we give an overview of the existing
literature in the field. Section 3 describes data sources for the comprehensive
research set, preprocessing methods used on data and gets the reader acquainted
with the dataset by presenting some descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the
usage of the framework and the system by comparing four sentiment measures.
Section 5 concludes the paper and describes the ideas for future research.
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2 Related Work
Many researchers have studied how published news influence market reactions.
The methodologies used range from a fairly simple content analysis using classical
statistical tools, to complex machine-learning methods. The approaches vary from
an engineering approach which focuses on implementation and proving economic
relevance, to chiefly theoretical approaches whose goal is to describe underlying
economic phenomena.
Mittermayer and Knolmayer (2006a) compare eight text-mining systems, includ-
ing their own. Since more technical performance criteria are often missing, it is
not possible to draw clear conclusions about relative performance. Wüthrich et al.
(1998) classify news articles published overnight on web portals into three categories
depending on their influence on the one of five equity indices: Dow Jones, Nikkei,
FTSE, Hang Seng, and Straits Times. With this system they attempt to forecast the
trend of the index daily value one day ahead. They use Naı̈ve Bayes, Nearest Neigh-
bour and Neural Net classifier, and a hand-crafted underlying dictionary. Lavrenko
et al. (2000) use Naı̈ve Bayes classifier to classify news articles from Yahoo!Finance
into five groups, according to the influence on particular U.S. stocks. The features
were determined automatically and the forecast horizon was from five to ten hours.
Gidófalvi and Elkan (2003) use again naı̈ve Bayes classifier with three categories to
recognize articles which have bigger positive or negative influence on constituents
of Dow Jones index. With features defined using mutual information measure
they work on ten minutes aggregated intraday data. Fung, Yu, and Lam (2003)
partially use commercially available text mining systems to predict a price trend for
intraday market movements of some of the stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. For classification purposes they use support vector machines. Finally,
Mittermayer and Knolmayer (2006b) propose a high frequency forecast system that
classifies press releases of publicly traded companies in the U.S. using a dictionary
that combines automatically selected features and a hand-crafted thesaurus. For
classification the authors use the polynomial version of SVM.
While most of the works focus on predicting price trends of single stock or index,
there are works that aim at determining influence of news releases to volatility.
Thomas (2003) improves risk-return profile by exiting the market in case of news
that are predicting high volatility, while Schulz, Spiliopoulou, and Winkler (2003)
attempt to classify press releases of German public companies according their
influence on volatility of stock prices.
Another group of publications not included in the survey by Mittermayer and
Knolmayer (2006a) contains works that do not primary attempt to prove economical
relevance of published text by evaluating specifically tailored trading strategies,
but rather to find statistically relevant relations between financial indicators and
sentiment extracted from the text.
Antweiler and Frank (2004) use Naı̈ve Bayes and SVM classifiers to classify
messages posted to Yahoo!Finance and Raging Bull and determine their sentiment.
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They do not find statistically significant correlation with stock prices, but they find
sentiment and volume of messages significantly correlated to trade volumes and
volatility. In their methodological paper Das and Chen (2007) offer a variety of
classifiers, as well as composed sentiment measure as a result of voting among
classifiers. In the illustrative example they analyze Yahoo stock boards and stock
prices of 8 technology companies, but they do not find clear evidence that the
sentiment index can be predictive for stock prices.
There are two pivotal articles published in the Journal of Finance. Tetlock (2007)
observes Wall Street Journal’s column ”Abreast of the Market”, uses content analysis
software General Inquirer together with Principal Component Analysis approach
and finds that high pessimism in published media predicts downward pressure on
market prices. Authors of Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) succeeded
to find that rate of negative words in news stories about certain company predicts
low earnings of the company.
If we observe text mining methodologies as a transformations that assign numer-
ical value to every textual string, we can refer to that numerical value as sentiment
index. All publications from the former group have at least implicit statements
about the predictive power of the specific sentiment index on e.g. returns or volatil-
ity. Following the evaluation approach from the latter group of publication, we aim
at providing financial text mining research community with a framework and a tool
that can be used for proving their statements using statistical significance criteria.
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources
We use Thomson Reuters TickHistory data and the output from the Reuters NewsS-
cope Sentiment Engine as a source dataset. These data sources are convenient
because they provide access to trading data over period of more than 10 years, and
extensive amount of sentiment data related to financial news stories.
Data constituting the output of the Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine rep-
resents the author’s sentiment measure for every English-language news item
published via NewsScope in years 2003-2008. The measure classifies a news item
into one of three categories: positive, negative, or neutral. The probability of the
news item falling into each of the categories is also given.
Thomson Reuters TickHistory data is available through the DataScope platform.
We use daily data for the period equivalent to the NewsScope Sentiment Engine
dataset. This provides us with data on opening and closing prices for the particular
product, bid and ask, as well as volume data. Other types of data about companies
coming from this source are the total amount of shares, used for calculating market
capitalization, and paid dividends, that can be used for adjusting the returns.
Additionally, it is the source of the data about daily values of the MSCI Indices for
individual countries, as well as MCSI World Index.
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Field Name Description Source
ric Reuters Instrument Code TH
d Date TH
Open Opening daily price TH
High Maximal price within the day TH
Low Minimal price within the day TH
vol Daily trading volume TH
Last Closing daily price TH
Bid Average bid TH
Ask Average ask TH
spread Average spread TH
cc Close to close daily return of the equity D
oc Open to close daily return of the equity D
oo Open to open daily return of the equity D
co Close to open daily return of the equity D
cnt Number of news items mentioning company RNSE
pnaccnt Number of news stories mentioning company RNSE
nsent pos Number of positive news items mentioning company RNSE
nsent neut Number of neutral news items mentioning company RNSE
nsent neg Number of negative news items mentioning company RNSE
avgsent Average sentiment RNSE
asent pos Average probability that news items are positive RNSE
asent neut Average probability that news items are neutral RNSE
asent neg Average probability that news items are negative RNSE
net sent Net sentiment: asent pos - asent neg D
net sent std Standard deviation of net sentiment D
ric market Abbreviation of company’s home market TH
country Country D
icc Close to close daily return of the country index D
ioc Open to close daily return of the country index D
ioo Open to open daily return of the country index D
ico Close to open daily return of the country index D
cnt country Number of news items related to country RNSE
avgsent item Average sentiment (country level) RNSE
eccc Excess daily close to close return w/r to country index D
ecoc Excess daily open to close return w/r to country index D
ecco Excess daily close to open return w/r to country index D
ecoo Excess daily open to open return w/r to country index D
Table 1: Main fields and sources (TH - TickHistory,
RNSE - Sentiment Engine, D - derived)
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Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine data has two main properties - the times-
tamp of the news item publishing, and the related company mentioned in the news
item. It is preprocessed in a way that the records are aggregated on the level of each
company, and also calendar day - according to local time in force at the location of
company’s home market. In that way we get an average sentiment for a company
for each day in 6 years period. The sentiments are expressed by different calculated
values. The first aggregated sentiment measure is average sentiment class - where
the classes are represented by values 1, 0, and -1 for positive, neutral, and negative
class, respectively. Further measures are average probabilities that each news item
falls into positive, negative or neutral class. As the Reuters sentiment index used
for the evaluation later we adopted a deducted value defined as average probability
of positive class minus average probability of negative class within one day.
From the data on daily prices we derive data on different returns: namely
close-to-open, close-to-close, open-to-open, and open-to close returns. This is done
considering only days with trades for particular equity or index. The generic way of
defining calculated fields derived from source data is described in later section. The
calculated returns are adjusted for paid dividends by increasing the price of share
on the trading day following the dividend payment by the amount of dividends
paid per share.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine data consists of author’s sentiment measures
of English-language news items published through Reuters NewsScope in the
period from 2003 to 2006 inclusive. Each record represents a unique mention of
the specific company, with a possibility of one news item relating to more than
one company. In our dataset there are 6,127,190 records about 10,665 different
companies. Figure 1 shows the top twenty companies with greatest number of
records related to that company. According to Reuters news production process,
several news items can make one single news story, e.g. short alert item is published
immediately, and after some time extension of the same story is published as a new
item, or in the case of corrections. In the available data average number of news
items per story is 1.995, saying that in average two items make one news story.
Increase in data volume over the years is obvious and yearly record number
doubles over the period of 6 years, as shown on Figure 2. Besides, on the same
figure, one can follow increase in the partial volume of records related to different
home markets. The information about a company’s home market is an integral
part of the Reuters code uniquely identifying each instrument. Figure 2 separately
shows data about the ten markets with greatest changes over the years. It can be
seen that the fraction of the two biggest US markets, NYSE and NASDAQ, in the
total data volume has grown from something over 40% to little less than 60% in this
6 years period.
Each news item can have multiple tags called topic codes, and topic codes are
grouped into categories. One of the categories represents countries, and can be used
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Figure 2: Data volume change over years
for determining what country is mentioned in the particular news item. Using this
author tagging feature, average sentiment per country can be calculated. The Figure
3 is showing counties with greatest and lowest average sentiment, when country
tags with less than 1000 mentions are excluded.
During the week, only 2.19% of all news items are published on weekends.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of records per days of week. Our dataset comprises
of data spanning 2192 days in total, considering GMT time zone, and there are even
13 companies that are mentioned at least once in more than 80% of all days, as
shown in Table 2. One more interesting property of the data is noticeable sentiment
decrease for news items published on Saturdays, as shown on Figure 5.
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Figure 3: Best and worst average sentiment for countries with over 1000 mentions
Company Days with news Percent
GENERAL ELEC CO 1911 87.18
SONY CORP 1891 86.27
CITIGROUP 1863 84.99
BP 1851 84.44
WALT DISNEY CO 1841 83.99
GENERAL MOTORS 1837 83.8
EXXON MOBIL 1822 83.12
WAL-MART STORES 1802 82.21
BOEING CO 1798 82.03
MICROSOFT CP 1792 81.75
HSBC HOLDINGS 1791 81.71
GOLDM SACHS GRP 1782 81.3
FORD MOTOR CO 1754 80.02
EADS 1752 79.93
TOYOTA MOTOR CO 1729 78.88
DEUTSCHE BANK N 1729 78.88
VOLKSWAGEN AG 1720 78.47
VODAFONE GROUP 1711 78.06
CHEVRON 1704 77.74
TOTAL FINA 1693 77.24
Table 2: The 20 companies mentioned on most days
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Figure 5: Average sentiment per days of week
3.3 Preprocessing
To enable easy extending of the existing dataset, generic interfacing is one of the
system’s features. It is generic in that aspect that it allows any format of the
DataScope platform output to be loaded into the system automatically. New source
to be added is placed in a comma separated values (CSV) file. The procedure of
generic load then starts, making new data source available for the next steps of
preprocessing. The names of the new columns that can be later used for referencing
are extracted from header row of the comma separated input file. The necessary
type transformations on the added data are conducted by means of metadata
dictionary, which holds datatypes and formats related to the column names. In this
way new data is transformed into the representation that can be used as input of
the successive steps.
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As our goal is to explore dependencies of various indicators and sentiment
measures, another feature of the system is a novel approach to defining calculated
indicators. Any of the columns from the source datasets can be used as a base
for calculations. Besides full range of arithmetic operators, lagging operators can
be defined and used as well. The definition of the calculated fields is given in
the notation of simple grammar we defined. The definition is saved in control
file, which is parsed and used for code generation. It produces PL/SQL code that
applied to the source datasets produces additional datasets containing calculated
fields.
Final result is a clean dataset with derived fields that were not part of the source
datasets, designed for particular benchmarking purpose. The overview of the data
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Figure 6: Overview of the Preprocessing system
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4 First Results
As an illustration of framework application we performed comparison of four
sentiment measures. Three of them are produced using classifiers that are imple-
mented in the scope of FINDS Project. The first one is using Bayes-Fisher filter,
second Support Vector Machines, while third implements artificial Neural Networks
methodology. The classifiers are trained on high frequency intraday data on trades,
aggregated to 1 minute average prices. The news items are grouped into classes
depending on their influence on the price movements. Observing the period of
two hours immediately following news item publication, we determine class of the
news item. If the price stabilized on the level higher than the level at the moment
of news item publication, news item was classified as positive. If the price stabi-
lized on lower level, news item was classified as negative. If the price stabilization
couldn’t be observed, news item is considered neutral. More details about classifier
implementation can be found in Pfrommer et al. (2010). Training period was first
nine months of 2003, and news stories about five big technology companies (SAP,
Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, and Apple) were used.
The last three months of 2003 represent the evaluation period, with total of 729
news stories analyzed. The process of news transformation shown on Figure 7
consists of text tokenizing, stemming, and finally text classification using selected
methodology. Using the dataset and the framework we calculated parameters for
regression of lagged dependent variables against each sentiment measure. The
variables were four different daily returns, four daily excess returns, and average
daily spread, all lagged up to ten days. The regression formula is given by idt =
α(id,i) + β(id,i)St−i + εt where id represents dependent variable, and i size of the
lag. The results are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. The column title determines
dependent variable, and the row represents days of lag between sentiment measure
S and dependent variable id. Each cell shows two values: estimated coefficient
value β first, and then p value according to t-statistics.
The results show that just for 14 variables could be proven statistically relevant
dependence on lagged sentiment values. Although RNSE data shows most of the
statistically significant results, seven, and all of them have positive coefficients, it is
not possible to give clear statement about comparative performance of sentiment
measures. This issue possibly arises from the low data volume, causing the statistical
dependence not to be observed. To overcome the problem, regression parameter
estimation for one of the measures is repeated with greater number of data points.
RNSE measure is chosen because of the extensive volume of the data. Table 5
presents the results from regression parameters estimation on data sample including
all six years of processed news stories in period 2003 to 2008 for two major U.S.
markets contained in the system. All tested dependent variables show statistically
significant dependence on sentiment value with lag of at least one day. The increase
in number of statistically relevant results shows that greater amount of data offers a
possibility to draw more confident conclusions.
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Figure 7: Transformations of news data
5 Conclusion
In an attempt to define a benchmark for performance of sentiment measures for
financial texts, we propose the framework and present implementation of the system
that enables easy deriving of financial indicators to be used in performance measure.
As an illustration we offer a use-case analysis of four different approaches, although
not giving any general conclusions about adequacy of particular approaches. It
is shown that due to the inadequate data volume conclusions are vague, but the
increase in the volume of analyzed data offers us a possibility to draw more robust
conclusions.
Some of the future directions of the research would be extending the source base,
including Compustat data on market capitalization and earnings of companies, and
also extending calculated dataset, to offer wider variety of indicators which could
be compared against candidate sentiment measure. More sophisticated statistical
analysis should be performed on the final dataset to be able to give more decisive
statements about general adequacy of text mining approaches in financial news.
These could include using panel regression to control for inter-firm dependencies
and applying significance test that would account for possible heteroscedasticity in
the data.
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Summary. In this paper we analyze the effect of the release of U.S. unemployment numbers
on information, liquidity, and trading activity in German Bund Futures. Our sample
comprises the years 2000 to 2009 of Eurex traded futures. We find that liquidity and trading
activity is lower pre-announcement associated with high adverse selection costs. Liquidity
recovers and adverse selection stays on a slightly higher level than normal within thirty
minutes after announcements. Trading activity drastically increases and stays on a high
level during the first thirty minutes after announcements. Our findings are consistent with
existing empirical literature. We find that the Euro-Bund Futures market is a highly liquid
and efficient market that incorporates public information fast. Private information arises
through varying information processing and gathering capabilities of market participants.
During the last decades, futures trading on government bonds has risen to con-
stitute a major part of trading in financial instruments. This paper analyzes how
information asymmetry and liquidity develops around U.S. unemployment rate an-
nouncements in trading of German Bund Futures. Bund Futures belong to Europe’s
most traded securities. With Eurex, we specifically analyze a highly automated
electronic market suitable for automated trading. Macroeconomic news are, addi-
tionally to official government outlets, also released through news wire networks of
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, and Dow Jones. Recent evidence from the foreign
exchange (FX) market suggests that algorithmic traders also use macroeconomic
news as input parameters (Chaboud et al., 2009). Algorithmic traders automatically
pull out of the FX market around macroeconomic news announcements to reduce
potential adverse selection costs. The role of information and liquidity has long been
of interest to market microstructure research. In combination with recent develop-
ments in trading systems and market automation the question of information and
liquidity around macroeconomic news events in electronic markets is interesting to
researchers and practitioners alike.
Our study shows, consistent with existing literature, higher adverse selection
costs around macroeconomic news, lower liquidity, and higher trading intensity
post announcements. We find that the Euro-Bund Futures market is a highly liquid
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and efficient market that incorporates public information fast. Private information
arises through varying information processing and gathering capabilities of market
participants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives a literature
overview, section 2 provides information about Eurex’s institutional details and
section 3 describes the unemployment and transaction data. Section 4 explains our
research design. Section 5 provides the results and section 6 finally concludes.
1 Literature Review
The notion of information in markets, its impact, and its relevance has triggered
lots of research in the area of market microstructure during the last forty years. One
fundamental model is the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model which also provides
the theoretical foundation for the Madhavan et al. (1997) model used in this paper.
The main contribution of the Glosten and Milgrom model is that it shows how
bid-ask spreads can emerge independently from exogenous transaction costs and
that private information is impounded into prices through order flow. Liquidity
suppliers revise their expectations about an asset’s value depending on whether
trades are buys or sells. Since liquidity suppliers try to safeguard themselves against
informed traders the amount of private information is reflected through the adverse
selection component in the spread.
This paper does not analyze general aspects of information and liquidity in
German Bund futures trading but concentrates on the effects in trading around
macroeconomic news announcements. In equity markets private information fun-
damentally consists of information about future cash flows. However, there should
not be substantial private information about future cash flows of government bonds.
From a theoretical point of view there are models that analyze effects before and
after anticipated announcements. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) formulate a model
which explains private information prior to an anticipated announcement such as
earnings announcements. Traders acquire costly private information to trade in
advance of a public announcement. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) introduce a model
with the notion that different traders have different capabilities to interpret earnings
announcements. This might lead to an increase in adverse selection costs associated
with a reduction in liquidity. However, according to their model trading volume
might still increase despite a decrease in liquidity around earnings announcements.
In short, their paper “suggests a model of trade in which financial accounting
disclosures simultaneoulsy induce increased information asymmetry, less liquidity,
and more trading volume” (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Economic news indicators
are similar to earnings announcements in that there should be no other prior direct
private information source and the information contained in the news might be
interpreted differently by different market participants. Kim and Verrecchia (1997)
provide an extension of their 1994 model in which they incorporate the effects of pre-
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announcement anticipation and private information as well as post-announcement
public event-period information.
Additional to theoretical models researchers have conducted empirical studies on
the effects of news announcements on information. Krinsky and Lee (1996) provide
empirical evidence for Kim and Verrecchia (1994). They find that the adverse selec-
tion component of the spread increases around earnings announcements. They also
attribute this effect to temporary information advantages of informed investors and
information advantages of public information processors. Niessen (2007) researches
into the effect of media coverage on macroeconomic news processing in the futures
market on government bonds. Her paper provides evidence that there is macroeco-
nomic information processing prior to economic indicator releases induced through
media coverage. Higher pre-announcement media coverage increases investor at-
tention and leads to stronger post-announcement market reactions. Vega (2006)
studies how stock prices react to media coverage. She finds a connection between
media coverage and post-announcement stock price changes. The paper explains
a post-announcement drift with different information market participants receive.
In a recent paper, Evans and Lyons (2008) investigate the effect of macroeconomic
news on foreign exchange markets. They analyze a broad spectrum of macroeco-
nomic news and study the direct influence on prices through order flow. They find
that after the announcement of macro economic news there is more information
impounded into the market through order flow than during normal times. This
finding translates into higher adverse selection after macro news than normal and
is not consistent with the hypothesis that public information is directly impounded
into the market and directly causes price changes. The paper closest to our study
is Green (2004). He studies U.S. government bond trading around macroeconomic
news releases. The results show higher adverse selection costs around macroeco-
nomic news releases as a result of private information impounded through the
order flow. Andersen et al. (2007) analyze different futures markets with respect to
the release of macroeconomic information. They find quick significant responses
also in non-U.S. government bond futures markets. This finding indicates a quick
and thus efficient price discovery process.
There exists also literature on the effect of liquidity, volatility, and trading
intensity around pulic information releases in securites markets. Mitchell and
Mulherin (1994) study the effect of publicly reported information by Dow Jones on
securities market activity. They find positive relations between the number of news
stories and volume and volatility in equity markets. Fleming and Remolona (1999)
find a reduction in trading volume and sharp price reactions with higher volatility
after the publication of macroeconomic news in the U.S. Treasury market. In their
study the quoted spread increases around macroeconomic news announcements
and then slowly reverts to normal. They also find highly significant cross-market
linkages between trading venues in different countries. Hess et al. (2008) focus their
analysis on the liquidity provision around macrocenomic news announcements
in the German Bund Futures market. They measure liquidity supply through the
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quoted spread and volume at the best bid and ask. However, they lack order book
data to analyze liquidity at order book levels beyond the best bid and ask. In
their paper, they find that bid and ask volume decreases around macroeconomic
news announcements while the quoted spread increases. In another analysis of
liquidity in equity markets Lee et al. (1993) find lower liquidity around earnings
announcements.
2 Institutional Details
We analyze trading at Eurex1, a joint-venture of Deutsche Boerse AG and SIX Swiss
Exchange. Eurex is a pure derivatives exchange that offers a wide range of products
based on interest rates, equities, volatilities, and options, but for instance also
weather derivatives. Eurex is built as an electronic public limit order book. Most
products are matched based on price-time priority, only money market futures
are matched through pro rata matching. Orders are executed against quotes with
the best prices first. If prices of quotes are equal, orders are first executed against
quotes with a lower timestamp i.e. which have been in the book the longest. The
trading day at Eurex lasts typically from 7h30 a.m. to 10h00 p.m. CET (Central
European Time) depending on the product and consists of a pre-trading, trading,
and post-trading phase. Trading hours have changed several times between the
years 2000 and 2009. Since we only consider data between 1h00 p.m. and 4h00
p.m., which have always been within normal trading hours, those changes are not
relevant for our analysis. Normal trading refers to the continuous trading period
with price-time priority based matching in the public limit order book. Nowadays,
Eurex is based on a version of the Xetra system which features low exchange system
latencies in the magnitude of milliseconds.2
Euro-Bund Futures are fixed income derivatives on German federal bonds3. They
are based on bonds with a remaining term of 8.5 to 10.5 years and a coupon of 6%.
The standardized contract value is 100,000 Euros. A delivery obligation might be
met with German federal bonds with a minimum issue amount of 5bn Euros. The
minimum tick size is 0.01 percentage points (pts) which is equivalent to a value of 10
Euros. Bund Futures are traded with the delivery months March, June, September,
and December. Three Bund Futures trade at the same time, the futures with the
1 http://www.eurexchange.com.
2 Eurex features different order types. Market orders are directly executed whereas stop orders
create market orders when a pre-specified stop price is reached. Market orders contain no limit
price and both normal market orders and stop orders are not visible in the order book. Stop orders
are not available for options traded at Eurex. There are several flags to influence the behavior
of limit orders. Good-for-Day flagged orders are not persistent over night, Good-till-Cancelled
orders can stay in the order book up to one year, and Good-till-Date limit orders can stay in the
book until some pre-defined date. Immediate-or-Cancel limit orders are filled immediately. If
such an order cannot be filled, partly or completely, then the whole order or parts of the order are
cancelled. The executed part of an Immediate-or-Cancel limit order is essentially a marketable
limit order.
3 http://www.eurexchange.com/trading/products/INT/FIX/FGBL en.html.
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three nearest delivery months. We incorporate the future with the nearest delivery
month in our analysis.
3 Data
3.1 Unemployment Data
We retrieve U.S. unemployment data from the official data bases of the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics4. The relevant data are released monthly with the Employment
Situation Report, always at 8:30 a.m. ET (Eastern Time). The monthly release
analyzes the previous month’s employment situation, i.e. the report released in
October describes the employment situation in September. The United States
Department of Labor does not release employment information prior to the official
release date. The official report is accessible via Internet at exactly 8:30 a.m. ET,
the information is also disseminated through Reuters or Bloomberg systems. We
are interested in the exact date of a report release and check these data with the
Employment Situation Report. We also re-check the exact release times. The reports
are mostly released on Fridays. However, sometimes release dates deviate due to
public holidays. Depending on the year and differences in daylight savings time, U.S.
unemployment data is released at either 1h30 p.m., 2h30 p.m., or 3h30 p.m. CET.
3.2 Transaction Data
We use transaction and order data retrieved from the Reuters DataScope Tick
History archive through SIRCA5. The DataScope Tick History archive provides
trade and quote and order book data for a wide range of instruments for all major
exchanges worldwide.
We retrieve data for Euro-Bund Futures from 1st January 2000 to 30th June 2009.
Our analysis comprises the future with the closest maturity date. To construct a
time series we roll over to the next future on the last trading day of the current
future. We do not use the last trading day of a future since trading already ends at
12h30 p.m. CET on those days for this particular future. Through rolling over we
construct a time series that consists of thirty-nine different contracts over eight and
a half years. We retrieve both trade and quote and order book data for our analysis.
Trade and quote data includes price and volume for transactions as well as best bid
and best ask including associated volumes. Order book entries feature bid and ask
as well as associated volumes up to twenty levels into the order book. All trades,
quotes, and order book entries are timestamped to the millisecond. All prices are
reported in percentage points (pts) to a contract value of EUR 100,000.
4 http://www.bls.gov.
5 Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA), http://www.sirca.org.au, We thank
SIRCA for providing access to the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History archive.
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As explained in the previous section, U.S. unemployment data arrives in the
middle of the Eurex trading day. For each month we cut the daily transaction
data to thirty minute time intervals around that month’s unemployment news
announcement time. For example, if in February the unemployment numbers
arrive at 2h30 p.m. CET then only trade and quote and order book data from
2h00 p.m. to 3h00 p.m. are included in the time series for February. If in a month
the unemployment numbers arrive at 1h30 p.m. CET then data from 1h00 p.m. to
2h00 p.m. are included in that month’s time series. Such an approach minimizes
time-of-day effects and compares data from announcement days with appropriate
data from other days. We also exclude any non-continuous trading from the
transaction data time series. Altogether the final time series comprises 4,917,372
trades with an average price of 116.06 pts.
4 Research Design
4.1 Information
We measure information impounded through order flow with an extended MRR
model introduced by Madhavan et al. (1997). We extend the model in the spirit of
Green (2004) to include variables for different intervals around a macroeconomic
news event. The MRR model is a common market microstructure model to ap-
proximate the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, the information
revealed through trades. When informed traders trade, prices tend to follow their
trades which constitutes a risk for market participants that post limit orders. The
adverse selection component measures the part of the bid-ask spread that is required
as a compensation for liquidity suppliers risk of losing against informed traders.
Hence, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread can be interpreted
as private information that is impounded into prices through the order flow. The
MRR model estimates an adverse selection component and an inventory and order
processing cost component of the bid-ask spread.
The MRR model is only based on the trade process and analyzes transaction
price changes and their relation to the trade direction of orderflow. We use the
common Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign trades with contemporaneous
quotes as proposed by Bessembinder (2003).
Let xi be the trade direction, 1 for a market buy order and -1 for a market sell
order at time i and pi denotes the transaction price. Specifically, i denotes a single
observation in the trade process. Then the original Madhavan et al. (1997) model
formulates the following relation:
pi − pi−1 = (φ + θ)xi − (φ + ρθ)xi−1 + εi. (1)
Let ρ be the first-order autocorrelation, θ denotes the asymmetric information
component, and φ captures inventory and order processing costs. The fundamental
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concept to measure private information is that only the deviation from expected
order flow comprises information. Expected order flow ρxi−1 is based on order
flow autocorrelation ρ. θ measures “the degree of information asymmetry or the
so-called permanent impact of the order flow innovation” (Madhavan et al., 1997).
Beliefs about asset values might change through new public information without
trade or through information impounded by the order flow. The change in belief is
positively correlated with order flow innovation. Inventory and order processing
costs represent the transitory effect of order flow on prices. Bid and ask quotes
that reflect the inventory and order processing cost component are ex post rational
independent of the trade direction. Accordingly, φ is not dependent on the trade
process’ autocorrelation ρ. The MRR model assumes a fixed order size and does
not consider volume. Madhavan et al. (1997) address this issue and find that trade
direction is better suited to analyze their model than signed volume.
To analyze information around economic news events we extend the original
MRR model based on Green (2004). We introduce several dummy variables for
different intervals around an economic news event. Dummy variables allow to
distinguish ten minute intervals within thirty minute time periods before and after
an economic news event from observations not close to the economic news events
under consideration. A dummy variable takes 1 if the observation is within the
time period asigned to this variable and else 0. Let i denote single observations
in the trade process and n ∈ {1, . . . , 7} denotes the different intervals around
macroeconomic news where n = 1 indicates observations on non-announcement
days then Dn,i represents the dummy variable. Then the following model that
allows for changes in the bid-ask spread components around macroeconomic news
announcements emerges:




[(φn + θn)xiDn,i − (φn + ρnθn)xi−1Dn,i−1] + εi. (2)
Madhavan et al. (1997) use absolute price changes to estimate the model. To
support the interpretation of results we use relative price changes in basis points to
estimate equation 2. However, results are robust to using absolute or relative price
changes. The model is estimated using the generalized methods of moments (GMM)
with the Newey and West (1987) procedure as proposed in the original paper by
Madhavan et al. (1997). The Newey-West procedure is robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. Let ri denote the relative price change which is calculated as
ri = 10, 000× ln (pi/pi−1) then the model can be estimated as:




[−(φn + θn)xiDn,i + (φn + ρnθn)xi−1Dn,i−1] . (3)
using the following implied moment conditions that exactly identify the constant α
and the parameter vector β = (θn, φn, ρn) with n ∈ {1, ..., 7}:
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E

xixi−1D1,i−1 − (xi−1D1,i−1)2 ρ1
...
xixi−1D7,i−1 − (xi−1D7,i−1)2 ρ7
ui − α
(ui − α) xi−1D1,i−1
...
(ui − α) xi−1D7,i−1
(ui − α) xiD1,i
...
(ui − α) xiD7,i

= 0. (4)
Equations one to seven in the moment conditions represent the autocorrelation of
the trade direction indicator. Equations eight to twenty-two represent the ordinary
least square (OLS) normal conditions. Finally, the estimation of equation 3 gives
results for private information (θ), the inventory and order processing cost or cost
of supplying liquidity (φ), and the autocorrelation of order flow (ρ) for each single
interval.
To assess the model’s statistical significance we apply likelihood ratio tests as in
Green (2004). These tests compare the GMM criterion function of the unrestricted
model with restricted models. Since model implied spreads are solely based on the
order flow they do not necessarily need to be exactly the same as data based quoted
spreads. However, they should be roughly similar in their order of magnitude.
4.2 Trading Intensity and Liquidity
To measure trading intensity we calculate the number of trades per minute and
transform the trade point process into a process with one observation per minute.
For the dummy variable definition we resort to the MRR information model defi-
nition of dummy variables and use exactly the same. The no-announcement day
dummy variable does not need to be included, it is the basis of comparison and co-
efficients capture the difference to no-announcement days. Let l denote the minutes
in the data and tml denotes trades per minute then the following model is used to
assess trading intensity around economic news announcements.
tml = a + t1D1,l + t2D2,l + t3D3,l + t4D4,l + t5D5,l + t6D6,l + el. (5)
The intercept a captures the number of trades per minute when there is no news
announcement thus there is no dummy variable for those time periods. To estimate
equation 5 and all future time-series regressions we again use GMM with the
Newey-West procedure based on five lags.
Liquidity is measured based on three different measures: quoted half spread, the
volume at the best bid and ask, and the volume to depth level three to account for
more than just best bid and ask. All liquidity measures are based on a quote-to-
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quote process which in the case of depth also includes changes in the book away
from the best bid and ask. Let ai denote the best ask and bi the best bid at time i
then the quoted half spreads (qsi) based on Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) are






/2× 10, 000. (6)
Quoted spreads, however, only capture liquidity up to a small trade size at which
orders start to sweep the order book. To further analyze liquidity we consider
volume at the best bid and ask (depth0) and volume to depth level three (depth3)
based on order book data both measured in available volume in points of contract
prices. Let again be ai the best ask, bi the best bid, ani the number of futures
available at the ask, and bni the number of futures available at the bid then volume
at the best bid and ask (depth0) (evi) is calculated as
evi = bni × bi + ani × ai. (7)
For estimation purposes we use the natural logarithm of volume at the best bid and
ask (levi = ln evi). However, evi only provides information about volume directly at
the spread. Order book data allows to analyze available volume deeper in the book
and liquidity which is used and needed for larger trades. In combination with the
other liquidity measures, depth allows for a much more precise analysis of liquidity
than quoted spread alone. Let ai,dl be the ask at time i on depth level dl, bi,dl denotes
the bid on depth level dl, ani,dl is the number of futures available on a certain depth
level at the ask, and bni,dl denotes the number of futures at depth level dl on the









ani,dl × ai,dl. (8)
As for volume at the best bid and ask we apply the natural logarithm to depth for the
estmation (ldi = ln di). The model to estimate the impact on liquidity measures is
comparable to the one for trading intensity. The only difference is that the estimation
is based on the quote-to-quote process instead of minute data. Let i be the indicator
for a single observation and lmi the liquidity measure under consideration. Using
the same definition for dummy variables as for trading intensity, the following
model emerges:
lmi = a + m1D1,i + m2D2,i + m3D3,i + m4D4,i + m5D5,i + m6D6,i + ei. (9)
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5 Results and Interpretation
Table 1 provides results for the estimated MRR model around macroeconomic news
announcements. Statistical significance at the 1% level is indicated through an ’a’.
The table shows the estimated spread components for no-announcement periods
and ten minute intervals in the thirty minutes pre and post the release of U.S.
unemployment information. The adverse selection (θ) component is the component
of the spread that arises as a result of private information impounded into the
market through order flow and the order processing component (φ) represents other
costs of supplying liquidity independent the of trade process autocorrelation (ρ).
Compared to equity markets it strikes that adverse selection costs only make up
a minor part of the spread. However, this is consistent with the fact that private
information should be much lower for Bund Futures than for individual firms.
For no-announcement periods the estimation of the spread through the MRR
model adds up to 0.3208 basis points, the sum of the adverse selection and order
processing components. The no-announcement period average quoted spread
calculated from actual quotes is 0.450 basis points. The similarity of estimated
spreads and data based spreads indicates that the MRR model is well specified to
analyze Bund Futures trading. Table 1 shows that adverse selection costs increase
sharply prior to the release of U.S. unemployment information. Thirty to twenty
minutes before an announcement adverse selection costs are slightly higher with
0.0797 basis points compared to 0.0680 basis points in no news periods. Then
adverse selection costs sharply rise to 0.1597 and 0.1488 in the two ten minute
intervals prior to the announcement. In both periods adverse selection costs rise
by almost 100% in comparison to normal periods. Directly after an announcement,
adverse selection is slightly higher with 0.0761 than normal and seems to slowly
revert to normal with 0.0724 basis points during the last ten minute interval.
Although the theoretical models of Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994, 1997) operate
under some assumptions, they qualitively fit our empirical observations. Economic
news releases are similar in nature to earnings announcements. Both forms of
news are scheduled and there should not be prior information leakage. Prior to
announcements traders who try to trade in advance of public unemployment
numbers collect private information. Costly private information gathering as
introduced in the Kim and Verrechia models could be the analysis of existing U.S.
job market data. As introduced by Kim and Verrecchia prior information gathering
is costly and requires benefits from trading in advance of public information. After
the announcement there seems to be a period where traders substantially differ
in their information processing capabilities and in their evaluation of the U.S.
unemployment information. Our results are also consistent with empirical papers
(cf. Krinsky and Lee (1996), Niessen (2007), Evans and Lyons (2008), Green (2004)).
For further analysis we need to look at trading intensity, liquidity and their relation
to information.
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Spread Components
Time Interval Adverse Selection Order Processing Autocorrelation
θn φn ρn
No econ news (n = 1)
Coefficient 0.0680a 0.2528a 0.4375a
t-Value (315.36) (920.44) (865.61)
30− 20 min. before news (n = 2)
Coefficient 0.0797a 0.2284a 0.3716a
t-Value (25.40) (56.11) (48.67)
20− 10 min. before news (n = 3)
Coefficient 0.1597a 0.2434a 0.3229a
t-Value (21.40) (34.97) (52.07)
10− 0 min. before news (n = 4)
Coefficient 0.1488a 0.3061a 0.3856a
t-Value (57.18) (89.26) (139.23)
0− 10 min. after news (n = 5)
Coefficient 0.0761a 0.2581a 0.4300a
t-Value (44.52) (131.15) (118.32)
10− 20 min. after news (n = 6)
Coefficient 0.0784a 0.2325a 0.3695a
t-Value (23.64) (53.27) (43.79)
20− 30 min. after news (n = 7)
Coefficient 0.0724a 0.2563a 0.4360a
t-Value (42.15) (124.32) (110.68)
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Statistics Constraints
LR Test 1 θn
χ2-value 1168.40 θ1 = θ2, θ1 = θ3, θ1 = θ4,
p-value < .0001 θ1 = θ5, θ1 = θ6, θ1 = θ7
LR Test 2 θn
χ2-value 788.49 θ2 = θ3, θ2 = θ4,
p-value < .0001 θ2 = θ5, θ2 = θ6, θ2 = θ7
LR Test 1 φn
χ2-value 307.59 φ1 = φ2, φ1 = φ3, φ1 = φ4,
p-value < .0001 φ1 = φ5, φ1 = φ6, φ1 = φ7
LR Test 2 φn
χ2-value 287.05 φ2 = φ3, φ2 = φ4,
p-value < .0001 φ2 = φ5, φ2 = φ6, φ2 = φ7
LR Test 1 ρn
χ2-value 750.24 ρ1 = ρ2, ρ1 = ρ3, ρ1 = ρ4,
p-value < .0001 ρ1 = ρ5, ρ1 = ρ6, ρ1 = ρ7
LR Test 2 ρn
χ2-value 342.86 ρ2 = ρ3, ρ2 = ρ4,
p-value < .0001 ρ2 = ρ5, ρ2 = ρ6, ρ2 = ρ7
Table 1: MRR Model Results - Information
Table 1 also provides likelihood ratio tests that evaluate the model specification.
We test against two restricted models for each value in table 1: the adverse selection
cost component, the order processing cost component, and autocorrelation. The
first test (LR Test 1) restricts all coefficients such that they cannot vary around
announcements and the second (LR Test 2) restricts all coefficents such that they
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Time Interval QSpread Depth0 Depth3 Trades/Min Volume/Min
in bp in pts in pts in pts
Overall
Mean 0.450 118,055 502,958 33 180,487
StdDev 0.162 98,669 336,348 51 262,642
Min 0.396 207 1,380 0 0
Max 23.772 1,341,411 3,051,869 1,409 5,827,331
No econ news
Mean 0.447 119,083 507,433 32 173,319
StdDev 0.112 99,042 337,503 47 245,826
Min 0.396 207 1,380 0 0
Max 11.809 1,341,411 3,051,869 1,409 5,158,429
30− 20 min. bef. news
Mean 0.451 97,798 410,084 16 86,467
StdDev 0.087 80,739 247,123 14 82,985
Min 0.402 651 30,759 0 0
Max 1.894 717,104 1,261,966 104 574,729
20− 10 min. bef. news
Mean 0.455 89,642 369,317 19 99,333
StdDev 0.101 77,423 227,502 24 95,138
Min 0.402 1,137 15,497 0 0
Max 2.805 682,682 1,214,729 309 1,060,851
10− 0 min. bef. news
Mean 0.528 63,369 249,590 30 138,826
StdDev 0.509 61,991 168,857 34 141,710
Min 0.402 207 2,615 2 2,480
Max 12.717 704,625 1,080,292 403 2,576,476
0− 10 min. aft. news
Mean 0.570 87,115 377,989 154 790,748
StdDev 0.788 77,630 256,907 191 797,614
Min 0.401 232 1,422 14 37,841
Max 23.772 1,078,402 2,169,725 1,327 5,827,331
10− 20 min. aft. news
Mean 0.450 116,636 496,078 85 515,903
StdDev 0.102 101,908 326,314 80 425,816
Min 0.402 621 4,224 3 4,343
Max 2.817 955,580 2,073,491 474 3,602,379
20− 30 min. aft. news
Mean 0.446 118,260 522,255 73 434,784
StdDev 0.086 99,564 374,364 75 399,885
Min 0.402 831 7,552 2 4,899
Max 3.556 920,757 2,986,006 658 3,424,390
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Liquidity and Trading Intensity
cannot vary for different intervals around economic news announcements. The
smallest χ2-value among all measures is 287.05 which rejects the the LR test’s null
hypothesis of a restricted model that is better specified than the unrestricted with
a p-value of less than 0.0001. All coefficients in Table 1 show highly significant
t-statistics.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for liquidity and trading intensity. On
average the quoted spread (Qspread) is very low at 0.450 basis points with a vol-
ume at the spread (Depth0) of 118,055 and 502,958 at three tick size levels into
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the order book (Depth3). A price change of 0.01 represents a value of 10 Euros.
Quoted spread, Depth0, and Depth3 reveal a highly liquid market for Bund Futures.
The descriptives already indicate a decrease in liquidity prior to unemployment
announcements followed by still comparably low liquidity in the first ten minutes
after announcements. Then liquidity reverts to normal. Depth0 decreases from
97,798 thirty to twenty minutes before announcements to 63,369 in the ten minutes
directly before announcements. The same holds for Depth3 which decreases from
507,433 to 369,317. The quoted spread shows a slightly different pattern. It increases
prior to announcements but reaches its high in the ten minute post-announcement
period. In combination depth seems to recover directly after announcements but
the spread still widens.
Estimation results for quoted spread, the natural logarithm of Depth0, and the
natural logarithm of Depth3 are provided in Table 3. Coefficents for all, but the last
interval from twenty to thirty minutes after U.S. unemployment announcements,
are highly significant with robust t-statistics for non-intercept results between 5.12
and 127.02. The estimation supports the descriptive statistics: a sharp decrease in
depth around unemployment announcements with a low prior to announcements
and an increase in quoted spreads with a high after announcements. Especially
the ten minutes before and after the release of new unemployment numbers are
highly statistically signficant as well as economically significant with the largest
coefficients of all intervals. Figure 1 shows how Depth0 and Depth3 develop per
minute around news announcements. The graph clearly shows that Depth0 and
Depth3 reach their low shortly before the announcement and then increase back
to normal within thirty minutes. The reduction in liquidity is also consistent
with theoretical predictions (cf. Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994, 1997)) as well
as empirical analyses (Hess et al. (2008), Lee et al. (1993)). Table 3 also provides
likelihood tests with the restriction that measures cannot vary for different intervals
around U.S. unemployment number releases. The restricted models are all rejected
with p-values less than 0.0001. The minimum χ2-value of all liquidity measures is
as high as 1,651 for quoted spreads.
We also measure trading intensity around announcements. Descriptive statistics
are provided in Table 2 for trades per minute and volume per minute. The descrip-
tive statistics already indicate that the number of trades and traded volume are
significantly lower prior to announcements than normal and significantly higher in
post-announcement periods. The normal average number of trades is 32 and average
traded volume per minute without news periods is 173,319. In pre-announcement
periods, the number of trades per minute is only between 16 and 19 for the periods
form thirty minutes before to ten minutes before announcements. The respective
numbers for traded volume are 86,467 and 99,333 in comparison to 173,319 in
no-announcement periods. Then directly after the U.S. unemployment numbers are
released we see a dramatic increase in trading activity up to 154 trades per minute
in the first ten minutes after announcements and up to 790,748 traded volume. Even
after thirty minutes, trading activity does not revert to normal. The number of
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Trading Intensity and Liquidity
Time Interval Trades / Min Quoted ln Depth0 ln Depth3
Spread
No econ news
Intercept 32.14a 0.4471a 11.3526a 12.8935a
t-Value (129.70) (6,776.06) (16,185.30) (28,588.90)
30− 20 min. before news
Coefficient −15.84a 0.0040a −0.2078a −0.1910a
t-Value (-19.14) (6.00) (-20.12) (-31.24)
20− 10 min. before news
Coefficient −12.30a 0.0081a −0.2895a −0.2985a
t-Value (-9.72) (10.49) (-30.52) (-50.72)
10− 0 min. before news
Coefficient −1.43 0.0814a −0.6942a −0.7256a
t-Value (-0.82) (20.27) (-73.55) (-127.02)
0− 10 min. after news
Coefficient 122.20a 0.1229a −0.4099a −0.3433a
t-Value (11.78) (35.57) (-59.57) (-74.29)
10− 20 min. after news
Coefficient 53.45a 0.0025a −0.0509a −0.0412a
t-Value (10.75) (5.21) (-7.61) (-8.92)
20− 30 min. after news
Coefficient 41.22a −0.0008b −0.0108c 0.0028c
t-Value (9.19) (-2.03) (-1.65) (0.0993)
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Trades / Min Quoted ln Depth0 ln Depth3
Spread
χ2-value 467.02 1651.00 5014.50 12536.00
p-value < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001
Table 3: Trading Intensity and Liquidity Model Results
trades is with 73 per minute more than double the normal value of 32 per minute
and trading volume still is at 434,784 which is also more than double the normal
value of 173,319. Figure 1 depicts the number of trades on a minute-by-minute basis
around announcements. The graph shows a huge spike in trading activity directly
after announcements.
Table 3 also provides regression estimates for trades per minute around announce-
ments. The estimations confirm the picture painted by the descriptive statistics.
Prior to announcements the number of trades per minute is significantly lower.
Only the period ten minutes before announcements is not statistically significant
since it does not differ much from normal trading activity. However, coming from
a very low number of trades per minute we can see an immense and statistically
highly significant increase in trading activity after announcements. This increase is
still not back to normal levels thirty minutes after announcements.
The increase in trading activity fits the predictions of the Kim and Verrecchia
(1994) model. Traders with high information processing capabilities try to use
their advantage and trade on public information. Hess et al. (2008) also find an





























































Figure 1: Liquidity and trading intensity around macroeconomic news announcements:
The upper graph depicts Depth0 (dashed line) and Depth3 (continuous line) and the lower
graph shows trading intensity around announcements measured by the number of trades
per minute.
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increase in trading volume around the release of U.S. unemployment numbers and
Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) find a positive relation between news and volume in
equity markets. Fleming and Remolona (1999) find a reduction in trading around
macroeconomic news for the U.S. treasury market. They, however, do not study the
futures market but directly the underlying U.S. treasury market which has different
market characteristics.
Table 3 also provides likelihood ratio test for trading activity with the restriction
that measures cannot vary among different intervals around U.S. unemployment
number releases. The restricted model is rejected with p-values less than 0.0001.
The χ2-value is 467.02.
The individual results of information, liquidity, and trading intensity are con-
sistent with existing empirical evidence. However, what remains is the relation
between all three factors. Before U.S. unemployment numbers are released we find
low liquidity and low trading activity but much higher adverse selection costs, i.e.
more private information impounded through order flow than normal in the market.
Directly after announcements, liquidity slightly recovers until it reverts to normal
and trading activity dramatically increases and stays at a high level even thirty
minutes after announcements. Adverse selection, however, decreases from its pre
announcement high but is still a bit higher than during no-announcement periods.
What kind of trading behavior could explain such patterns? Only a few trader with
private information trade prior to announcements. Private information derived from
in-depth analysis and research is costly and gains from trading in advance of public
information need to be high enough to offset the costs of private information gath-
ering. However, such traders seem to see profits from pre-announcement trading
since they are not put off by low liquidity. As soon as U.S. unemployment numbers
are released we find a strong decrease in adverse selection which is consistent
with the fact that this information is now public information. However, adverse
selection is still slightly higher than normal. The results for trading activity indicate
a “race of public information processing”. Massive amounts of traders trade on
processed public information but bring considerably less private information into
the market than the pre-announcement traders. Overall the fast incorporation of
public information is an indication for efficient markets consistent with Andersen
et al. (2007).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the effect of the release of U.S. unemployment numbers
and its effect on information, liquidity, and trading activity in German Bund Futures.
We find that liquidity and trading activity is lower pre-announcement associated
with high adverse selection costs. Liquidity recovers and adverse selection stays
on a slightly higher level then normal within thirty minutes after announcements.
Trading activity drastically increases and stays on a high level during the first thirty
minutes after announcements. Our findings are consistent with existing empirical
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literature and the theoretical models of Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994, 1997).
Additionally, the results implicate a significant influence of U.S. unemployment
announcements on trading behavior in German Bund futures. The confirms the role
of these announcements as an important worldwide economic indicator.
Our results show that Eurex is a highly liquid and efficient market for Bund
Futures that incorporates public information fast. Private information arises through
varying information processing and gathering capabilities of market participants.
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Summary. We examine the introduction of the voluntary filing program of financial reports
using XBRL by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a quasi-natural experi-
ment to isolate the effects of an improvement in the information environment of program
participants. The voluntary SEC XBRL program, generally referred to as Interactive Data,
has allowed firms to file annual and quarterly reports using eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL). XBRL is a machine-readable Interactive Data format, designed to improve
the financial information environment of a firm and the accessibility of financial information.
We study the effects of this event of corporate disclosure on the cost of capital of participat-
ing companies and information intermediation of investors following and find statistically
significant results for medium-term cost of capital and for information intermediation.
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, developments in information technology (IT) have
facilitated information transparency and investment decisions. This change has
translated into easier access to management reporting data and corporate disclosure,
for example via the EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval)
system, for investors and regulators alike. In April of 2005, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the regulating authority in the US, introduced a
voluntary filing program (VFP) for the introduction of XBRL (eXtensible Business
Reporting Language), or ’Interactive Data’ as it is called in the US, designed to
make corporate reports more accessible and to reduce costs of data preparation
and analysis. XBRL is an innovative XML based format geared towards corporate
information disclosure, which has already gained international importance and has
been implemented in report management systems by market regulators of several
countries. In this paper, which is research in progress, we study how IT innovation
facilitates information intermediation and transparency. More specifically, this paper
investigates the market effects of the introduction of Interactive Data for companies
and investors, and also tries to find interest groups among participating companies
for the voluntary participation in this program.
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2 Hypothesis Development
For the analysis of market reactions, we extract two hypotheses from related litera-
ture of possible effects of voluntary disclosure: (1) reduced cost of equity capital,
and (2) increased information intermediation. The cost of equity capital hypothesis
states that companies increase their level of voluntary disclosure in order to reduce
adverse selection risks for investors, since investors then require lower returns to
offset the information risk they bear. This hypothesis is in line with empirical
evidence of Botosan (1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2001). Thus, we expect a long-
term effect of Interactive Data reflected in a significantly lower level of cumulative
abnormal returns as an indicator for lower cost of equity capital. This translates
into hypothesis H1:
H1: The introduction of Interactive Data should lead to decreased cost of equity
capital of participants.
Regarding information intermediation, Lang and Lundholm (1996) conjecture
that voluntary disclosure leads to reduced analysts’ costs of information acquisition.
As a consequence, the reduction of information acquisition costs ceteris paribus
leads to an increase in the number of analysts covering a specific stock. In our
analysis, the number of available EPS (earnings per share) estimates on a specific
stock serves as a proxy for the number of analysts. Therefore, this proxy is utilized
as an indicator for the conjecture that information intermediation is facilitated
through IT innovation. This reflected in hypothesis H2:
H2: The number of analysts following should increase with the introduction of
Interactive Data.
The SEC’s goal by adopting XBRL is to enhance information transparency and
to facilitate investors’ report analysis. Decision facilitation may be increased with
XBRL usage as investors can electronically download and analyze reports in a
standardized structure and format with pre-defined semantics and taxonomies
(dictionary of terms). They are able to use information directly from corporate
reports in software applications, which are able to “understand” and “interact” with
this data with little transformation and interpretation.
3 Data and Sample
We use market data from Compustat and Thomson Reuters Tick History1. For
the identification of the participating companies, we use the report data from
the 163 participating companies between April 4, 2005 and March 23, 2009 from
the SEC website2. We exclude companies, like trust funds and ADRs (American
1 We thank SIRCA for providing access to the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History
2 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/filings-and-feeds.shtml
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Panel A: Sample Creation Procedure
Sample Change Number of Companies
92
Panel B: Industry Groups
Industry Group Industry Group ID Number of Companies
Total Number of Companies 92
Panel C: Report Counts
Year Apr Mar Number of reports filed Number of first reports filed
Total Number of Reports 578
Table 1: Event Study Sample Distribution
depository receipts) since we are interested in effects of transparency proxied
through Interactive Data on normal stocks, as well as companies with recent mergers,
stock splits or other kinds of corporate actions (reverse splits, etc.) around their
first reporting with Interactive Data in order to exclude distorting effects in our
data. Our final data sample consists of 92 US companies, listed on NASDAQ and
NYSE, which filed their first XBRL report between March 2004 and April 2009. The
number of reports increased constantly, from 27 reports between April 4, 2005 and
March 2006 to 254 reports between April 2008 and March 23, 2009 (cf. Table 1).
From Compustat, we collect data for daily close prices in dollars (Close), daily
P/E (price/earnings) ratios (P/E) and daily market capitalization in millions of
dollars (Market), as well as daily trading volume (Volume) and volatility (Vola) as the
ratio of the current 10-day average of high-low price difference and the previous
one. Annual long-term debt is in millions of dollars (Debt), number annual common
shares outstanding (Share) in millions and annual book value of common equity in
millions of dollars (Book). The participating companies range from big companies
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Table 2: Company Descriptives
like General Electric and Microsoft to smaller companies like Bowne & Co. and
ICUI Medical, Inc. They belong to ten different industry groups, with Information
Technology, Energy, Financials and Industrials representing the largest group of
participating companies.
Additionally, we cluster our sample into groups. First, we include all sample
firms into our analysis. Second, we only analyze those industry groups which have
10 or more participating companies in the voluntary interactive data program. And
third, we analyze all companies that belong to industry groups with less than 10
participating companies. Panel B of Table 1 provides an overview of companies’
industry groups. The industry groups with 10 or more participating companies
comprise of Energy, Financials, Industrials, and Information Technology.
4 Methodology
4.1 Event Study
We use an event-study methodology as described in MacKinlay (1997). Event studies
are a commonly used instrument in finance literature to identify and measure the
impact of the announcement of new, value-changing information on stock returns.
We fit a market model to measure abnormal stock returns during the event windows
in order to test for differences in the distribution of abnormal returns. The null
hypothesis for these tests is that the event has no impact on the distribution of
returns.
We set the filing of the first Interactive Data report as Day 0 for each participating
company, and measure the OLS model coefficients during the estimation period
(day -211 to -11) in order to compute expected returns and thereby cost of equity
capital. The prediction errors during different event periods (day -10 to +2, day
-10 to +10, and day -10 to +30) can be interpreted as the abnormal returns during
these periods, i.e. the difference of realized and expected returns, more precisely
ARit = Rit − E[Rit|Xt]. The event windows are relatively short in order to avoid
other possible events that might influence stock prices. We further sum up daily
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to measure the aggregate effects of the event. As recommended in Patell (1976) and
in Boehmer et al. (1991), the analysis is based on robust standard test statistics to
measure the statistical significance of standardized CARs.
We use the market model in order to calculate expected returns and cost of
capital. We follow the standard event-study methodology, which compares the
difference of abnormal returns before and after the event.
The statistical market model is a basic model which “relates the return of any
security to the return of the market portfolio” defined as in FFJR (cf. Fama et al.,
1969):
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit (1)
with Rit and Rmt being the return in period t of security i and of the market portfolio
respectively.
4.2 Information Intermediation
In order to analyze the impact of XBRL on information intermediation, we use the
monthly number of EPS forecasts as a proxy for the number of analysts interested
in the specific company. We aggregate the number of all monthly estimates from
I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System) (NEst) and perform a panel
regression on this data by using a dummy variable before and after the introduction
of XBRL. Let m denote months and i the cross section, then the following panel
regression emerges
NEsti,m = αi + δXBRLi,m + εi,m (2)
We use robust standard errors by Arellano (1987).
5 Results and Interpretation
5.1 Cost of Capital
Our hypothesis that the SEC’s voluntary filing program decreases the cost of capital
is derived from literature. Again, we cluster our results by industry groups. We
analyze the largest industry groups participating in the VFP, which are Information
Technology, Energy, Industrials, and Financials, separately from the rest. We assume
stronger motives for these industry groups to participate in the program and
therefore that the participation might have a stronger effect than on companies of
other industry groups.
For a window of 30 days, the event analysis reveals a significant impact for
the ITEFI group. For this subsection, we obtain negative coefficients, which are
significant at the 5% level. The results are robust against different estimation
periods. This provides support for hypothesis H1, i.e. a reduction in the cost of
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Days relative to XBRL Introduction
Figure 1: Impact of XBRL on CAR
capital through voluntary XBRL filing. However, the results are not significant for
the Non-ITEFI group, which leads to the conclusion that the largest participating
industry groups experience a stronger negative effect on their cost of capital than
other industry groups. Looking at the 2 day event window, we can observe that
firms do not show positive short term abnormal returns. We take the first filing with
XBRL as our event date since we do not have information on firms’ announcement
dates for their participation in the SEC’s voluntary XBRL filing program.
In future research, we have to further investigate the results for cost of capital with
other models and robustness checks so that we can draw more robust conclusions.
5.2 Information Intermediation
As shown in Table 3, we find an increase in analyst counts consistently over all
industry groups, which supports our hypothesis of an increase in information
intermediation through XBRL. However the p-value is below 5% for firms which do
not belong to the industry groups Energy, Information Technology, Financials, and
Industrials.
This is consistent with our expectation that the introduction of XBRL enables
more analysts to acquire information and therefore increases the supply of analysts
covering a stock. Filing through Interactive Data could have had two effects. First,
our hypothesis that it increases information intermediation. However, it could also
have reduced the number of analysts covering a specific stock since information is
more easily retrieved by investors themselves. Our results indicate that this has not
been the case and investors still seek analysts’ advice. Further analysis to support
the robustness of our results can be done by using newsreport counts and analyst
counts from other data sources.










Table 3: Results of Analysts Counts
6 Conclusion
The main focus of this paper was to investigate whether IT innovations can facilitate
information intermediation and transparency in markets. Participation in this
program qualifies as voluntary disclosure. In April 2009, the SEC made the program
compulsory and the program will be implemented through a staggered introduction
over three years. However, it is still unclear what the effects of reporting with
XBRL are on financial markets. We derive two hypotheses from existing literature.
Previous studies suggest that voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital
and increases information intermediation. The introduction of XBRL has turned
out to (H1) decrease costs of capital for the four largest participating industry
sectors and (H2) increase information intermediation of investors. Further, with
respect to the results of hypothesis H1, the analysis reveals that specific industry
groups have stronger incentives to participate on a voluntary basis and, therefore,
experience stronger market reactions, e.g. on their costs of capital. Our results so
far raise questions whether voluntary adaption has had other effects than those we
analyzed which might justify the decision of early voluntary adoption or whether
participation might even have been harmful for participating companies, considering
costs involved in early adoption. We preliminarily accept the increased information
intermediation hypothesis. Our results show an increase in analyst coverage after
reporting with XBRL through the SEC’s voluntary filing program, proxied by
I/B/E/S estimates counts. We will further use news reports counts as well as
other proxies to get more robust results. In conclusion, future research needs to
involve more robust checks on liquidity and information intermediation and a
deeper analysis of the effects on the cost of equity capital. Further studies might
also include an analysis of the mandatory introduction of Interactive Data by the
SEC.
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Summary. One of the most important news events in the European carbon market is the
yearly announcement of aggregated realized emissions for the previous year. Especially in
2006, this event attracted a lot of attention, when CO2 allowances lost about two thirds of
their value in consequence of a big permit surplus that became known. We use standard
event study methodology to analyze the impact of the yearly emissions announcement
event on CO2 prices for the years 2006 to 2010. We find that the surprise effect caused
by this event has considerably declined over the years. Furthermore, the market seems
to incorporate information conveyed by such events efficiently and we cannot find clear
evidence of prior information leakage. We additionally observe that futures maturing in
the same trading period show almost the same reaction to these events according to the
cost-of-carry-relationship.
1 Introduction
In January 2005, the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was
introduced, and along with it, a market for tradable permits began to evolve.
Since then, European CO2 prices have gone through turbulent phases. The most
spectacular price movements occurred in 2006 when permits of the first trading
period lost about two thirds of their value in less than three weeks. This collapse was
mainly caused by the yearly emissions announcement of the European Commission,
which stated that aggregated emissions for 2005 were far below the number of
allowances allocated for that year. Surprisingly, the collapse already took place
more than two weeks before the official announcement date, scheduled for May
15, and it became known later that this was due to an accidental publication of
preliminary emissions data on the European Commission’s website.
Due to these occurrences, the yearly emissions announcement event has attracted
the attention of traders as well as researchers. However, there is only sparse literature
on this topic. Conrad et al. (2009) analyze the market response to decisions on
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National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) also focus
on NAP events, but take into account the influence of the emissions announcements
in 2006 and 2007. Referring to only two events of that type, they are not able to
discuss the price impact of these events in detail. Additionally, they take May 15 as
the 2006 event day which is inappropriate in our opinion and causes misleading
results for that event. Chevallier et al. (2009) analyze changes in investors’ risk
aversion around the 2006 announcement event.
Still, it is of interest to analyze the influence of this event in detail which is
supposed to be the main news event related to the European CO2 market. Based on
an available set of five events now, it is possible to gain first substantiated insights
into this topic. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to analyze the
influence of the yearly emissions announcement event on European CO2 prices in
detail. We use standard event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns and
volumes around the event date for the five events from 2006 to 2010. We find that
the surprise effect caused by this event, which has been clearly visually observable
in 2006, has considerably declined over the years. The market seems to incorporate
information conveyed by such events efficiently and we cannot find clear evidence
for information leakage prior to an announcement event. Furthermore, futures
maturing in the same trading period show almost the same reaction to such an
event according to the cost-of-carry-relationship.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the most
important regulatory rules of the EU ETS and discusses the impact of emissions an-
nouncement events on CO2 prices. Section 3 describes the emissions announcement
events. Section 4 derives our research design. Section 5 presents empirical results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 EU Emission Trading System and the Impact of Emissions
Announcements
2.1 EU Emission Trading System
In 2005, the EU ETS was launched in order to reduce CO2 emissions of the EU
member states. It was designed as a cap-and-trade system. The main advantage of
such a market mechanism compared to other measures is that it is supposed to give
companies an economic incentive to use the cheapest abatement opportunities of
the economy. The EU ETS is subdivided into different trading periods. First, a trial
period (Phase I) from 2005 to 2007 was introduced, followed by the current trading
period from 2008 to 2012. The next trading period will be from 2012 to 2020. At the
beginning of each trading period, the EU Commission allocates emission permits
to the regulated companies according to National Allocation Plans. Each permit,
called EU Allowance (EUA), allows for the emission of 1 ton CO2 during the year
the permit is allocated for.
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At the end of each year, companies have to cover their emissions by EUAs,
whereas additional emissions are penalized. The penalty has been 40 Euro per
ton in the trial period and is 100 Euro per ton in the current trading period. Still,
the payment of a penalty does not exempt a company from delivering lacking
allowances later. The compliance date for allowance delivery is April 30 of each year.
As the allocation of new permits takes place each year at the end of February and as
permits from different years within the same trading period are not distinguishable,
allowances allocated for the following year can in fact be used for compliance as well
(“borrowing”). Thus, borrowing within a trading period is implicitly allowed, but it
is not allowed between two different trading periods. The opposite of borrowing, i.e.
the usage of current allowances for the following year (“banking”), is allowed within
a trading period, again because permits of the same trading period are identical.
Contrary, banking has not been allowed between the trial period and the current
period because the trial period was intended to be separated from the following
trading periods. From this trading period on, banking is allowed between trading
periods as well. Since allowances can be banked and borrowed from one year to
another within a trading period, one can consider a whole trading period as one
market and penalties are in fact only paid at the end of a trading period.1
In addition to EUAs, standard EUA derivatives are traded on several exchanges
across Europe, most importantly futures contracts expiring in December of each year
with an underlying allowance of the same year.2 Currently, the futures with the latest
maturity date expire in December 2014. That means that there are futures expiring
in the next trading period, although the underlying allowances are not allocated
yet and thus are not tradable. The December futures contract next to maturity is
usually traded with higher liquidity than the EUAs themselves. Furthermore, there
are European-style options written on the different futures with maturity dates few
days before the underlying futures expire.
2.2 Influence of Emissions Announcements on Permit Prices
As emission permits are used to cover realized emissions and to avoid paying
penalties at the end of a trading period, the (expected) scarcity of permits heav-
ily depends on the expected overall emissions belonging to that trading period.
Therefore, this parameter is the main influencing factor of CO2 permit prices.3
The expected overall emissions for a specific trading period are made up of the
known realized emissions4 and the expected emissions up to the end of the trading
1 This simplification cannot be made if there is a significant probability that allowances allocated
for the current and the following year are completely needed to cover emissions of the current
year because borrowing from later years is not allowed. However, in realistic scenarios this is very
improbable.
2 Recently, futures with expiry in March, June, and September of each year are traded as well.
3 There are also other influencing factors that are not fixed, such as allowance allocations in the far
future or the amount of transferable allowances from connected trading systems, like the Clean
Development Mechanism.
4 Clearly, realized emissions are known once they have been published on an announcement event.
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period. If the whole trading period that is considered lies in the future, the realized
emissions part does not exist. An emissions announcement event, on the one hand,
has the effect that realized emissions are exactly known for one additional year,
but as it gives an indication about the current emission rate of the economy, it also
affects the expected emissions in the future. Let us distinguish between the first
part, which we will call information about realized emissions, and the second part, the
indication about future emissions.
A change of the information about realized emissions clearly affects the expected
allowance scarcity for the related trading period, which is the current trading
period unless we are in the first year of a new trading period. The indication
about future emissions may influence the expected emissions for the current and
all future trading periods. Precise effects depend on how these expectations evolve.
For example, if they show a mean-reverting behavior to a predefined trend, the
indication about future emissions will mainly affect the current trading period and
will have only little impact on a trading period in the far future.
Additionally, the allowance scarcity of one trading period might be forwarded
to the following period, depending on whether banking is allowed or not. When
banking is prohibited, as it was the case in the trial period, the amount of realized
emissions during the related period has an impact on the permit scarcity in all
following trading periods if the current market is short due to the obligation to
deliver lacking allowances later, but is irrelevant if the market is long. In contrast, if
banking is allowed, realized emissions always influence permit scarcity in following
trading periods, independent of the current market being long or short.
This means that both types of information conveyed by announcement events
should influence permit prices of all trading periods when banking is allowed, and
that should also be the case when banking is not allowed, but the market of the
related trading period is short. In these cases it is not possible to separate both
types of information from each other and to identify the dominant one. Contrary
to that, if the market of a trading period is known to be long and banking is not
allowed, the information about realized emissions should not affect permit prices of
the following trading periods, so that only the indication about future emissions
should have an impact on those prices.
3 Emissions Announcement Events
The available set of realized emissions announcement events consists of those
observed between 2006 and 2010 which we will call EA2006, EA2007, EA2008,
EA2009, and EA2010. An overview of these events and related data is shown in
Table 15. The first release of verified emissions data took place in 2006 and the
official announcement date was planned to be on May 15. However, as the European
5 We refer to data from the first official press release after an emissions announcement. In 2006,
this data includes emissions from Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak
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Table 1: Data related to emissions announcement events from 2006 to 2010: the event date,
the compliance year related to the announcement and the associated trading period, the
number of permits allocated for the compliance year (in millions) and the emissions realized
in that year (in million tons). Data source: EUROPA Press Releases (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010).





EA2006 Apr 25, 2006 2005 2005-2007 1,903 1,785
EA2007 Apr 2, 2007 2006 2005-2007 2,152 2,027
EA2008 Apr 2, 2008 2007 2005-2007 2,152 2,050
EA2009 Apr 1, 2009 2008 2008-2012 1,909 2,060
EA2010 Apr 1, 2010 2009 2008-2012 1,967 1,873
Commission confirmed later, some figures had been published accidentally on the
European Commission’s website. So already on April 25 it became known that
the emissions of the Czech Republic had been 15 % below the quotas and that
the emissions of the Netherlands had been 8 % lower than the quotas. Thus, we
take April 25 as the event date. Its impact cannot be clearly separated from the
information events on April 26, when realized emissions data from France, Estonia,
and Spain became public. Spain was the first country for which it became known
that emissions exceeded the quota. However, the news on April 25 and 26 clearly
indicated that the total 2005 emissions were considerably below the cap. Until May
12 the realized emissions of all other participating states became public, adding up
to a surplus of about 118 million tons of allowed CO2 emissions. Since banking was
allowed within the trading period from 2005 to 2007, and since emissions were not
expected to rise dramatically, the whole trading period was considered to be long
of allowances from that time on.
Accordingly, the announcement of realized 2006 emissions on April 2, 2007 was
of little importance for the trading period from 2005 to 2007. Contrary to that, it
was of interest in terms of providing an indication about future emissions for the
following trading period (2008 to 2012), for which most of the allocation plans had
been released up to this date, setting the cap much tighter for that trading period.
The realized 2006 emissions were about 125 million tons below the quotas.
The announcement of realized 2007 emissions on April 2, 2008 was of even less
importance for the first trading period (which the emissions were actually belonging
to), because it had terminated at the end of 2007. Hardly worth mentioning, realized
emissions in this year were about 102 million tons lower than the quotas.
On April 1, 2009, realized 2008 emissions data (i.e. belonging to the current
trading period from 2008 to 2012), was released. For the first time, it occurred
that realized emissions exceeded the quotas for one year. For this year, the market
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The 2007 and 2008 data additionally
covers Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Poland. In 2009, Malta and Romania are added, and in 2010,
Bulgaria, Liechtenstein, and Norway are included as well.
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was short by about 151 million tons. Comparing this figure to prior projections as
established by a Reuters poll shows that emissions were at the upper end of market
expectations.6
Realized 2009 emissions, published on April 1, 2010, were 94 million tons lower
than the quota, a consequence of the economic downturn. According to estimates of
the Reuters poll, this was expected by market participants, and in fact the emissions
were again higher than expected on average.7
4 Research Design
The magnitude of abnormal performance at the time of an emission announcement
event provides a measure of the unanticipated impact of this event. We derive
hypotheses concerning the behavior of EUA prices around announcement events
and apply event study methodology as mean of testing our hypotheses.
4.1 Hypotheses
Bearing in mind the dramatic drop of CO2 prices on April 25, 2006, when first
details of the realized 2005 emissions became known, it is reasonable to conjecture
that this event always causes a huge surprise effect. However, in the following years
a similarly big surprise was not observable, at least not by visual inspection. To
analyze possible surprise effects, we test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) Information regarding emissions of all regulated companies is com-
pletely priced into CO2 prices. The yearly announcement of realized emissions thus does not
cause a surprise effect.
The market crashed on April 25, 2006 although the official announcement date in
2006 was on May 15. As described before, in retrospect it is clear that there was
an obvious information leakage caused by the European Commission. Meanwhile,
the reporting process has been optimized, so that countries report to the European
Commission on March 31 and aggregated figures are published on April 1. Never-
theless, information leakages might still exist on the level of individual countries.
To discover possible information leakages, we test H2.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) The aggregated information about emissions can be kept confidential
by the European Commission and countries until the official announcement date. No
information will leak out on the days before the official announcement date.
The collapse on April 25, 2006 was followed by further big losses on the following
trading days. Again, in retrospect we know that these were caused by additional
6 Estimates ranged from 100 million tons long (Citi) to 180 million tons short (IDEACarbon), median
expectation at 30 million tons short. Biases may arise from divergences in the number of included
countries.
7 Excluding an out-dated estimate of UBS, figures ranged from 190 million tons long (Deutsche
Bank) to 60 million tons long (Nomisma Energia), median expectation at 150 million tons long.
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information about realized emissions leaking into the market. Anyhow, this price
behavior has as well attracted publicity, in this case with respect to market efficiency
as formulated in H3.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) The market reacts to new public information about realized emissions
without delay.
Finally, we have discussed in Section 2 that price reactions to an announcement
event should be mainly characterized by the trading period the permit belongs
to. Only permits of the current year are tradable, as stated before, but futures are
available for permits of other years as well. Prior literature, such as Uhrig-Homburg
and Wagner (2009) and Rittler (2009), lends support to the cost-of-carry-relationship
between futures belonging to the same trading period. Our hypothesis H4 is that
this relationship also holds on a daily basis around the news events considered.
Hypothesis 4 (H4) Futures belonging to the same trading period react to an announcement
event in line with each other.
4.2 Event Study Methodology
We will analyze our hypotheses by applying standard event study methodology.
Our study considers abnormal returns and volumes for a short horizon around
the events identified to provide evidence relevant for understanding the role of the
yearly emissions announcement event in the EU ETS. A general overview of event
study methodology can be found in Binder (1998).
To calculate abnormal returns we choose a mean-adjusted return model according
to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) as a benchmark model. Generally, it is also
possible to use market-adjusted returns as proposed in Fama et al. (1969) or certain
deviations based on other models (cf. Binder (1998)). As pointed out by Brown and
Warner (1980, 1985), the mean-adjusted model is very simple, but the use of more
sophisticated models often does not lead to a smaller variance of the abnormal
returns.
We apply the mean-adjusted return model to arithmetic daily returns rt. Given
an event at time 0, an estimation window Iest := [t1, t2] with t2 < 0 is chosen. The








Furthermore, we calculate abnormal (mean-adjusted) returns art in Iest and their
variance as
art = rt − r̂ (2)
and
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σ̂2(ar) =
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Based on r̂ and σ̂2(ar), we are able to determine standardized abnormal returns





To consider the cumulative abnormal return over a certain time window within the
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. (6)
We use a standard one-tailed t-test according to Brown and Warner (1980) with t2 −
t1 − 1 degrees of freedom to test the significance of the (cumulative) standardized
abnormal returns under the assumption that the abnormal returns are independent
and identically normally distributed. Departures from this assumption and potential
biases induced by non-normally distributed abnormal returns are not accounted for
in this study.
For the calculation of abnormal volumes, we apply the mean-adjusted model as
well. As established by Ajinkya and Jain (1989) and Mai and Tchemeni (1996), it
is recommendable to use the logarithm of the traded volume in monetary value8
rather than the untransformed volumes. Given these daily log-volumes, denoted
by vt, we simply reuse the calculation methodology for the abnormal returns by
replacing all rs by v.
To calculate abnormal returns and volumes of the data described in the next
section for the days around the announcement events EA2006, EA2007, EA2008,
EA2009, and EA2010, we choose an estimation window from 70 to eleven days
before each of the events.
4.3 Price and Volume Data
We use price and volume data of futures contracts instead of EUA spot data for two
reasons: First, futures are traded with higher liquidity than the EUAs themselves.
Second, at every point in time, futures are available for the permits of following
years, while the allowances are only traded for the current year (or trading period).
Our data set consists of daily EUA futures prices and volumes of all futures contracts
8 To this end, we multiply daily prices by daily volumes. Of course, use of tick-by-tick data would
be more accurate to determine the monetary value of trading volumes, but such approach should
not lead to markedly different results.
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with maturities reaching from December 2005 to December 2012 on all trading days
between April 22, 2005 and May 10, 2010. We use settlement prices from the
European Climate Exchange (ECX), London, which are determined under the ECX
settlement procedure that takes place every day from 4:50 to 5:00 p.m. local time.
In Figure 1, we can observe the price data visually. Most eye-catching is, as

























Figure 1: EUA futures prices from April 22, 2005 to May 10, 2010. Prices are settlement
prices determined under the ECX settlement procedure every day from 4:50 to 5:00 p.m.
local time.
described, the collapse of the futures prices belonging to the first trading period
around the emissions announcement in 2006. We also note that the group of
futures belonging to the second trading period strongly decoupled from the futures
belonging to the first trading period at that time, each group, however, trading at
similar prices due to the cost-of-carry-relationship. After that, the former group
recovered and rose up to a high of 29.33 Euros for the December 2008 contract in
July 2008, before the current financial crisis and the related economic downturn
caused another decline to a level between 12 and 16 Euros for the December 2010
contract. The EUA prices remained at that level until today. By visual inspection it
is not clear whether the announcement events after 2006 had a significant influence
on futures prices.
The volume figures of our data set are total traded volumes, which means that
they include screen trading as well as the exchange-for-physical facilities of the ECX.
Volume data is illustrated in Figure 2, where the ten trading days moving average
volumes in the different futures are shown in a “stacked” view, so that the volume
is accumulated. Firstly, it is observable that the total volume traded in EUA futures
has strongly increased from 2005 until today, although the exponentially-looking
increase has halted at the end of 2008. Recently, volumes have soared to a new
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Figure 2: Daily volumes (ten trading days moving average) in EUA futures from April 22,
2005 to May 10, 2010 shown in a “stacked” view, so that the volume is accumulated. Volume
data includes screen trading as well as the exchange-for-physical facilities of the ECX.
high. Moreover, we can see that the futures with maturity in December 2008 have
been the most liquid EUA futures since the end of 2006, when futures belonging
to the first trading period had totally lost their importance. In 2009, as expected,
the futures maturing in December 2009 have been traded with the highest liquidity,
superseded by the December 2010 futures in 2010.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Abnormal Returns and Volumes
Abnormal returns and volumes are stated for the three single days before the event
day, for the event day itself, and for the two single days after the event day as well
as cumulated from seven days before and seven days after (including the event
day) the event. Our results include the three futures next to maturity at each of the
events.
Table 2 shows abnormal returns and volumes around EA2006. It is clearly
observable that there are highly significant negative abnormal returns in the two
futures belonging to the first trading period on the event day and the following days.
The futures maturing in December 2008, which belong to the second trading period,
also show highly significant negative abnormal returns on these days, even though
a little less pronounced than the two futures belonging to the first trading period.
Looking at volumes, we observe highly significant positive abnormal volumes
in the futures maturing in December 2006 on those days as well. Contrary to
that, the December 2007 futures do not show any significant abnormal volumes,
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Table 2: Abnormal returns and volumes around EA2006 (∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ stand for significance at
the 10, 5, 1 per cent level).
days abnormal returns abnormal volumes
Dec06 Dec07 Dec08 Dec06 Dec07 Dec08
[−7;−1] −0.011 −0.011 +0.026 +1.734 +6.427 +4.353∗
−3 −0.020 −0.022 −0.046∗∗ +0.370 +1.013 +1.314∗
−2 −0.011 −0.011 −0.004 −0.304 −0.685 +0.622
−1 −0.000 +0.002 −0.007 +0.005 +0.719 −0.632
0 −0.089∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗ +1.186∗∗ +0.715 +0.015
+1 −0.266∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ +1.518∗∗∗ +0.856 +1.113
+2 −0.180∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ +1.514∗∗∗ +1.876 +1.952∗∗
[0;+6] −0.826∗∗∗ −0.813∗∗∗ −0.422∗∗∗ +3.233∗∗ +5.074 +4.785∗∗
suggesting that most trading takes place in the futures of each trading period next
to maturity. Accordingly, the December 2008 contract partially shows significant
positive abnormal volumes on the days around the event.
Table 3: Abnormal returns and volumes around EA2007 (∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ stand for significance at
the 10, 5, 1 per cent level).
days abnormal returns abnormal volumes
Dec07 Dec08 Dec09 Dec07 Dec08 Dec09
[−7;−1] +0.412∗∗ +0.071 +0.069 −7.926∗∗∗ +5.247∗∗∗ +27.155∗∗
−3 +0.178∗∗ +0.024 +0.022 −1.198∗ +0.583 +4.017
−2 +0.157∗∗ +0.010 +0.010 −0.314 +0.868∗∗ +4.833
−1 −0.013 +0.001 +0.002 −1.370∗ +0.473 +3.655
0 −0.190∗∗ −0.036 −0.035 +0.763 +0.935∗∗ +3.996
+1 −0.102 −0.055∗∗ −0.052∗ +0.025 +1.178∗∗ +3.863
+2 −0.031 +0.016 +0.015 −0.921 +1.009∗∗ +3.114
[0;+6] −0.286 −0.014 −0.013 −19.993∗∗∗ +1.731 +12.833
Results for EA2007 are shown in Table 3. We see that the futures maturing in
December 2007 exhibit significant abnormal returns on most days prior to the event
and on the event day. Significant abnormal returns are all positive on the days
before the event and negative on the event day. Both of the other futures, which
belong to the second trading period, show (weakly) significant negative returns
on the day after the event. Regarding abnormal volumes, we observe an increased
trading volume around the event in the 2008 and 2009 futures, while volumes in
the December 2007 futures are very low in comparison to the estimation window.
Abnormal returns and volumes around EA2008 are stated in Table 4. Here, the
only clear observation is a significant positive abnormal return on the event day in
all futures considered, which all belong to the second trading period. Moreover,
there are weakly significant positive abnormal volumes around the event in the
December 2008 futures, especially on the event day.
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Table 4: Abnormal returns and volumes around EA2008 (∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ stand for significance at
the 10, 5, 1 per cent level).
days abnormal returns abnormal volumes
Dec08 Dec09 Dec10 Dec08 Dec09 Dec10
[−7;−1] +0.045 +0.045 +0.043 +1.944∗ +1.981 +6.130
−3 −0.022 −0.022 −0.022 −0.020 −0.560 −0.002
−2 +0.024 +0.023 +0.022 +0.154 +0.098 +0.869
−1 +0.011 +0.011 +0.012 +0.153 +0.280 +1.821
0 +0.040∗∗ +0.039∗∗ +0.038∗∗ +0.755∗ +0.472 +1.642
+1 +0.002 +0.004 +0.003 +0.528 +0.780 +2.387
+2 −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.003 +0.576 +1.204
[0;+6] +0.084∗ +0.084∗ +0.081∗ +3.024∗∗ +4.679 +6.848
Table 5: Abnormal returns and volumes around EA2009 (∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ stand for significance at
the 10, 5, 1 per cent level).
days abnormal returns abnormal volumes
Dec09 Dec10 Dec11 Dec09 Dec10 Dec11
[−7;−1] +0.064 +0.070 +0.066 +4.753∗∗ +10.088∗∗∗ +17.118∗
−3 +0.024 +0.023 +0.026 +0.539 +1.277 +1.811
−2 +0.003 +0.004 +0.003 +0.314 +1.183 +2.475
−1 +0.051 +0.048 +0.044 +0.654 +1.791 +3.177
0 +0.042 +0.037 +0.030 +1.024 +0.613 +2.418
+1 −0.004 −0.005 −0.008 +0.563 +1.068 +2.208
+2 +0.034 +0.035 +0.034 +0.854 +2.068∗ +2.956
[0;+6] +0.150 +0.140 +0.124 +4.613∗∗ +10.313∗∗∗ +16.280∗
Table 5 shows the results for EA2009. Here, we cannot observe any significant
abnormal returns within the event window. Only significantly positive abnormal
cumulative volumes can be observed around the event.
Table 6: Abnormal returns and volumes around EA2010 (∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ stand for significance at
the 10, 5, 1 per cent level).
days abnormal returns abnormal volumes
Dec10 Dec11 Dec12 Dec10 Dec11 Dec12
[−7;−1] −0.020 −0.016 −0.016 +0.878 −0.835 +0.411
−3 −0.011 −0.010 −0.009 +0.020 −0.341 +0.396
−2 +0.006 +0.005 +0.007 −0.013 +0.599 +0.509
−1 −0.000 +0.001 −0.001 +0.087 −0.294 +0.335
0 +0.021 +0.020 +0.020 +0.237 −0.299 +0.291
+1 +0.027 +0.027 +0.027 +0.714∗ +0.229 +0.745
+2 +0.007 +0.008 +0.009 +0.676 +0.626 +1.182∗
[0;+6] +0.069 +0.069 +0.071 +3.537∗∗∗ +2.466∗ +4.281∗∗
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The results for the last event of our set, EA2010, are stated in Table 6. As for
EA2009, there are no significant abnormal returns within the event window. Again,
partly significant positive abnormal volumes can be observed, but only after the
event in this case.
5.2 Interpretation
In light of these results, we can now have a closer look at the hypotheses formulated
in Section 4.1.
Hypothesis 1 says that the emissions announcement event does not cause a
surprise effect. We have observed highly significant abnormal returns for EA2006
and still significant abnormal returns attributed to EA2007 and EA2008, rejecting
H1. For EA2009 and EA2010, however, no significant abnormal returns around the
event day are observable. This is noteworthy especially for EA2010, where realized
2009 emissions were announced to be far below the quotas. One may conclude that
the surprise effect caused by this event has declined, which might be evidence for
an increased capability of the market to anticipate unpublished information about
realized emissions and the current emission rate of the economy. Nevertheless there
still are increased trading volumes in the relevant futures around the emissions
announcements suggesting higher trading activity induced by such an event. While
at EA2006 and EA2008, significant positive abnormal volumes roughly correspond
to significant abnormal returns on the event day or the days thereafter, at EA2009
and EA2010 mainly the cumulative abnormal volumes over the whole event window
are significant. This supports the thesis of the surprise effect caused by the event to
have declined.
As discussed in Section 2, in special cases, the allowance prices of different
trading periods should be affected by the new information in different ways. In our
sample, futures prices from different trading periods are only available for EA2006
and EA2007. Before EA2006, it was not clear that the market of the related trading
period had been long, so that the information about realized emissions and the
indication about future emissions cannot be separated from each other. On the other
hand, it was very clear before EA2007 that there was a huge surplus of allowances
belonging to the trial period, and banking into the following trading period was
not allowed. This means that, according to our theoretical considerations, abnormal
returns in the futures maturing in December 2008 and 2009 around EA2007 are
only caused by that share of the information that we call indication about future
emissions. As we see, this part can be sufficient to cause a surprise effect.
Hypothesis 2 states that there is no information leakage prior to an announce-
ment event and would be rejected by significant abnormal returns on the days
antedating such an event. It is quite obvious that there have been highly significant
abnormal returns at EA2006 before May 15 because of information leakages, but
these information leakages were obvious. Therefore, we choose April 25 as the event
day, as information started to leak on this day. Before that day, there are hardly
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any significant abnormal returns observable, so there does not seem to have been
any additional “hidden” information leakage. Considering EA2007, we observe
significant positive abnormal returns in the December 2007 futures prior to the event.
This could be construed as evidence for information leakage, but we think that there
are other reasons. Firstly, the first trading period market had already collapsed, and
the low prices should have attracted speculators previous to the event. Secondly,
there has been a significant abnormal return in the opposite direction on the event
day, which underpins the conjecture of speculators getting into the market before
the event and getting out of it afterwards. Thirdly, the futures belonging to the
second trading period do not show any evidence for information leakage, so that
it is quite unlikely that such leakage has occurred indeed. The same is valid for
EA2008, where no significant abnormal returns prior to the event are observable.
On EA2009 and EA2010, there are no abnormal returns at all. Altogether, we are
not able to substantiate information leakages previous to the announcement events.
In Hypothesis 3 we have formulated an immediate market reaction to the news
published, whereas significant abnormal returns on the days after the event would be
evidence to the contrary. On EA2006, such abnormal returns are clearly observable,
but again this event is special in that parts of the information were published on
every day from April 25 on. Therefore, these abnormal returns are supposed to
be a reaction to the new information becoming available. For EA2007, we do not
rely on the futures maturing in December 2007 for the reasons described before.
However, both of the other futures show significant negative abnormal returns one
day after the event day, which, further, are in the same direction as the abnormal
returns on the event day. One could take this as evidence for market-inefficiency,
which affected futures belonging to the following trading period. Contrary, for
EA2008, EA2009, and EA2010 there are no significant abnormal returns after the
event day. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that H3 holds true since the market
has achieved a more mature state.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 states a similar behavior of futures belonging to the same
trading period. We are able to provide support for this hypothesis by comparing the
related abnormal returns. Contrary to that, it is interesting to see that futures from
different trading periods may behave differently. For example, the abnormal returns
after EA2006 are obviously smaller for futures belonging to the second trading
period than they are for those belonging to the first trading period. Around EA2007,
the behavior of both types of futures differs even more as has been described
already. However, due to the small set of relevant events, we are not able to make
any statement about the different reaction of futures from different trading periods
to an announcement event.
6 Conclusion
The incidents related to the emissions announcement event in 2006 raised several
questions regarding the impact of such announcements on CO2 prices. We formulate
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these questions in form of hypotheses and analyze them by using standard event
study methodology. One finding is that this event has caused a surprise effect
in the years 2007 and 2008 which has, however, been much weaker than for the
announcement event in 2006. For the events in 2009 and 2010, no surprise effect
is observable. Additionally, we cannot find any evidence for information leakage
prior to an announcement event. Regarding market efficiency, the market seems
to be mature enough now to react immediately and without delay to these events.
Furthermore, futures maturing in the same trading period show almost the same
reaction to such an event.
Relating to the evolution of this still new market, our results can be interpreted in
a very positive way. It is good to see that prices seem to incorporate new information
coming from an emissions announcement efficiently. Even before the information is
published, the market seems to anticipate it more and more, so that the surprise
effect caused by such events has considerably declined. Since we do not detect any
information leakages on the days prior to the events, the surprise effect is supposed
to diminish due to a better capability of the market in anticipating information
about realized emissions and the current emission rate of the economy.
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Summary. Communication is often measured as events streams. Events are directed, dyadic
and time-stamped interactions. A model is introduced that allows to describe the occurence
of new events in a data stream dependent on actor activities and network structures. To
illustrate how the model and its estimation works, a straightforward example is given. Some
possible applications of the model are proposed.
1 Introduction
Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) are widely used to model structural
choices of actor in networks (Wasserman and Pattison (1996); Snijders et al. (2006);
Robins et al. (2007); Wang et al. (2009)). Given a static network, its estimates express
in how far the network structures that actors are connected with and embedded
in differ from some random graph. A similar estimation can be done for binary,
static networks that are measured at a small number of discrete points in time as
longitudinal data (see Snijders (2001, 2005)). Some new approaches (Butts (2008);
Brandes et al. (2009); Zenk and Stadtfeld (2010)) use event data instead. Events
are any kind of social, dyadic interaction and are related to certain types of ties
in social networks. However, when describing such an event stream with ERGMs,
the estimation of optimal parameters is a bit different from the longitudinal data
case: Firstly, the model assumes availability of full information, so no guesses about
unobserved tie changes have to be made. Secondly, the amount of data which has
to be processed is much bigger.
The goal of this paper is to introduce a generic model (that we call event-based
ERGM) and illustrate its estimation with some exemplary input data. This idea is
explained in several steps: Firstly, in section 2 the underlying event stream format
is introduced (subsection 2.1), after this some information about the observed
communication network is given (subsection 2.2), then it is explained how events
and time change the network (subsection 2.3) using update rules. Based on these
basic introductions, a Markov model framework is explained in section 3. A concrete
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two-parameter model and a related exemplary event stream are defined in section 4.
In section 5, the maximum likelihood function of the abstract model is introduced
and plotted for the example. The results of the exemplary estimation are provided
in secion 6. In section 7 possible applications of event based models are specified.
Finally, section 8 summarizes and gives an outlook on future work.
2 Data, Network and Updates
2.1 Event Stream
When analyzing the change in communication networks, the underlying data does
not need to be collected at discrete points in time by surveying the actors in a
network (as in longitudinal studies). Instead, computer mediated communication
data can be used. Dyadic communication interactions are in the following named
events. Events are defined as directed, dyadic, social interactions.
An event stream Ω is a chronologically ordered finite list of events
Ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ων, . . .). (1)
Events ων are defined as triplets
ων = (ων.sender, ων.recipient, ων.timestamp)
= (iν, jν, tν) (2)
where the first element is the sender of the event (the person who starts a phone
call), the second one the recipient and the third element the timestamp when the
event takes place. For each pair of events ων (ν is the index ∈ {1, . . . , |Ω|}), ωφ
holds
ν < φ⇒ tν ≤ tφ. (3)
The timestamps tν have values in R+. Sender and recipient are elements of the set
of actors A. The time between to subsequent events is named
δν = tν − tν−1. (4)
2.2 Network
The set of actors A and the communication intensities between them are represented
by the stream of events Ω. For each point in time t ∈ [t1, t|Ω|], the communication
intensities are represented by a directed, weighted communication network. It
is described with a graph X. The nodes of this network are all actors occuring
in the data stream as senders or recipients. Ties in this network represent recent
communication intensity.
X(t) = (xkl(t)), k, l ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}. (5)
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Figure 1: For very short time spans ε holds that the adjacency matrices X(t) are stable
is the adjacency matrix of the communication network at time t. It represents the
communication intensity ∈ R+ until time t between all actors k, l ∈ A. The elements
of this matrix are the weights of the directed communication ties.
The value of a directed tie from actor iν to jν is increased in the network, when
event ων takes place. In the time between two events, tie values decay. The network
update rules are introduced in section 2.3.
Of specific interest are the two graphs “just before” an event ων, and the graph
after the event triggered changes have been realized. These graphs are abbreviated
in the following way:
Xν = (xν;kl) := X(tν)
Xν̃ = (xν̃;kl) := X(tν − ε)
The elements of these adjacency matrices are named xν;kl, where k, l ∈ A are line
and column index of the matrix, and ν stands for the corresponding event. ε is a
very short time span so that generally holds
X(t) ≈ X(t + ε) (6)
if no events take place in the timespan ∈ [t− ε, t]. In very short time spans, the
network is stable, although tie values decay slowly. So, the network states Xν̃ and
Xν are assumed to be equal, except for an event triggered update of tie xiν jν . For
events at the same time holds that
tν = tν+1 ⇒ X(tν) = X(tν+1). (7)
Figure 1 shows a network with three nodes at four different point in time: The first
three networks represent a decay of tie values. Within the short time span tν − ε
to tν all ties are stable. Only one tie is updated (increased by 1) because event ων
takes place from the lower left to the upper right node.
2.3 Network Update Rules
The occurence of events is influenced by structures in the communication network
X. This communication network is changed if events take place and due to a time
decay. Informally, a communication event ων leads to the update of the network X.
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Figure 2: A process with four events. Senders of each event are marked as solid circles,
senders as dotted circles. The set of actors is A = {a, b, c}. The blackness of directed ties
represents its value. Tie values decay over time.
This is modelled by increasing the edge weight between iν and jν by 1 at tν. Since X
is a continuous time network, inactivity leads to an exponential decay of all edge
weights with a defined half-life.
In figure 2 this process is exemplarily sketched for five events Ω = {ω1, . . . ω5}
on a set of three actors A = {a, b, c}. This process starts with an empty network X0
without any ties. X1̃, . . . X5̃ are the state of the networks at the time of the event before
the communication tie has been updated (in tν − ε). Networks X1, . . . , X5 are the
network states after this network update. In the time spans in between (δ2, . . . , δ5),
the tie values decrease dependend on the length of the interval. Time span δ3, for
example, is the shortest one, except for δ4 which is zero as ω3 and ω4 take place
at the same time t3 = t4. Tie values are expressed by the blackness of the directed
ties between actors. Over time, new ties get lighter. Events in this example are
shown as triplets, like (i1, j2, t3) = (a, b, t1) in case of the first event ω1. Senders are
marked with a solid, empty circle, recipients of events as dotted, grey circles. The
time axis from left to right is continuous, while the indices ν of events ων are discrete.
The update triggered by events is defined as follows: If an event ων takes place,
the tie value from actor iν to jν is increased by 1. This transformation is described
by a function r(1) : X×Ω 7→ X:
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r(1)(Xν̃; iν, jν) = (xν;kl) =

xν̃;kl + 1 , if k = iν, l = jν
xν̃;kl + 1 , if ∃ωφ : k = iφ, l = jφ, tφ = tν
xν̃;kl , else
(8)
In the time between two events, tie values decrease with an exponential decay
function r(2) : X×R+ 7→ X. It weakens the ties of a graph, dependent on the time
span δν between the current and the previous event.
r(2)(Xν−1, δν; τ1
2





δν = tν − tν−1




Dyadic communication (like phone calls) within communication network structures
can be described with a stochastic model. Two decisions about interaction can be
modelled as a two-level decision process:
• Every actor has a personal activity rate that determines whether he starts an
interaction
• If an actor starts an interaction, the network structures embedding sender and po-
tential communication partners influence the choice of the actual communication
partner (recipient)
3.1 Actor activity rate
Informally, the probability for the first decision of an actor i (to become active) in a
time span [t, t + epsilon] is
P(i active in [t, t + ε]) (10)
where ε is a very short time span so that i is active zero or one time. The points in
time when actors start events are determined by a Poisson process with parameters
ρi for actor i ∈ A. This also means that the time δi between events that are started
by the same actor i is exponentially distributed with parameter ρi (Waldmann and
Stocker (2004)):
P(δi < δ; ρi) = 1− e−ρiδ (11)
is the probability that actor i starts at least one event in a time span δ. It is assumed
to be indendent of the decisions of any other actor to start events. Given a data
stream, this actor activity can easily be determined using a maximum likelihood
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(ML) estimation. However, this article focuses on the parameter estimation of the
second decision in the process about event recipients. So, the estimation of actor
rates is not discussed in more detail. More information on the ML estimation of
Poisson parameters can be found in Davison (2003)[p.].
3.2 The Choice of Recipients
The second decision of i is the choice of a communication partner (recipient). This
decision depends on the state of the communication network X(t + δi) at time
(t + δi) ∈ [t, t + ε]. From equation 6 follows that X(t + δi) ≈ X(t). Informally, the
probability that i contacts j at time span [t, t + ε] is then
P(i contacts j|X(t)). (12)
Since this decision is independent from the first as long as ε is very small and
the network has not been changed by other actors, the probability for a new
communication event between i to j in time span [t, t + ε] is then
P(i active in [t, t + ε])P(i contacts j|X(t)). (13)
The second decision about recipients depends on structures in subgraphs of X(t+
δi). How these structures are measured and evaluated in a non-linear regression
model is illustrated in the following.
3.3 Network Statistics
The choice of the recipient is based on network structures. For each possible event
recipient k ∈ A\{iν} of an event ων, statistics are measured of the subgraphs that
surround sender iν and all possible recipients.
The statistics are represented by a statistics matrix Sν ∈ R|Q|×|A|≥0 for each event
ων:
Sν = (sν;qk) =
 sν;11 . . . sν;1|A|... . . . ...
sν;|Q|1 . . . sν;|Q||A|





Q is the set of statistics of the local network embedding sender and recipient of
the event. The elements sν;qk of Sν include the q-th statistic for a possibly chosen
recipient k in event ων. The semicolon is used to avoid confusing the event index ν
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with the line and column indices q ∈ Q and k ∈ A. A vector sν;k includes all |Q|
statistics for the potential case that in event ων the sender iν had chosen actor k ∈ A
as recipient. The elements of matrix Sν are results of the evaluation of functions
fq : X × A× A 7→ R+ that are part of a function S(X, i) for any network state X














:= S(Xν̃, iν) (16)
Under the assumption that k was chosen as the recipient, a subgraph of the
potential network r(1)(Xν̃, iν, k) around sender iν and potential recipient k ∈ A is
analyzed. Typical examples for communication structures that have an effect on fu-
ture communication are repeated using of the same communication ties, reciprocal
or transitive communication.
The choice of the statistics set Q defines a concrete model. An examplary model
with two parameters is introduced in section 4.
3.4 Markov Model
This two-level decision process can be modelled as a Markov process (or continuous-
time Markov chain). The state of this process at time t is the state of the communi-
cation graph X(t). Poisson transitions can be defined for the occurence of events
with each possible sender-recipient combination (i, j) on this graph.
Given a communication data stream, activity of actors and the influence of
network structures on recipient choices can ex post be determined. The set of
measured structures defines the concrete model. The estimation of the weights
of the structures influencing the choice of recipients takes place in a non-linear
regression model. It belongs to the class of exponential random graph models. The
corresponding probability function for chosing a recipient jν over any other possible
recipient is:














p(jν; Sν, β) returns the probability that an event from actor iν to actor jν is
observed, given that iν started this event at all. The probability depends on the
network statistics in Sν and a vector β that weights statistics in the graph after a new
tie has been added. The constant c(Sν, β) makes sure that the function is a proper
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probability distribution by measuring the structures of any other possible recipient
decision. Reflexive events are not part of the constant, so sender iν is excluded from
the set of possible recipients.
For very short time spans δ at time t with X(t + δ) ≈ X(t) (see equation 6) holds
that the general tendency for certain events can be described with the following
Poisson parameter:
λ(i, j; X(t)) ≈ ρi p(j; S(X(t), i), β) (18)
This rate defines transitions in a Markov process and assumes that both decisions
in the process are independent. λ(i, j; X(t)) is a Poisson rate that indirectly defines
the probability of the occurence of a new tie from i to j in graph x within short time
spans. The subsequent sections focus on the second part of this Markov process rate
λ(i, j; X(t)), which is the probability p(j; Sν, β) that defines the choice of recipients.
In the following section, exemplary input data for the introduced model are given
and a simple dyadic model with two parameters is applied to it.
4 Example
To illustrate the above introduced model framework, a concrete dyadic model is
defined, which is later tested on a straightforward data stream with only three
events. This exemplary data stream is introduced first.
4.1 Exemplary Data Stream and Initial Network
An examplary event stream Ω with three events is observed:
Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} (19)
These events are defined as triplets like in equation 1. The list of exemplary
events can be found in talbe 1. In event ω1, for example, actor a4 sends an event to
actor a5 at time 0.
ων =
ν {iν ∈ A, jν ∈ A, tν}
1 a4 a5 0
2 a1 a2 100
3 a2 a1 200
Table 1: Event stream
This event stream is observed on a set of five actors:
Estimating Event-based Exponential Random Graph Models 87
A = {a1, . . . , a5}.
with an initial communication matrix X0, representing previous unknown com-
munication:
X0 = X1̃ =

0 2 6 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 2 0
0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 1 0
 (20)
Elements x1̃;kl represent the recent directed communication intensity from actor k
to l. Actor a1, for example, has recently communicated with actor a2 as the commu-
nication matrix returns an intensity of 2. Still, it is lower than the communication
intensity from actor a1 to a3 which is 6 at time t = 0. The diagonal elements are all
0 as there is no reflexive communiation.
4.2 Network Update Rules
The network is changed by the two update rules from section 2.3. Events increase
the ties between sender and recipient. In the time between events, there is a steady
exponential decay.
r(1) is defined by equation 8. Whenever an event ων between actors iν and jν
takes place, the directed tie from iν to jν is increased by 1.
Function r(2) is defined by equation 9 with a half life τ1
2
= 100 of 100 time units:
Xν̃ = r(2)(Xν−1, tν − tν−1, 100) (21)
A tie value of 2, for example, is decreased by 1 (50%) in a time span of length 100 if
no event takes place.
4.3 Network Statistics
In this example, we next consider a concrete model. It shall represent in how far
actors in this example tend to re-use existing ties and communicate reciprocally.
Therefore, the set of statistics is
Q = {re-using of existing ties, reciprocal communication}.
Note, that this model is a very simple one: In this case, communication choices
are only explained with dyadic structures. In more complex models other statistics
could be included that also measure multi-node structures or actor attributes. For
example, in communication networks often transitivity effects can be observed
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and therefore should be included in a more precise model that aims on explaining
communication choices.
For each event ων there are |A| − 1 potential recipients ∈ A\{iν}. For each of
them, there are two statistics based on the measured structures in the event statistics
matrix Sν (see equations 14 and 16). In case of the two given structures the matrix
looks as follows:
Sν = (sν;qk) (22)
sν;qk =
{
f1(r(1)(Xν̃, iν, k), iν, k) q = 1
f2(r(1)(Xν̃, iν, k), iν, k) q = 2
(23)
f1(X, i, k) = Xik − 1
f2(X, i, k) = min{Xik, Xki}
q ∈ Q
i, k ∈ A
Whether existing ties are tended to be re-used is measured by the value of the
used tie just before the event takes place. Whether people tend to communicate
reciprocally is measured with the weaker of the two in- and outgoing ties between
sender and recipient of the event.
The graphs X1̃ and X1 are shown in figure 3 from a global and an ego perspective.
The total graph has five actor nodes (indicated by framed numbers) and seven non-
zero communication relations. If actor a4 decides about the recipient based on the
given dyadic model, only the decisions to communicate with actors a3 and a5 are
influenced by dyadic statistics that are not zero. So, these dyadic structures are
plotted in a ego network with a4 as its center in subfigures 3(b) and 3(c).
The corresponding matrix S1 is shown in equation 24. In can be represented by
the statistics vectors s1;k for all actors k ∈ A.
S1 =
1 2 3 4 5︷ ︸︸ ︷(
0 0 1 0 2
0 0 2 0 1
)}


















Sender i1 = a4 choses actor a5 as recipient. So, the functions f1 and f2 in equation
23 return statistics 2 (re-using of existing ties) and 1 (reciprocal communication).





. If a4 had chosen to communicate with a3 instead, he
had re-used a tie with value 1 and strengthened a dyad with minimum tie value of
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(a) Graph X0 = X1̃ (b) Ego network of a4
in X1̃ before ω1
(c) Ego network of a4
in X1 after chosing re-
cipient j1 = a5 in ω1
Figure 3: The graph X1̃, the relevant sub graph from an ego perspective of actor 4, and the
same ego network after event ω1
2 then. This explains the values in vector s1;3. All other statistic vectors are zero as
they do not measure any dyadic structures.
Because of the exponential decay with tie half-life 100, the tie values in graph
X2̃ and X3̃ before events ω2 and ω3 have halved compared to those of the previous
event. The time span between these events is 100, which is as long as the half-life of
the exponential decay. The corresponding communication networks are shown in
figures 4 and 5.
(a) Graph X2̃ (b) Ego network of a1 in X2̃ (c) Ego network of a1 in X2
Figure 4: The graph X2̃, the relevant sub graph from an ego perspective of actor 1, and the
same ego network after event ω2
The statistic matrices and vectors for the second and third decision about recipi-
ents are
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(a) Graph X3̃ (b) Ego network of a2 in X3̃ (c) Ego network of a2 in X3
Figure 5: The graph X3̃, the relevant sub graph from an ego perspective of actor 2, and the
same ego network of X3 after event ω3
S2 =
(
0 1 3 0 0






















0 0 0 0 0



















Based on the observed behavior in the exemplary event stream it can now be
figured out, which of the structures explain dynamic behavior in the data set
best. The resulting model represents which structures rather increase or decrease
communication choices compared to a random choice. This can be concluded from
the values in parameter vector β (see equation 17). The optimal estimators β̂ are
found at the maximum of the log likelihood of the observed event stream. In the
next section, this likelihood function is introduced generally and plotted for the
exemplary two-parameter model and the exemplary data stream.
5 Likelihood
If an event stream is described with a specific model, the unknown part of the
second decision is the vector of paramters β that explain whether certain structures
(in the example: re-using of existing ties and reciprocal communication) increase or
decrease the probability for the choice of recipients compared to random choice of
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recipients. The network statistics sν;qk can be interpreted as independent variables of
a non-linear regression model (see e.g. Myers et al. (2002)). The dependent variable
is the choice of a recipient that is described with the probability function in equation
17.
(a) likelihood L (equation 29) (b) log likelihood (equation 30)
Figure 6: Likelihood and log likelihood for different parameters β1 and β2 of the example
in section 4.
Assuming that all these decisions are independent, the total likelihood for the





p(jν; Sν, β). (29)
The fact that previous interaction changes the probability of current interaction is
assumed to be fully encoded in the underlying network structures. Apart from
this, all decisions are independent which follows from the Markov property of the
stochastic process. For the example in section 4, a plot of the likelihood dependent
on the chosen parameters β1 (weighting Re-using of existing ties) and β2 (Reciprocal
communication) is shown in figure 6(a). Clearly, there is an optimal maximum
solution for this case. But when estimating the optimum of a maximization problem,
it is very helpful to have a (strictly) concave function, so the likelihood function is
transformed with the natural logarithm:
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A plot of the log likelihood values dependend on parameters β is given in figure 6(b).
The maximum likelihood estimator β̂ can easily be found by applying a Newton
Raphson optimization algorithm.
6 Results of the Example
The estimation of the simple example in section 4 needs four iteration steps with a
Newton Raphson algorithm until the additional improvement of estimators is below
10−4. As can be seen in figure 6(a), the estimators are close to zero, the estimation
returned the results given in table 2.
β̂1 (s.e.) β̂2 (s.e.)
-0.7965 (0.886) -1.4692 (0.528)
Table 2: Estimation results of the example data in section 4
.
The estimator of β̂1 (Re-using of existing ties) is clearly not significant as the
standard error is bigger than the absolute value of the parameter. Therefore, it
should not be interpreted. Estimator β̂2 (Reciprocal communication), on the other
hand, is significantly negative with a lower standard error. If this effect is measured
as part of a sender-recipient-structure, the choice of the corresponding recipient is
less likely than chosing a recipient without this structure. Looking on the input
data in section 4 it is clear that in the first decision a low statistic for reciprocity
is chosen over a high one. However, this effect is weakend by the third decision,
where 1 is chosen over 0.5 and other zeros, but as the absolute value of this choice
is lower, the general tendency is negative. However, three events are not enough to
give any valid statements about communication behavior in a network.
When aligning the statistics values of the third decision to chosing 1.0 over
0.9 only, β̂2 has a even lower parameter value of −4.464(0.244). When observing
the third event twice, β̂1 gets also lower and then also rather significant value of
β̂1 = −1.7162(0.427).
7 Applications
Finding good parameter estimates for event-based exponential random graph mod-
els can be useful in many regards. Basically, the parameter vector β̂ gives an
evaluation of network structures that influence decisions about event recipients. The
model generally allows a closer look on decision making in networks. As networks
can be oberved in various forms and many fields, there is a broad range of possible
applications.
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In the context of electronic markets, estimated results may describe the environ-
ment in which agents in a market interact with others in a certain way. It can be
tested whether agents who know each other are likelier to trade.
In the context of information or knowledge management it can be tested whether
links between actors and certain entities (like knowledge bases) increase the likeli-
hood of information flow between actors.
In service value networks (SVN), some services are not compatible with others.
Events in this context are, for example, the emergence of new interfaces. The
introduced model could help to explain whether there are network effects that
increase the likelihood for such a product change when observing the SVN market
over time. Network effects may represent market concentration or competition
between service providers.
In the context of communication theory, the results may help to understand and
test sociological theories. Some examples are homophily theories, contagion theories
or dependency theories (see Monge and Contractor (2003)) in communication
environments.
8 Summary and Outlook
This article aimed on introducing event-based ERGMs, a model to describe choices
in communication event streams. The model was illustrated using a simple exam-
ple and the estimation process was briefly explained. The model can be used to
research decision making processes in different environments, some examples for
applications were given.
There are still some open, but interesting questions regarding the introduced
model. Firstly, a way has to be found to reduce the set of possible recipients
without violating statistical assumptions and features of the model. Secondly,
further research will focus on how graph dependencies between network structures
affect estimates. Also, estimation results may be influenced by general network
features like density or degree distributions. These questions will be addressed
using simulations. In further work it will be shown that the maximum log likelihood
function is concave and in most cases even strictly concave.
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Part II
Design of Market Mechanisms and Systems
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Summary. Many online service-oriented interactions rely on reputation systems to facilitate
trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. However in the absence of indepen-
dent verification authorities, feedback on interaction outcome could be manipulated. In this
work, we constructs a model, which 1) extends symmetric games like prisoner’s dilemma by
allowing players to elicit feedback; 2) rewards participants having high reputation with bonus
points. The better reputation a player has, compared to other players, the more bonuses
he could gain. In another word, participants have incentives to win higher reputation than
others and thus reputation itself turns to be a kind of competitive goods.
Our focus is to investigate what kind of impact has bonus mechanism on participants’
cooperation and feedback behavior. In this work we will analyze this game model to find
out, under which condition could such a bonus mechanism incentivize cooperation and
truthful feedback.
1 Introduction
With the proliferation of a broad range of services on the web like auction platform
(eBay, Amazon) or file-sharing (Freenet, Gnutella) or scientific distributed computing
(Seti@home, Folding@home), virtual social networks have attracted a lot of attention.
Since in many online service-oriented interactions, there are no explicit payments or
contracts for the shared service, a widely adopted method is reputation mechanism
(Bolton et al., 2007). Much existing literature has confirmed that the publicly
available reputation information is an incentive for participants to cooperate, even
with unknown interaction partners (D.Engelmann and U.Fischbacher, 2002; Nowak
and Sigmund, 1998; I.Seinen and A.Schram, 2006). However the premise of an
efficient reputation mechanism is that the reports about participants’ behavior in
the history are truthful (Jurca and Faltings, 2004).
However in most online communities this premise could not be hold, because in
the absence of independent verification authorities the true outcome of an interaction
can not be revealed. players’ behavior is reported by their co-players. It is difficult
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to distinguish whether a player is really uncooperative or he is defamed by his co-
player. A reputation system could be distorted by strategic reports. To describe this
phenomena, in this work we will extend symmetric games like prisoner’s dilemma
by allowing players to elicit feedback, which reports the interaction outcomes. In
such surrounding strategic participants could manipulate their submitted feedback.
Furthermore in Internet markets, market competition creates incentives that
arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of reputation systems. (Bolton
et al., 2007) have investigated how different forms of market competition and social
reputation networks interact in a series of laboratory online markets. The argument
is that information about reputation trumps pricing in the sense that traders usually
do not interact with someone with a bad reputation, not even for a substantial price
discount.
Based on this observation we argue that reputation has not only indirect influence
on pricing, but reputation itself is a kind of competitive goods. High reputation
yields a high payoff. For example, on a web portal for hotel reservation, the hotels
which have higher reputation, could have better ranking positions and thus attract
more tourists. We propose that participants having high reputation will be rewarded
by bonus points. The better reputation a player has, compared to other players, the
more bonuses he could gain. In another word, participants have incentives to win
higher reputation than others. Our focus is to investigate what kind of impact has
bonus mechanism on participants’ cooperation and feedback behavior.
Following we will introduce our model, which enables participants to elicit
feedback and participants gain bonus points dependent on their own reputations
and the distribution of global reputation. Based on this model, we construct two
games and draw analysis, under which condition could such a bonus mechanism
yield in equilibrium cooperation and truthful feedback. These two games differ
from each other in the available information, one offers no reputation information
and the other offers first-order information.
2 The Model
At the beginning of a round all M players will be randomly matched into pairs.
Two players in a pair have equal roles and make decision simultaneously. In the
first stage (service stage), players decide whether they want to provide service for
the opponent, to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). It costs a player c points for the
cooperation, while his opponent gains b (b > c > 0) points as profit; otherwise there
is no payoff for both. In the second stage (feedback stage), players submit feedback
on each other to report the opponents’ action. Such feedback in our setting is either
positive (1) or negative (0).
Furthermore players gain bonus points from the system as reward. We compute
a player’s bonus according to his reputation, which is dependent on the feedback
submitted in the current round. Player i receives feedback Fni ∈ {0, 1} at round n
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from his opponent. Hence his reputation at this round is Rni = F
n
i . The sum of all
players’ reputations in the n-th round is Rntotal = ∑i∈M R
n
i . At the end of round n,





i f Rntotal > 0
0 i f Rntotal = 0
(1)
Parameter g decides the value of assigned bonus. Equation 1 reflects two basic
principles for assigning bonus. First, the better reputation has a player, the more
bonuses he could gain. Second, the more outstanding is a player’s reputation
compared to those of other players, the more bonuses he could gain.
Since a negative feedback is a dominant strategy in the subgame of the feedback
stage, a rational player is expected to choose this action in the second stage. By
taking this prediction into account, a payoff maximizing player decides on playing D
on the first stage. Thus there exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
(D, 0), which is given by the strategy:” Choose D on the service stage, followed by
0 on the feedback stage, independently of the other player’s decision on the first
stage.”
Based on this analysis we see that players prefer to defect under the belief that
the opponent always submits negative feedback. However in the following we want
to analyze whether players could be incentivized to cooperate if players change this
belief through coordination.
The amount of information available is decisive for players’ strategies. Based on
this model we analyze games with two information conditions – no information and
first-order information. For no information players know nothing about his opponents’
behavior in the history. Thus their decision of cooperation or feedback depends
only on the action profile of himself and of his opponent in the current round.
For first-order information, the players know what kind of feedback their opponents
submitted and received in the last round.
3 The Game Without Reputation Information
At the decision, whether a player should cooperate in the service stage, he has not
only to estimate whether his opponent cooperates but also has to estimate what
kind of bonus he could gain. Since there is no reputation information available
and it is not possible to observe players’ behavior in the history, the estimated
feedback outcome is only dependent on the action profile from the service stage.
For Player i, we denote his expected bonus as Ei[Bonusi|(Ai, Aj)]. Here (Ai, Aj)
stands for the action profile of Player i and Player j in the service stage, (Ai, Aj) ∈
{(C, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, D)}. Furthermore, in a two-player game after each round,
it is valid that:
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Bonusi =

g Fi = 1, Fj = 0
1
2 g Fi = Fj = 1
0 Fi = 0
(2)
Hence Ei[Bonusi|(Ai, Aj)] ∈ {0, 12 g, g}. The payoff matrix of the game without
reputation information could be illustrated in Figure 1.
C D
C b− c + Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)], −c + Ei[Bonusi|(C, D)],b− c + Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)] b + Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)]
D b + Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)], Ei[Bonusi|(D, D)],−c + Ej[Bonusj|(D, C)] Ej[Bonusj|(D, D)]
Figure 1: Outcome of Game without Reputation Information
Observation 1 Incentives for (C, C)
For Player i, if following condition is fulfilled, defecting is strictly dominated by
cooperation: {
b− c + Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)] > b + Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)]
−c + Ei[Bonusi|(C, D)] > Ei[Bonusi|(D, D)]
(3)
In the similar way we know for Player j, if following condition is fulfilled, he always
prefers to cooperate rather to defect:{
b− c + Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)] > b + Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)]
−c + Ej[Bonusj|(D, C)] > Ej[Bonusj|(D, D)]
(4)
Now we can draw the condition, when (C, C) could be one of the dominant strategy
combinations. It is:{
Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)]− Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)] > c
Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)]− Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)] > c
(5)
If following condition is fulfilled, then (C, C) is a unique dominant strategy
combination: 
Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)]− Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)] > c
Ei[Bonusi|(C, D)]− Ei[Bonusi|(D, D)] > c
Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)]− Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)] > c
Ej[Bonusj|(D, C)]− Ej[Bonusj|(D, D)] > c
(6)
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Symmetric Believes on the Feedback Strategies
In this section, players of a single homogeneous population are involved anony-
mously and symmetrically. A two-player game is “symmetric” if each player has
the same set of actions and each player’s evaluation of an outcome depends only on
his action and that of his opponent, not on whether he is Player i or Player j. Player
i has the same expectation on the outcome (Ai, Aj), in which Player i’s action is Ai
and his opponent Player j’s action is Aj, as Player j expects on the outcome (Aj, Ai),
in which Player j’s action is Ai and his opponent’s action is Aj. In addition, in this
section we assume that two players have the same belief on the feedback strategy.
Observation 2 Incentives for (C, C) in a symmetric game with the same belief on feedback
strategy
Since both players have the same belief on the outcome of feedback stage, which
is only dependent on the action outcome of the first stage, it is valid that:
Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)] = Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)] and Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)] = Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)].
Further constraints on expected bonus are: 0 ≤ Ei[Bonusi|(Ai, Aj)]+Ej[Bonusj|(Ai, Aj)] ≤
g and Ei[Bonusi|(Ai, Aj)] ∈ {0, 12 g, g}. Back to Equation 5 we get the only possible
combination is:
Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)] = Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)] = 12 g and
Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)] = Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)] = 0 and g > 2c.
Lemma 1. Under the condition g > 2c, (C, C) is dominant in the first stage if through
coordination, players from a single homogeneous population could agree with following
perception on feedback strategies: both submit positive feedback if both cooperated and they
submit definitely negative feedback if his opponent defected and he himself cooperated.
Proof. From Observation 1 we know the condition for (C, C) as dominant ac-
tion profile in the first stage is Ei[Bonusi|(C, C)] = Ej[Bonusj|(C, C)] = 12 g and
Ei[Bonusi|(D, C)] = Ej[Bonusj|(C, D)] = 0. Thus we gain constraints on the possi-
ble submitted feedback, which leads to (C, C) as dominant action profile. Figure
2 shows the feedback submitted by Player i under different action profiles in the
service stage.
CC DC CD DD
i→ j 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
Figure 2: Possible Feedback Strategies leading to (C, C) as dominant action profile in the
first stage
The intuition behind above feedback strategies is: if both cooperated, both submit
positive feedback; if the player himself cooperated but his opponent defected, the
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opponent receives then negative feedback. The resulted Nash Equilibria of above
feedback strategies is either [(C, C)] or [(C, C), (D, D)]. Since the payoff for both
players under (D, D) is surely smaller than the payoff under (C, C), we could
assume that after coordination both players will agree to cooperate in the service
stage.
4 The Game with First-Order Information
Now we consider the game with first-order information, where players know what
kind of feedback their opponents submitted and received in the last round. In-
tuitively speaking, a player cooperates in the service stage in the hope that his
opponent also cooperates and he could gain positive feedback for a higher bonus.
But a player prefers to submit negative feedback to the opponent, so that his own
reputation could be more outstanding compared to those of others. Thus defaming
co-players by submitting negative feedback should be penalized.
Strategy Space
We assume that all players use uniformly the same Service Trigger (ST) strategy for
the service stage. A player cooperates if his opponent didn’t receive or submit any
negative feedback in the last round; otherwise he defects. This trigger strategy
penalizes not only the player who received negative feedback strictly, but also the
players who submitted negative feedback. Under this strict punishment players
may tend to avoid negative feedback by submitting untruthful positive feedback.
Therefore in this work we analyze the effect, in which three feedback strategies
interact with each other: honest players tell always truth, unconditioned positive
players submit always positive feedback and unconditioned negative players submit
always negative feedback. We notate these three feedback strategies as Truth, AllP
and AllN. We consider a large, well-mixed population. Among all M players, the
number of players of these three feedback strategies (Truth, AllP, AllN) are given by
r, s and t with r + s + t = M.
4.1 Cooperate or Defect
According to the ST strategy, a player cooperates only if the opponent is qualified
in the way that he didn’t receive or submit negative feedback in the last round. We
suppose at round n, there are ωn percent of the players who are qualitfied to win
cooperation, whereby 0 ≤ ωn ≤ 1.
Observation 3 Sum of all players’ reputations
If all players follow the prescribed service strategy, it means they cooperate with
probability of ωn at round n. Any player who meets a AllP player, gets always
positive feedback, while he always receives negative feedback if he meets a AllN
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player. Any player who meets a truth telling player, receives positive feedback if he
cooperated.















M ∗ 1) =
M−1
M ∗ (rωn + s).
Assumption 1 In a stable system, the probability that a player is qualified to win coopera-
tion stays unchanged.
Observation 4 Probability of qualified players ω = ωn−1 = ωn in a stable system
At the beginning of the game each player is qualified to win cooperation, so ω0 = 1.
A player is qualified for winning cooperation in the next round, if he receives and
submits positive feedback at the current round. He receives positive feedback if he
cooperates with a qualified opponent according to the prescribed service strategy





ωn−1. With the same probability he submits positive feedback: Probnsub = Prob
n
rec.
So the probability that a player is qualified for winning cooperation is ωn =




M ∗ ωn−1)2. According to Assumption 1 (ωn = ωn−1)




r = 0, ω = ( sM )
2, the probability that a player is qualified to win cooperation stays
unchanged.
Lemma 2. A rational player prefers to cooperate, if all other players follow ST strategy and
following condition is fulfilled: if r > 0,








Proof. We assume that each player believes that all other players follow the
subscribed service strategy. Now we want to discuss under which condition a
player prefers to cooperate.
If a player cooperates, it costs him c points and he could gain positive feedback
with the probability of 1− tM . According to Observation 3 his expected bonus





. He could be free from punishment by his next
opponent only if he receives and submits positive feedback in the current round. In
an infinitely repeated game with discount factor δ, his expected punishment in the
next round is bδ[1− (ω ∗ rM +
s
M ) ∗ (1−
t
M )]. His expected utility by cooperating is
therefore:
Uc = −c + g ∗
1− tM
M−1
M ∗ (rω + s)





) ∗ (1− t
M
)] (7)
If a player defects, he could save the cooperation cost but he could gain positive
feedback only when he meets a AllP player. His expected utility by defecting is:




M ∗ (rω + s)
− bδ[1− s
M






104 Jing Zhi Yue, Klemens Böhm, and Karl-Martin Ehrhart
If Uc > Ud, a player prefers to cooperate. So we gain following condition: if
r > 0,
g >
(M− 1)(rω + s)
r
[c− bδr(rω + s)
M2
], (9)





For long-run players, they have incentives to keep above condition fulfilled so
that there are still players, who are willing to cooperate. We see the relationship
between bonus parameter g and the number of Truth and AllP players decides
whether rational players prefer to cooperate.
4.2 Dynamic among Feedback Strategies
We consider the effects of three feedback strategies. With UTruth, UAllP and UAllN
we denote the expected utility by using these three strategies. Strategy with high
utility dominates.
Under the premise that all players follow the ST strategy, we could analyze when
is a feedback strategy more successful than another. For a truth telling player if he
meets another truth telling player, he could gain positive feedback if he cooperates.
And he could be free from punishment if both truth telling players cooperate. If
this truthful telling player meets a AllP player, he gains certainly positive feedback.
He will not be punished if his opponent cooperates and thus he submits positive
feedback. However if he meets a AllN player, he could never get positive feedback
and he will be surely punished in the next round. Therefore for a truth telling










− bδ(1−ω)]− bδ t
M
(10)
Two AllP players meet each other and both get certainly positive feedback and
will never be punished. But if he meets a truth telling player, he gets positive
feedback only when he cooperates. Similarly he gets also only negative feedback
and will be punished by his next opponent if he meets a AllN player. His utility






− bδ(1−ω)] + s− 1
M





A AllN player could never escape from punishment. In the similar way we could






− bδ) + s
M
∗ (g ∗ 1
Rtotal
− bδ)− bδ t− 1
M
(12)
By comparing the resulted utility of different feedback strategies, we could
see which strategy is more successful. From Lemma 2 we know rational players
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have incentives to keep opponents to cooperate. For a given bonus parameter
g, the number of Truth and AllP players decide, whether cooperation and truth







2M ), UTruth > UAllP and UTruth > UAllN is fulfilled, rational players will
choose to cooperate and to submit truthful feedback.
5 Conclusion
In this work we have constructed a model, which 1) extends symmetric games
like prisoner’s dilemma by allowing players to elicit feedback; 2) rewards partici-
pants having high reputation with bonus points. The better reputation a player has,
compared to other players, the more bonuses he could gain. In a game without repu-
tation information, a player estimates his received feedback based on the interaction
outcome in the service stage, i.e., whether the player himself and his opponent
cooperated. According to the analysis in section 3, we know if players play pure
strategies, the relationship between bonus parameter g and payoff parameter b and
c decides whether cooperation and truth feedback is dominant action combination.
In a game, where first-order information is available, we suppose players penalize
not only the players received negative feedback strictly, but also the players sub-
mitted negative feedback. In addition, we analyze how three possible feedback
strategies (telling truth, always positive feedback and always negative feedback)
interact with each other. For a given bonus parameter g, we have observed that
the number of Truth players and AllP players decide the outcome of the game. In a
stable system, where the number of players who are qualified to win cooperation
stays unchanged, players are motivated to keep the number of Truth players to fulfill
certain threshold so that there are still incentives for players to cooperate.
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Summary. The availability of functionality and information as Web services fosters the
dynamic cooperation of heterogeneous providers in form of service compositions. The
standardized interfaces of Web services enable unlimited options to combine services on a
technical level. In contrast there is also a business and economical view that may constrain
these possibilities. Service and data providers can restrict allowed usages of their resources
and link it to obligations, e.g. only non-commercial usage is allowed and requires an
attribution of the provider. Such terms and conditions are currently typically available in
natural language which makes verifying, if a composition is compliant with the policies
of the used services, a tedious task. In order to make it easier for users to adhere to these
usage policies, we propose to formalize them. This enables policy-aware tools that can
(semi-)automatically check compliance of service compositions. In this paper we analyze
the requirements for such a formalization, both from technical view as well as driven by the
actual usage restrictions of existing Web services. We propose design decisions for a formal
model and show how they fulfill the postulated requirements. Furthermore we outline legal
aspects of a system relying on formal usage policies.
1 Introduction
Modern information and communications technology (ICT) enables low-effort inte-
gration of services from different providers. This facilitates the dynamic formation
of service value networks (SVN), which are compositions of services created in order
to fulfill customer needs (Blau et al., 2009b). SVNs are not restricted to use only
services from a closed repository, but can foster service offers in open markets, that
pose low entry barriers for service providers due to the use of standardized Web
service interfaces. Due to changing customer needs and the steady (dis-)appearance
of providers and offered services, SVNs are continuously formed and transformed.
This can be automated, e.g. by an electronic auction market (Blau et al., 2009a) or
decentralized formation algorithms (Speiser et al., 2008). Such automation mecha-
nisms rely on formal descriptions of Web services. There exist several approaches
that describe the functionality of services as well as their quality attributes, e.g.
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WSMO (Roman et al., 2005) or OWL-S (W3C, 2004a). These approaches however do
not cover usage restrictions, which are relevant as not all services and their output
data can be freely used for every purpose. For example take a photo community
that provides pictures over a Web service interface. The service has the usage policy
that a payment of 1 Euro per call has to be paid and that the picture is displayed
with an attribution. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Formalized usage policies can be
used by a tool to automatically inform the Web service user which requirements his














Figure 1: Example for an application adhering to a usage policy
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the scope
for Web services and usage restrictions that are treated in this paper and motivate
why formalized usage policies are beneficial for Web service applications. Section 3
analyzes the requirements for a corresponding policy language. The analysis treats
two different perspectives. First, we analyze which technical properties are required
to support usage policies that are compatible to Web service design principles and
can be used effectively for service composition. Secondly, we define requirements
for the expressivity of the usage policy language, driven by the analysis of the
content of actual natural language terms and conditions of existing Web services.
We present a number of design decisions for the policy formalism in Section 4 and
explain how they support the postulated requirements. In Section 5 we outline legal
aspects that are relevant for a system based on formalized usage restrictions. Finally
we discuss related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Web Services and Usage Restrictions
Web services are broadly used for different tasks such as giving programmatic access
to Web applications, providing standardized interfaces for information sources, or
enabling the creation of lightweight mashup applications. Furthermore Web services
are the most commonly used technology to implement service-oriented architectures
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(SOA). Correspondingly there exist numerous definitions of Web services, that cover
a wide range of aspects. We do not rely on a narrow definition of Web services,
that dictates the adherence to specific standards (e.g. WSDL and SOAP). Instead we
accept that depending on the used architecture or application environment, different
technologies can be appropriate. We consider as Web services all components that
fulfill the following requirements:
• Self-contained: the functionality of the Web service is independent of other
services and can be used in different applications and processes.
• Interoperable: no or minimal integration effort is needed to access the service.
This is realized by communicating over an interface adhering to a standard Web
protocol (e.g. HTTP) and exchanging data represented in a (quasi-)standard
format (e.g. XML, JSON).
• Self-described: the Web service provides a description of its interface that
enables the correct invocation of the service by a client that fulfills the same
interoperability requirements.
• Loosely coupled: for the Web service, the only relevant property of a system
using it, is that it adheres to the published interface of the service.
This rather broad classification abstracts from technical details and includes, de-
pending on the used environment, also technologies like linked data or HTML
forms. For more detailed information on these requirements and more aspects, that
are not relevant in our context, we refer the reader to Erl (2007).
Descriptions of Web services are not only helpful for the invocation but also
for the selection of services. Users select services based on the net value they
expect from the service consumption (Ng, 2007, p. 23ff). The net value is given by
subtracting the costs from the experienced gross value. Both can only be determined
after consumption, as the actual service is only co-created at the time of consumption.
Therefore users have to rely on value estimations that are based on experience or
service descriptions.
Description of services that can be used for service selection have to be more
extensive than in the above definition of the requirement “self-described”. The
most obvious parts of a description influencing service selection are about the
functionality of the service and its price. However costs of a service have not to be
restricted to payments and value gained from the functionality can be influenced
by the non-functional properties (NFPs) of the service. NFPs cover a wide range of
issues, such as quality of service (QoS), limited liabilities, usage restrictions of the
service or its output data, privacy terms or obligations, e.g. to attribute the provider
of a used service in the corresponding application.
Service selection can be split into two operations: discovery and ranking. Dis-
covery filters from a set of services (e.g. retrieved from a repository or by crawling
the Internet) those that match the user’s request (Sycara et al., 2003). Ranking
sorts this list according to preferences given by the user, see e.g. Lamparter (2007).
Furthermore several services can be combined to form a service composition with
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combined functionality and properties that can be determined from the service
descriptions. Another desired operation is to check if the use of a service in a
composition is compliant with the restrictions and conditions stated in its NFP de-
scriptions. Validating a composition means checking if all service uses are compliant
and the desired functionality is achieved.
Performing these operations manually can be a cumbersome and time-consuming
task. This is in contrast to the principles of dynamic service selection and frequent
transformation of applications, business processes and service compositions, that are
propagated by popular Web service scenarios, such as SOA or mashups. Formalized
service descriptions help to perform discovery, ranking, composition and validation
(semi-)automatically. Current approaches to formal service descriptions mainly
concentrate on functionality and quality of service. These aspects are often sufficient
for service users to build running systems and therefore other properties such as
usage restrictions and obligations are easily ignored. We call these properties usage
terms and define them as follows:
The usage terms of a Web service restrict the invocation of the service and the utilization
of its output data based on the usage context, including purpose, time, location, identity
of the user, as well as structure and non-functional properties of the composition in which
the service or its output data is used. Furthermore the usage terms can optionally link
obligations, including attributions and payments, to the service or data usage.
In this paper we analyze the requirements for usage policies, i.e. the formalization
of usage terms, that can be used to consider them for (semi-)automatic discovery,
ranking, composition and validation. Our main goals are:
• Make it easier to adhere to usage terms than to break them. Tools can help the
user to build and check for compliance. However we do not want to enforce
usage policies technically, e.g. by using digital rights management (DRM). Such
approaches are based on cryptography and work only in trusted computing
environments. This contrasts our notion of open markets, where everybody can
participate. Furthermore DRM only allows predefined actions, which hinders
new and innovative data and service usages.
• Support providers to make their services and data broadly available in open
markets, without giving up their rights and commercial interests. This has both
advantages for users, who can access more services and for providers, who reach
a larger customer base.
Currently usage terms are defined in natural language documents, depending on
the relation between provider and user. This ranges from individually negotiated
contracts to terms and conditions published on the provider’s homepage. We are
especially interested in the latter case, where a provider offers his service under
certain conditions and the user can decide whether to accept or not. The reason for
this decision is that individual contracts are negotiated in a way that the desired
usage scenario is compliant to the contracts.
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3 Requirements for Formalizing Usage Policies
Web services are typically not directly invoked by end users but as part of applica-
tions. These applications provide the context in which the service and its output
data is used. The context can be of different types from simple user interface wrap-
pers, over dynamic Web pages and service compositions to business processes. The
context however is not only defined by the technical description of the application
but also includes aspects such as the purpose of the service invocation and the
intended usage context of the application. As an example for the last statement,
consider a Web service which provides confidential data that is displayed by a
dynamic Web page. This usage is only compliant, if the access to the Web page is
restricted in the same way as for the service.
The usage context regards the usage of a service and its output data as an isolated
event. Usage terms however can also regulate repeated service usages, e.g. impose a
limit on the number of service invocations per day, or obligate the user to pay a price
based on the total number of service usages. Repeated usage situations describe
multiple occurrences of usages, which can be of different types (e.g. commercial or
academic usage), as well as other actions, such as payments, that are not directly
linked to the application, respectively usage context in which a service or its output
data is used. We therefore split a usage policy in two parts:
• Usage context policy: a function mapping the set of all possible usage contexts to
a hierarchical set of usage types, e.g. compliant usage and non-compliant usage.
Compliant usage could have a possible subtype “compliant non-commercial
usage” of a specific service.
• Repeated usage situation policy: a function mapping the set of all repeated
usage situations, that can refer to the usage types as defined by the usage context
policy, to either compliant or non-compliant.
In order to support formalization we need models for usage contexts and repeated
service usages, as well as languages for specifying restrictions that form the policies.
Additionally we need algorithms that can process the models and languages. In the
following we present requirements that have to be fulfilled by the models, languages,
policies and algorithms in order to enable usage policy aware applications.
3.1 Technical Requirements
In this section we concentrate on aspects that are independent of the contents of
concrete usage policies but are required in order to build applications that support
both Web service consumers and providers to be policy compliant, respectively
specify policies.
Requirement 1: Interoperability
We defined above that interoperability is a required criterion for Web services, which
can be directly transferred as an requirement for usage policies of services. Web
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services are used in heterogeneous environments across technological boundaries.
We therefore require that policies are accessible over standard Web protocols (e.g.
HTTP) and can be serialized in a widely understood format (e.g. XML, JSON, RDF).
In order to avoid ambiguities, we require that the terms of the policies are uniquely
named by using URIs. Furthermore it is desirable that the meaning of usage
situation descriptions and policies are not dependent on a reference implementation
of used algorithms or the human interpretation of a textual specification. This
has to be achieved by basing models and policy languages on a formal logic with
well-defined semantics.
Requirement 2: Loose Coupling
The purpose of usage policies is to restrict the situations and applications in which
a service can be employed. This means that providers deliberately constrain the
reusability requirement of Web services. By referring to the usage context of a
service, however also the loose coupling property is violated as a form of collateral
damage. While this cannot be completely avoided, it is essential to keep the violation
at a minimum. This means that the usage model underlying the policies should
be general and abstract enough to support the wide range of possible technical
environments in which services could be used, e.g. BPEL processes, dynamic Web
pages or lightweight mashups.
Requirement 3: Computational Efficiency
We cannot make the used formalism arbitrarily powerful, as we have to keep it
decidable, so that automated reasoning about compliant usages and policy proper-
ties is possible. Furthermore, operations such as searching for a service with given
policy properties, can involve the evaluation of a large number of policies. Thus
we require that reasoning complexity for the policy formalism should be kept at a
level, which allows the efficient evaluation of realistic policies.
Supporting this point, we require that it is possible to directly specify properties
of usage situations, that cannot or only very costly be determined from the formal
model. An example for this includes determining whether a service is called for
academic purposes, which cannot be inferred from a technical description of an
application, but can be specified very easily by a human user.
Requirement 4: Usability for Web Service Consumer
Above we described a usage policy as a function that classifies a usage situation
as either compliant or non-compliant. This is not sufficient for service consumers,
who do not only want to know that their current application is non-compliant, but
also why this is the case (e.g. missing payment) and how they can fix this (e.g. add
a payment of 1 Euro). Thus we require our algorithms to include a justification
mechanism for their decisions. In principal, justifications can be embedded with
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little effort in reasoning algorithms for many logics by saving a history of logical
conclusions. However such bare-metal justifications are not easily understandable
for service consumers that cannot be expected to be logic specialists. Therefore it is
essential that justifications are given in a format that users can utilize.
Requirement 5: Usability for Web Service Provider
Not only the service consumers but also the service providers and policy specifiers
will be mostly non-logicians. Therefore it is important that providers are not
required to specify their policies directly as logic formulas. Instead they should be
able to reuse building blocks which they can configure for their specific offer.
3.2 Content Requirements
In this section we list a number of requirements that are motivated by the contents
of actual usage restrictions. Many different terms can be covered by the first content
requirement extendability, but it is followed by others that have to be structurally
present in the policy formalism.
Requirement 6: Extendability
Specifications of policies should be able to extend the used vocabulary, terms and
attributes. This is required because it cannot be assumed that a standard model
can be built that covers all desired aspects of all service providers on the Web. This
should include possibilities to define new attributes of operations, e.g. a restriction
about the minimal or maximal size which has to be used to display output data of a
service, this is required by YouTube1, respectively Google Maps2. Another example
is the inclusion of flexible authentication requirements. While for company internal
services it may be possible to use a centralized, identity-based system, it may be
more appropriate for a service provided between independent partners to rely on a
credential-based authentication scheme (see e.g. Agarwal and Sprick (2005)).
In the following we will discuss requirements that cannot be covered by intro-
ducing new operations and attributes.
Requirement 7: Restrictions on other Policies
Providers can also impose constraints on the policies of applications using their
services or data. This is mostly done to prevent third parties from making a
profit of cheap or free offers. Examples include the share-alike clause of Creative
Commons3, and the restriction of Google Maps that forbids that applications using
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non-commercial clause, which is also popular by Creative Commons users, even
though there is no general consensus what this clause exactly means4.
Requirement 8: Dependence on Invocation of other Services
In general Web services can be combined with other services in so-called composi-
tions. According to the Web service characteristics self-contained and interoperable
there is no restriction about which other services can be used, as long as they have
compatible inputs and outputs. However it is required that usage policies can spec-
ify that certain other services must or must not be composed with their described
service. Depending on the used composition model this property has to be checked
in different ways. For simple dynamic Web pages the composition model can be
seen as a set of services, where (non-)containment of (un)desired services has to
tested. Complex processes on the other hand require that branching conditions
are evaluated in order to determine if two services are always, respectively never
invoked together in a process instance.
Policy examples for this requirement include:
• A Web service requires that an external authentication service is successfully
called before each invocation.
• An image forbids that services with the purpose “advertisement” are used in
an application displaying the image. This is another partial interpretation of a
non-commercial clause.
• Amazon.com Product Advertising API5 can only be used for applications, whose
main purpose is generating sales of products and services on the Amazon site.
Requirement 9: Counting and Arithmetic Operations
This requirement concerns the language of repeated usage policies. Usage restric-
tions can contain quantifiers on the number of allowed invocations of services.
Furthermore counts of certain usage types have to be added, multiplied with cost
per call prices, compared to discount levels, etc. in order to calculate the total
amount that has to be payed for service usage in a specific time period.
Examples for this requirement are:
• Usage terms of Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3)6 that require a payment for
each package of thousand service calls.
• eBay API license agreement7 which imposes a limit on the number of calls that
users are allowed to make.
4 Creative Commons has commissioned a study about the understanding of commercial vs.
non-commercial use. An interim report can be found at:
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Requirement 10: Notion of Time
The previously introduced limits on the number of service calls as well as the
complex payment terms usually refer to a time period. Thus it is essential that the
repeated usage policy component is able to relate the occurrence of service usages
to time points and intervals.
Examples for time in usage terms are Amazon S3 that is paid monthly and eBay
which specifies call frequency limitations on a daily basis.
4 Concepts for a Formal Model
In this section we describe high level design decisions for our formal model for
usage policies. We base these decisions on the requirements analysis presented in
Section 3.
Decision 1: RDF Model of Usage Contexts
Applications using Web services can be treated as distributed computer programs
using message passing. A powerful model for such programs are process calculi.
Constraints on such models can be expressed by temporal logic formulas. Agarwal
(2007) employs these techniques for Web service discovery. For our purposes, we
however do not need this level of detail in modeling usage contexts. The only
requirement for expressiveness regarding the structure of a usage situation is (R8)
dependence on invocation of other services. To fulfill (R8), it is sufficient to have a usage
model that specifies if two service invocations are either (i) always executed in
combination, or (ii) can be executed in combination. Case (i) is relevant if another
service is required to be always executed whenever the regulated service is called.
Case (ii) can be used in a negated condition, in order to forbid other services to
be used in combination with the regulated service. We propose to model actions,
such as service invocations or payments as instances of corresponding classes of
an RDF(S) model (W3C, 2004b). Action instances are then linked with properties
representing cases (i) and (ii) above that are abstracted from the specific computing
model underlying a usage situation. Such a model has the following properties:
• Actions are not modeled with a fixed schema, but can be easily extended by
using standard RDF constructs, thus fulfilling (R6) extendability.
• Usage contexts are represented on a general and abstract level, that does not
have assumptions on the technology underlying a service usage. This fulfills
(R2) loose coupling.
• RDF(S) is a standard Web format, relying on URIs and providing formal seman-
tics, which supports fulfillment of (R1) interoperability.
• The usage of RDF(S) instead of a more expressive ontology language such as
OWL has the advantage that complex queries over the model have well-defined
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semantics and there exist efficient algorithms for query evaluation. This supports
(R3) computational efficiency. Queries are suitable for policy specification, as we
will discuss in the next paragraph.
Decision 2: Usage Context Policies using SPARQL Queries
We propose to construct policies using SPARQL queries (W3C, 2008) on usage
descriptions according to the RDF usage model. The queries can extract instances
that fulfill given properties, e.g. return all usage situations that invoke a specific
service. By combining several queries, we can reuse previous results to check further
properties, e.g. check for each usage situation, if the service invocation is always
executed in combination with a payment action. The two basic ways of combining
such queries are (i) for each result of query 1, evaluate query 2, and (ii) if query 1
has a result, proceed to query 2, else proceed to query 3. Such combinations lead to
directed graphs with queries as nodes and as leafs (nodes that are no queries and
have no outgoing edges) we allow the creation of statements that classify instances
retrieved by one of the queries as specific usage types. We will define a formal
semantics for these query trees and thus fulfill (R1) interoperability. By checking
all possible paths from the root of a query tree to its leafs, we can check (i) if a
certain condition is required for compliance in all paths, or (ii) if it is impossible to
reach compliance given a certain condition. These tests enable the fulfillment of (R7)
restrictions on other policies. In such a model it is also possible to reuse parametrized
queries provided by a third party in its own policies. This mechanism can be used
to provide standard building blocks, thus fulfilling (R5) usability for Web service
provider.
Decision 3: Foster User-given Query Groupings and Labels
As mentioned in (R4) usability for Web service consumers, we want to have decision
justifications that are valuable for a service consumer. Therefore we propose to foster
the groupings given by the specifier of the policy, when he splits his usage policy
into several SPARQL queries, as described above. We assume that he will typically
check a specific aspect in a single query, that the user can fix, if the evaluation fails.
An algorithm that regards the policy as a complete logical specification, has to work
with heuristics to determine which level of detail for explanations is useful for a
service consumer.
Additionally the policy creator has the possibility to label SPARQL queries,
using natural language strings with references to variables occurring in the current
and previously evaluated queries. These labels can give a high level and easily
understandable explanation, why the checked restriction was not fulfilled, and
possibly a hint, how it can be fixed.
A similar approach is taken by the policy language AIR (Kagal et al., 2008), but it
has currently no formal semantics, therefore violating (R1) interoperability and does
not support (R7) restrictions on other policies.
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Open Decision: Repeated Usage Situation Policies
Above we described, how we can split usage policies into a usage context part and a
part constraining the repeated usages of services. We have defined that the interface
between the two parts is a number of usage events with corresponding usage types
and point in time when they occurred. These usage events can also be generated
by an estimate in order to forecast the repeated usages, e.g. to know the price for
a planned service usage. Currently we have not yet decided on a formalism to
represent the aspects of usage policies concerning repeated usage situations. In the
following we list two possible approaches that can solve the task:
• Treat the event log as a linear trace of system behavior and define the repeated
usage situation policy as restrictions in temporal logics. The (R10) notion of time
can be introduced by creating artificial events representing relevant time points.
• Treat the event log as a set of data tuples, consisting of usage type and time
point. One could then filter events in a specific time frame and then use a query
language for counting the tuples and performing arithmetic operations, fulfilling
(R9) counting and arithmetic operations.
5 Legal Perspective
In this section we regard usage policies from a legal perspective, based on the
laws in Germany. The purpose of this section is to point to questions that have
to be considered, when formalized usage policies and policy-aware systems are
used. Note that it is neither possible nor intended to answer these questions in the
scope of this work. Rather we want to give an overview of laws and norms that
are relevant for the following questions: (i) what is the legal foundation for usage
policies?, (ii) do restrictions on the freedom of contract apply?, (iii) who is liable
in case of policy violations?, and (iv) are usage policies protected by intellectual
property right?
5.1 What is the legal foundation for usage policies?
Software in general is subject to the German Copyright Act (§69a UrhG) and thus
the creator holds the exclusive rights to exploit the software. For software that is
created within an employment, the employer is entitled to the exploitation rights
according to §69b UrhG. The rights holder can grant third parties rights to exploit
the software. This grant can be linked to obligations and usage restrictions. Web
service consumers however do not directly use the software providing the service’s
functionally, but only use its interface. The code implementing the interface is also
protected by copyright, but not the specification of the interface (Meyer, 2008, p.
55)(Gangadharan et al., 2008). It has therefore to be examined, if the copyright is
applicable as a legal foundation for specifying usage policies.
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Data that is obtained from a Web service, can be subject of copyright, if it is a
creative work, e.g. a photo. For output data that is no creative work, one has to
check, if it can be protected as a database, according to §§87a ff. UrhG. However it
has to be reviewed, if the result of a service call is considered as a marginal part of
a database, and thus not protected.
Copyright does not have to be registered by a creator, but is given automatically.
This means that without an explicit grant of the creator, one is not allowed to exploit
his works. Thus an usage policy in this case can be seen as an allowance of usages
that would otherwise be forbidden.
Similar is the situation with data that is related to individuals and thus is subject
of data protection laws (in Germany “Bundesdatenschutzgesetz”). This protection
is also automatically given and usage of such data requires the consent of the
concerned individual.
In case that data is not automatically protected, usage policies can be specified,
that forbid things that would otherwise be allowed. The foundation for such
policies depends on the data to protect. If data can be declared as a trade secret, it is
protected by §17 UWG, the German law against unfair competition. Usage policies
can in this case be seen as non-disclosure agreements.
Apart from legal foundations, the restriction of service and data usage can also
be based on social norms. This can be the case for usage inside a company, or
between private persons, e.g. a friend providing personal pictures to another friend
via a Web service, and forbidding him to share the pictures or give access to the
service to other people.
5.2 Do restrictions on the freedom of contract apply?
Usage policies are formalized contracts (or parts thereof) between a service provider
and a service user. In general both parties are free to form the contact as they like,
as long as it does not break any laws. However we can think of two sources for
restrictions on the freedom of contract, that are explained in the following.
First is the German Civil Code (“bürgerliches Gesetzbuch” BGB) and its regu-
lations on general terms and conditions. We assume that individually negotiated
contracts are only established if they allow the intended usage of the service user.
Thus formal usage policies are more useful in situations where they are offered to
all potential customer on a take-or-leave basis. In such cases it has to be checked if
the policy is considered as general terms and conditions (AGB). AGB are subject
to a content check according to §307 BGB and §§308 - 309, if the service user is a
consumer. The latter can be a blurry notion, if we consider the Web 2.0, where
individual users also often act as providers. A similar situation is given with online
auctions on eBay8, where private persons act both as seller and buyers. There have
been several judgments in Germany concerning the classification of individuals as
consumers or tradesman, that could possibly be relevant in a Web service scenario.
8 http://www.ebay.de
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Furthermore AGB have to be presented and pointed to in an appropriate way,
according to §305 BGB.
Second is §19 GWB (German Law Against Restraints on Competition), that
forbids the misuse of a market dominating position. The prohibition comprises
besides others arbitrary pricing and denial of service to other companies.
5.3 Who is liable in case of policy violations?
The obvious answer to this question would be the service user violating the policy.
However there may be other parties involved that can make mistakes, which lead to
an unintended policy violation by the user. The policy specifier for example can
be different from the service provider, e.g. a third party company that provides
formalized usage policies as added value services. Similarly the developer of the
policy engine can have errors in his software that leads to wrong classifications. In
case of mistakes by third parties that lead to policy violations, it is unclear if the
user can have recourse. Policy specifiers and engine vendors are certainly interested
how far they can rule out liabilities according to law and user acceptance.
5.4 Are usage policies protected by intellectual property right?
This question is important for a potential market for reusable policy clauses. A
policy clause can backed by a legal text, having the advantage that it can be checked
automatically and has a representation that is suitable for enforcing it through
a lawsuit. The creation of such clauses can cause great effort and can only be
conducted by lawyers, but can be reused in many situations by many people (cf.
the Creative Commons RDF representation (Abelson et al., 2008)). If the clauses can
be protected by intellectual property right, its creators can develop business models
based on the licensing of rights to use the clauses. If intellectual property rights
apply to a legal document does however not depend on the amount of effort that
went into its creation. Rather the decision is based on the level of creativity that
was required to produce the document. Legal documents have been classified as
scientific documents (e.g. in the judgment of the Oberlandesgericht München on
October 16th 2007, reference: 29 W 2325/07), for which other criteria of creativity
apply than for literature.
6 Related Work
O’Sullivan (2006) presents in his thesis an extensive taxonomy of non-functional
properties (NFPs) of services. His results are based on the analysis of classic
services and Web services from numerous domains. The taxonomy deals with
various categories of NFPs, such as availability, price, discounts and quality. Usage
policy related concepts that allow providers e.g. to forbid commercial usage of
their service are not considered. The taxonomy itself is not concerned with the
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specification of service policies but delivers a vocabulary for common aspects of
services.
The taxonomy of O’Sullivan was modeled as WSML ontologies and used to
represent NFPs in WSMO (Toma and Foxvog, 2006). Originally WSMO supported
annotations like creator or title adapted from Dublin Core to describe non-functional
properties of ontology elements. With the integration of the O’Sullivan NFP concepts
and the extension of WSMO models to include rule-based definitions of NFPs for
services, the approach is now able to describe expressive NFP offers in terms of the
defined ontologies. The proposed ontologies can serve as a formal vocabulary to
model restrictions in our approach.
Web service policy languages can be used to define quality guarantees and
also user requirements. For example WS-Policy can specify with assertions which
technologies users have to support, e.g. encryption (W3C, 2007). Assertions are
defined in different WS-* standards which cover technical domains but no usage
rights and restrictions. Furthermore the semantics of language constructs that
combine several assertions are not clearly specified and thus can lead to ambiguities.
Formalized usage policies exist for digital objects such as e-books and music
files. The RDF serialization of the Creative Commons licenses can be used for
automatic determination of associated rights (Abelson et al., 2008). This is used by
Google’s advanced search9, where users can specify their desired Creative Commons
license and only documents that were annotated correspondingly by their owner are
returned. However Creative Commons is mainly suitable for open contents, as the
licenses are generally addressed to the public and do not specify rights for single
users. Another point is that commercial usage can be allowed but no specific terms
(e.g. price) can be expressed. Thus the Creative Commons licenses, can be regarded
as a subset of our proposed usage policies. The standard building blocks of our
proposed approach are inspired by Creative Commons, and we plan to enable reuse
of their existing blocks.
In the area of digital rights management (DRM), there exist several rights expres-
sion languages (REL), e.g. ODRL (Iannella, 2002) and XrML (Wang et al., 2002).
These are XML based languages that allow more complex right specifications than
Creative Commons. In theory existing RELs would be a good basis for service
usage policies, however the mentioned RELs include language elements that go far
beyond rights expression. They handle encryption, media encodings, user authen-
tication and other domain-specific aspects. These are represented as syntactically
defined XML elements and a meaning has to be given in the corresponding standard
specifications (e.g. ODRL). Also they are lacking formal semantics which leads to
ambiguities in scenarios with heterogeneous providers.
This problem is also recognized by Jamkhedkar et al. who present a DRM
architecture that separates rights expression from other aspects (Jamkhedkar and
Heileman, 2009). They propose that there is a need for a core REL which is based on
9 http://www.google.com/advanced search
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a logical foundation (Jamkhedkar and Heileman, 2008). We share this thought and
have split the usage description model and the formalism for specifying policies. In
contrast to our work, Jamdkhedkar et al. do not consider usability and thus employ
a complex formalism that also prevents the specification of restrictions on other
policies.
Arnab and Hutchison (2007) present LiREL which is a formal REL. They show
what the difference to classical access control is and what the resulting requirements
for an REL are. LiREL focuses on the expression of rights and requires an external
standardized vocabulary for the definition of actions, constraints, etc. This is in
contrast to our planned solution which relies on extendable ontologies and ontology
mappings rather than trying to build a closed standard vocabulary that covers all
domains and has to be used by all providers and users.
Gangadharan et al. (2008) developed an ODRL profile for service licenses (ODRL-
S). As a service license they define regulations concerning the use of a service. This
is a similar concept to our proposed usage policies, however their approach defines
a static vocabulary of actions, including composition or attribution. This regulates
the general usage of the service but does not incorporate context information, e.g.
this means that generally composition can be forbidden but there is no way to
specify that composition is allowed with specific other services or providers. Also
the policy does not refer to the output data of services. The lack of clear semantics
is inherited from ODRL. The interpretation of licenses relies on information such as:
composition is a special case of derivation. This hierarchy is however not modeled
formally, so that it has to be implemented manually in every program that reasons
about service licenses.
The thesis of Lamparter (2007) presents a policy-based approach for service
offers, requests and contracts for Web service markets using ontologies to match
different provider vocabularies. The approach models functions ranging over non-
functional properties of Web services. The functions are used to compactly represent
policies that map configurations of NFPs to numerical values. Users specify their
valuation of configurations and providers their prices. The policies are then used to
find the optimal configuration with respect to the difference of user valuation and
price. Lamparter identifies the allowed use of information returned by services as a
relevant NFP. Our approach can be used as a NFP representation in Lamparter’s
approach and thus enabling a usage policy aware market mechanism.
Accountability in RDF (AIR) is a policy language based on RDF, extended with
formulas using quantified variables that can be used as conditions in nested if-
then-else rules (Kagal et al., 2008). It supports justifications based on user-given
labels, which inspired us to support them in our approach. In fact we evaluated
the possibility of using AIR as a general purpose policy language as foundation
for our approach and supplement it with usage models. However, currently the
semantics of the variables and the rules are not formally defined, and therefore the
interpretation of policies is dependent on its existing implementation. This violates
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the requirement interoperability and makes it unsuitable for extending the language
with features that we require, such as introducing restrictions on other policies.
The traditional access control model is the access control matrix, which specifies
whether a specific action on a specific object by a specific subject is allowed or not
(Lampson, 1971). Most access control approaches like role based access control do
not explicitly state the matrix but can be reduced to it. Park and Sandhu (2004) break
with this model and present the UCONABC approach for usage control which not
only regulates the access to resources but also their further usage (Park and Sandhu,
2002). Their model includes obligations on the user side and mutable subject
and object attributes that have influence on user rights after the initial access to a
resource was granted, e.g. an object can only be printed twice. Parker et al. observe
that DRM, privacy policies and access control are developed independently despite
their similarity and propose the UCONABC model as a theoretical foundation for
the mentioned wide range of application areas (Park and Sandhu, 2004). The model
has received broad attention, but views usage control from another perspective
as our approach. UCONABC regulates access requests and the following ongoing
usage at the time they occur. In contrast, our proposed solution is able to classify
descriptions of usage situations, that can be instantiated many times.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we motivated the need for formalized usage policies. We conducted an
extensive requirements analysis based both on technical aspects and on the usage
restrictions of existing services. The two overarching goals of formal usage policies
are: (i) being able to build tools that make it easier for users to adhere to usage
restrictions than to break them, and (ii) supporting providers to make their services
and data available in open markets, without having to fear that they give up all
their rights and commercial interests.
Based on the requirements analysis, we proposed conceptual decisions how the
usage policy formalism should be designed. We showed how the proposed solution
fulfills the requirements postulated before. Namely the decisions are: (i) develop
an RDF model of usage contexts, (ii) design policies as SPARQL queries on this
model, and (iii) foster user-given query groupings and labels for policy decision
justification. We also presented some initial ideas for the repeated usage situations
part of usage policies, but left the decision open for the future.
We gave an comprehensive overview of related works, and showed how they
differ from our approach and only partially fulfill our stated requirements.
Furthermore we outlined legal aspects of the proposed solution. We covered
questions about the legal foundation, possible legal restrictions on policies, liabilities,
and the protection of policy clauses by intellectual property rights.
As future work we plan to develop a usage policy language and engine, based
on the design decisions, proposed in this paper. Based thereon we will evaluate
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our approach by formalizing usage restrictions of existing Web services and testing
the usability of policy-aware tools. Thus we can check, if our two main goals are
reached, i.e. if service providers can express their interests adequately and if users
can adhere to usage restrictions more easily with the help of tools.
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1 Introduction
The Internet is considered to be one of the most important inventions in the history
of information technologies since the introduction of letterpress printing. Services
like E-Mail, file transfers, and the World Wide Web have become a part of everyday
life. Services traditionally provided by dedicated networks like cable television,
telephony, and radio are becoming more and more available via the Internet, through
new services such as VoIP, IPtv, and online radio.
Theoretically it is possible for any two devices to exchange information via the
Internet regardless of their current position. In order to enable all kinds of different
devices such as cell phones, laptops, or for example cars to communicate with each
other, some kind of protocol is needed. In the Internet several protocols define the
form of exchanged data, and regulate how this data is exchanged.
Historically a relatively small number of protocols emerged, with TCP (transmis-
sion control protocol) respectively UDP (user datagram protocol) and IP (internet
protocol) being the most prominent ones. Nearly all applications and services
offered via the Internet today are somehow based on these protocols.
Over time the need for several enhancements to this initially simple set of
protocols arose. Originally designed to connect stationary devices like desktop
PCs, we have to deal with mobility today. There are cell phones and other mobile
devices, which change their location and thereby their Internet access point. Another
example would be security in general. Security mechanisms are often just tacked
on instead of being properly integrated into today’s Internet protocol stack. Viruses,
worms, phishing, and spyware pose a serious threat for inexperienced Internet users
today and we experience a constant arms race between malware developers and
security solutions providers.
Many new applications, like social networks, online data storage accessible from
everywhere, or online gaming for instance, put further demands on the current
Internet architecture, which have become increasingly difficult to meet. This will
become even worse in the future. With scenarios like car-2-car communication or
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pervasive computing on the horizon, there will be all kinds of new devices with
online access.
2 Architectural Problems
Today we are facing a multitude of problems within the current Internet architecture,
some of which are described in Why the Internet only just works[Handley (2006)].
These stem mainly from the fact that the Internet core protocols have not significantly
changed since the early nineties. Many changes occurred on the physical layer,
considering the introduction of several new wireless standards in the field of mobile
devices for instance. Above that however it is basically all TCP/IP.
Some problems are more deeply rooted within the Internet architecture and its
core protocols.
2.1 Address space exhaustion
In today’s Internet a hosts network interface is reachable via an IPv4 address.
Every host participating in an IP-based network like the Internet, needs a unique
IP address in order to receive and send data packets from or to other hosts in
the network. Since the early 1990s it has become apparent, that the Internet will
eventually run out of IP addresses. This has been delayed by introducing Classless
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) in 1993 and the rise of network address translation
(NAT) later on. NAT is used to connect (private) subnetworks with the Internet, by
allowing the usage of several private IP addresses behind one public IP address.
This is achieved through rewriting the IP address information for incoming or
outgoing connections. Today NAT is considered to be rather harmful. It does not
solve the address space exhaustion problem but instead just conceals it. Despite all
efforts it is still assumed, that IPv4 addresses will run out in 2012.
With IPv6 on the horizon and IPv6 support in most major operating systems, this
problem might be solved in the near future. Yet widespread adoption of IPv6 is
still lacking. A study conducted by Google1 in 2008 concluded, that less than one
percent of the Internet’s hosts was reachable via IPv6. This is also a prime example
of how rigid the structure of today’s Internet is. IPv6 was first proposed in 1998
over 10 years ago, and thus took a long time to develop and establish. In general
it has become elaborate to change core parts of todays’s Internet, as most of our
infrastructure today is dependent on the Internet. Future network architectures
therefore should foster a flexible replacement of different components without
compromising the robustness of the Internet itself.
2.2 Mobility
Another problem is lacking support for mobile devices like laptops or mobile phones.
Due to their nature those devices are often used to access the Internet on the go via
1 http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-57/presentations/thursday.html
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wireless connections. Mobility refers to the fact that while communicating, a device
can migrate from the reception area of one wireless network to another. The same
applies for mobile phones, while moving through different radio cells. In such cases
the connection is normally lost for a short time and has to be re-established, often
accompanied by an IP address change. Today applications are mostly designed to
be delay and loss tolerant, to compensate for regular reconnects. On a connection
loss applications pretend to still be connected. Data to be sent is cached, while
re-establishing the connection in the background, so that the user does not notice
any unwanted behavior. With the possibility of support for VoIP and IPtv on mobile
devices, in the future a more transparent, and application independent way of
handling handovers is desirable.
2.3 ID/Locator split
Both of the aforementioned issues are part of an additional problem. Even with IPv6,
an IP address always specifies a location and at the same time serves as an unique
identifier. In today’s Internet this is sufficient, as most applications are designed
in a way that a specific resource is expected to be found at a specific location. In
the future however, it might be possible to address specific content directly. A
circumstance described by the lately coined term Content centric Networking2. In
such a scenario it is conceivable, that an actual resource like an online video or a
webpage, may be available on multiple host e.g. locations. Also one host may hold
many resources, which should be directly accessible via unique identifiers. Finally
it is possible, that one resource changes its location. In all of these cases, specific
content should still be available via the same identifier.
A solution to this problem is often called ID/Locator split. In the future a new
addressing scheme, which offers a dynamic association between an objects identifier
and one of its current locations, is very likely. Today this is mainly achieved by
search engines like Google, as most Internet users rely on them for finding certain
resources quickly. Even with IPv6 there is however no immanent support for an
ID/Locator split in today’s Internet architecture.
3 The Future Internet
One core issue within the scope of Internet development and advancement, aside
from fixing current short and long term problems, is to specify and anticipate what
the Internet of tomorrow might look like. It is important to assess though, that there
exists no such thing as one Future Internet. Rather several national and international
research initiatives exist, which try to overcome the shortcomings of and improve
the current Internet architecture. These are often summarized under the term Future
Internet. Our understanding is that instead of one network, there will be many
different networks in the future, with many heterogenous devices.
2 http://mmlab.snu.ac.kr/courses/2007 advanced internet/papers/20071010 1.pdf
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Currently the Internet operates according to the best-effort paradigm. For a
packet switched network this means, incoming data-packets are forwarded as long
as there are enough free resources. Theoretically every Internet user is able to
utilize the maximum bandwidth provided by his network access. There are however
no guarantees regarding the actual provided bandwidth or any delays before a
data-packet is delivered. Neither is there a guarantee, that a data-packet reaches its
destination at all.
The best-effort paradigm is however mitigated by higher level protocols like
TCP, which enable reliable delivery of data-packets by retransmitting lost packets.
In addition multiple quality of service mechanisms like IP differentiated services3
(DiffServ) or IP integrated services4 (IntServ) exist. None of them was however able
to achieve a widespread distribution thus far. Still the need for quality of service
support is constantly growing, as more new applications emerge, which could profit
from quality of service mechanisms.
Instead of integrating existing or new quality of service approaches into the
current Internet architecture, we envision a Future Internet consisting of many
different networks, specifically suited for single applications or services. One
step towards such service tailored networks is to provide an architecture and
environment, which allows for easy creation and deployment of new networks.
Network virtualization[Schaffrath et al. (2009)][Chowdhury and Boutaba (2010)]
is regarded to be one key technology towards achieving this goal, by providing
a flexible virtual infrastructure, which abstracts from the underlying physical
infrastructure.
On the other hand different protocols are needed to control, how data is ex-
changed in different networks. Within the scope of the projects 4Ward5 and GLab6 a
Node Architecture was developed, which aims at providing a flexible environment
for concurrently running different network architectures, each with its own set
of protocols. Also tools were developed, which aid protocol designers with the
creation and deployment of new protocols.
4 The Node Architecture
A simplified version of the Node Architecture is shown in figure 1. The Node Architec-
ture is intended to work on end-nodes. The main goal is to provide a protocol-stack
independent framework to connect applications and network interfaces. Instead of
being bound to a certain set of protocols, it provides the option to run a multitude
of future protocols and applications side-by-side. It hides the actual protocol-stack
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to the Node Architecture. Thus it becomes possible to exchange complete protocol-
stacks, without the need to modify or adapt the application. Applications are hence
enabled to communicate via a multitude of protocols and even networks, without
detailed knowledge about the underlying network architecture. In the following
sections the individual components shown in figure 1 are outlined. A more detailed
description of the Node Architecture and its concepts is available in [Völker et al.
(2009a)].
4.1 Netlets as future protocol containers
Netlets represent the fundamental concept of the Node Architecture, as they contain
the actual network protocols or even complete protocol stacks. For example today’s
protocol-stack could be encapsulated by a Netlet. At the most basic level a Netlet
provides a simple send and receive interface for an application on top of the Netlet







































Figure 1: Simpliefied node architecture for flexible protocol selection
As Netlets are generic protocol containers. Whether encapsulated protocols
are compiled from handwritten code or are e.g. composed from smaller protocol
components is of no consideration. Therefore Netlets are also able to support
different existing protocol composition approaches, like e.g. RNA[Touch et al.
(2006a)] or SILO[Touch et al. (2006b)].
Netlets need to share a common understanding about the exchanged data. Netlets
have to use a common Protocol Data Unit (PDU) format. A PDU has to contain basic
information about a common identifier, in order to match incoming data-packets or
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streams to their designated Netlets. As depicted in figure 1, the Node Architecture
allows several multiplexers, responsible for matching incoming data-streams and
Netlets, to run alongside. Each multiplexer is specific to one architecture. Through
different multiplexers it is still possible to connect to multiple network architectures
at once, each with their own basic PDU and addressing scheme. Netlets are always
associated with a certain multiplexer and thus certain network architecture.
4.2 Management
The management component of the Node Architecture is responsible for gathering
and exposing information about the underlying virtual or physical network in-
frastructure, as well as the specific network architectures. Netlets can query the
management component or register themselves to be notified, if certain parameters
in the underlying network change. Netlets are then able to adapt their behavior.
Such changes may for example occur, if a smartphone has to switch from HSDPA to
GPRS, due to worsend reception conditions. Adaptable parameters in such a case
include e.g. different bandwidth usage or longer packet delays.
4.3 Name Address Mapper
Communication between applications and today’s TCP/IP based protocol stack is
normally handled via a standardized socket interface. It fills the gap between the
operating systems implementation of the standard communication protocols and
the actual applications using them to connect to a network. In order to communicate
with another end system, the IP address of that system has to be known. Today it is
common though, to reach other hosts through human readable names. Therefore
applications often need to resolve those human readable names themselves, in order
to get the corresponding IP addresses, before they can start to communicate with
another host. This is done by invoking a lookup service, the Domain Name System
(DNS), which is responsible for name resolution in today’s Internet.
Within the Node Architecture, the name address mapper is responsible for name
resolution. In the following we distinguish between name, identifier and locator as
depicted in figure 2. A name is always in a human readable form like e.g. a URI.
An identifier has to be unique within a specific network architecture and identifies
a specific resource, e.g. a webpage. It is possible that a name is an identifier at the
same time. An identifier could also be in a non-human readable form, e.g. a hash
string. In that case several names could be mapped onto the same identifier, e.g.
http://www.kit.edu and http://kit.edu are two names, which identify the same
resource. The identifier of an resource is needed to get the location of a resource.
A resource has at least one location at any moment, but can also have more than
one locator at the same time, when it is available at several locations. An address is
nothing more than a locator, as its sole purpose is to specify a location.
Within the Node Architecture applications only need a name of a resource instead
of its locator or address. The Node Architecture handles the lookup of the correct






Figure 2: Name, Identifier and Locator in relation to a Resource
locator, by mapping the name onto an identifier and checking in which networks
a locator for the identifier is available. With several different networks running
concurrently on a host, this enables applications to be network independent, as
different networks could feature different addressing schemes. The name address
mapper is also responsible for deciding, which locator should be used, when one
identifier returns several locators, probably in different networks. For these cases it
is possible to define heuristics to decide which locator should be favored.
4.4 Network Accesses
Network accesses provide an interface between the Node Architecture and any
physical or virtual network infrastructure underneath the Node Architecture. A
network access abstracts from certain physical media and provides a generic and
extensible interface. The Node Architecture and Netlets therefore are useable in
different networks and do not rely on a certain hardware infrastructure. Network
accesses can also provide basic information about a network. Properties like packet
loss rate or the maximum permitted bandwidth of a network or a link can be
obtained. These properties also aid with the Netlet selection process.
Network accesses are connected to a suitable multiplexer. This ensures that a
network access understands an architecture specific PDU. Each Multiplexer can
have an arbitrary number of network accesses, as long as the PDU format used
matches.
5 Netlet description and selection
A great challenge when running many concurrent networks next to each other, each
with its own Netlets, is selecting a suitable Netlet available for a certain task. Also
this should happen automatically since users expect to be able to communicate with
other users instantly, without having to specify what kind of connection or protocol
they want to use.
The Node Architecture automates Netlet selection where it is possible, even though
there will always remain scenarios where user interaction is needed. For example









































































































Figure 3: Features and requirements affecting protocol selection
when a certain Netlet’s usage is associated with immediate costs for the user. Figure
3 illustrates the role of different Node Architecture components during the process of
selecting a Netlet. Network accesses expose technical properties, like e.g. bandwidth
or the support for secure communication. The management component exposes
features, which have to be measured. The current packet loss rate or the experienced
packet delay to another host for example.
As Netlets contain the actual communication protocols, they can provide all kinds
of different services. Features like reliable transport, error detection and correction
mechanisms, routing, or security are common of today’s TCP/IP based protocol
stack. In the future however Netlets may also have additional features like data
privacy, validity of delivered content, or access rights management for certain data.
Applications can state their requirements through feature requests, which a
Netlet has to meet in order to be a suitable for the users communication needs.
These requirements have to be defined by the application’s developer. To make
the task of defining requirements easier, extensible profiles can be predefined for
standard use cases. For application developers, profiles like WWW, distributed file
storage, multimedia data, or a generic reliable transport can be defined. Device
manufacturers could set up predefined profiles for, e.g., mobile phones, which are
tuned for low energy consumption.
Not only applications, but also Netlets can have requirements. A Netlet might
need a certain set of system resources to work properly. For example a Netlet could
require local disk space to store data or have certain energy consumption demands,
which have to be met by e.g. a mobile device.
Furthermore the user can formulate additional requirements as a set of feature
requests. These can be defined as a general policy, for a specific application, or
per connection. Users could limit the maximum bandwidth an application uses
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for instance. In the context of social networking, features could include privacy
preferences which define how long certain data may remain within a network, or
who is allowed to access it. Further features concerning content validity may be
possible, e.g., networks that guarantee a trusted source for delivered content instead
of just guaranteeing non-manipulated data. If application and user requirements
are conflicting with each other, user requirements override application requirements.
This can however prevent the usage of certain applications, until the user resolves
that conflict.
In rare cases users may have to decide, which resources the Node Architecture
or a certain (group of) Netlets may use. Netlets can request resources on a per
connection basis. These are handled by default policies for a certain (group of)
Netlets, as manually deciding on resource consumption per connection would be
far too elaborate. Default policies should be defined within the Node Architecture.
Operating Systems may feature their own set of extended default policies though.
These policies can however be overriden by the user, so that it is possible to
accomodate the Node Architecture to personal needs. Also system administrators
are enabled to modify these policies, to adjust the Node Architecture to their specific
communication needs.
The Netlet selection component gathers all this data, and tries to determine the
best possible Netlet for an incoming connection request. A set of features can be
derived from application, user, and policy defined requirements. This process is
shown in Figure 4. When an application wants to establish a connection, a set of
features alone is not sufficient. In most cases, there will be dependencies between
at least some if not all features. Therefore, constraints have to be defined too.
Features then have to be checked against these constraints. Constraints define
functional dependencies between two or more features. They can state simple
dependencies, like two features which can never be used together, but also more



































Figure 4: The protocol selection process
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Feature constraints and the set of desired features are therefore combined into
a Connection Request Profile. This is done with combined user and application
requirements. Furthermore, a Connection Profile for each Netlet has to be created.
Constraints have to be predefined for every feature combination which has depen-
dencies, and can later be automatically derived from the set of features. Within
the Validator, constraints are then applied to the features. If constraints can not be
fulfilled, a list of features which do not work together is sent to the application. The
application then has to modify its requirements where feasible. Alternatively, the
decision which requirements have to be modified can be passed to the user or an
error can be shown to inform the user that no connection could be established.
Once all constraints can be fulfilled, a Connection Profile is considered to be
valid. Finding the best Netlet available for a Connection Request Profile is then
done, by matching the feature-sets of all available Connection Profiles against it. A
Netlet, whose Connection Profile overlaps completely with the Connection Request
Profile is chosen. If several Netlets fulfill the requirements, additional features can
be specified or default behavior, like choosing the first Netlet that fits can be set. If
no overlapping Connection Profile can be found, the non-satisfiable features are sent
back to the application, and the same process is triggered as with non-satisfiable
constraints before.
Connection Profiles are split up into features and feature constraints, to allow
for a flexible extension of the system. As constraints are not mandatory, new
features can be added without the need to create several constraints alongside of
them. It is the responsibility of the application designer then, to define feasible
requirements. This allows for features that would otherwise be hard to verify. Also
constraints can be added at a later time, to make the verification of application or
user requirements easier. Another advantage in relation to performance is, that
a given set of features and constraints can be pre-checked for validity and only a
few checks or just a matching of features is needed at run time, when a connection
should be established. Finally new features and constraints can be negotiated
via the Management component and a signaling protocol to adjust application
requirements between two or more hosts. Constraints between two features may
also be platform specific, and can thus be exchanged independently from existing
features.
5.1 Features and feature constraints in RDF
Features are expressed in XML in an RDF-based[W3C Recommendation (2004b)]
format, so that they are easy to extend and modify. RDF describes resources via
statements. A RDF statements consist of a subject, predicate, object triple. Features
are identified via a FeatureName, which is a unique resource identifier (URI) to
avoid ambiguities. The FeatureName forms the subject part of a RDF statement.
Nested within the subject are the predicates whose actual values are the objects. The
Info predicate provides a human readable explanation of the feature, which can
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be displayed to the user, if requirements have to be altered. The ValueComperator
predicate defines how this feature’s value has to be compared during the matching
phase. At the moment, we allow comparators like greater, smaller, equal, or none. The
none comparator can be used for features, which have no value and just need to
be present. A ValueFormat predicate sets, whether the predicate Value is an integer,
float, or per cent value for instance. Figure 5 shows an exemplary definition of three
Quality of Service features, e.g. minimal bandwith, average packet loss, and maximum
latency.
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf = "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
         xmlns:na = "http://www.kit.edu/nodearch-ns#" >
    <rdf:Description rdf:about = "na://features/QoS/minimalBandwidth"><!-- minimal bandwidth feature -->
        <na:name>"Minimal Bandwidth"</na:name>
        <na:info>Describes the minmum bandwidth needed for a connection.</na:info>
        <na:comparator>greater</na:comparator>
        <na:unit>
            <rdf:Bag>
                <rdf:li>mBit/s</rdf:li>
                <rdf:li>kByte/s</rdf:li>
            </rdf:Bag>
        </na:unit>
    </rdf:Description>
    <rdf:Description rdf:about = "na://features/QoS/averagePacketLoss"><!-- average packet loss feature -->
        <na:name>"Average Packet Loss"</na:name>
        <na:info>Describes...</na:info>
        <na:comparator>average</na:comparator>
        <na:unit>
            <rdf:Bag>
                <rdf:li>perCent</rdf:li>
                <rdf:li>pkt/s</rdf:li>
            </rdf:Bag>
        </na:unit>
    </rdf:Description>
    <rdf:Description rdf:about = "na://features/QoS/maximumLatency"><!-- maximum latency feature -->
        <na:name>"Maximum Latency"</na:name>
        <na:info>Describes...</na:info>
        <na:comparator>smaller</na:comparator>
        <na:unit>ns</na:unit>
    </rdf:Description>    
</rdf:RDF>
Figure 5: A RDF document defining three Quality of Service features
Feature constraints can be defined in a similar manner. Constraints identify
two features by their FeatureName. Dependencies between these two features
can be formulated with comparators as well. For example the Value of the min-
imumBandwithFeature always has to be smaller than or equal to the Value of the
maximumBandwithFeature. Additionally dependencies between features itself can be
specified, with and, or, xor relationships.
6 Related Work
Several description languages for application interfaces or web services already exist
within the World Wide Web context. Common to many solutions like the Web service
Description Language (WSDL)[W3C Recommendation (2001)] is however, that they
are tailored to a specific kind or class of service. In order to support platforms like
sensor networks for instance, we need a lightweight solution. Our approach does
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not require a complex syntax or even full-featured XML parser for its properties,
which also makes it easily portable to other languages. The Web Ontology Language
(OWL)[W3C Recommendation (2004a)] which is also based on RDF, could be used
in a lite version. OWL comes with a larger vocabulary and stronger syntax than
RDF. Therefore OWL is more powerful in terms of expressiveness. OWL however is
more complex to parse and process. We believe that describing services at a basic
level is sufficient for protocol selection, as in our context time constraints are also
an important factor.
7 Conclusion
This paper described an architecture, which is suited for executing parallel network
architectures on a single host. It is designed with flexibility and extensibility in
mind. We presented a concept for defining requirements for and features of network
protocols and applications in future networks. The solution aims at recreating the
straightforward and hassle-free experience users have come to expect from today’s
Internet, in an environment where several protocols and network architectures
are running concurrently. We achieve flexibility by using an RDF-based format,
which is portable and can be converted to other formats. Extensibility is supported
by a design, which fosters the addition of new features and feature constraints
step-by-step.
Current work focuses on the definition and refinement of requirements and fea-
tures. In a next step means are needed to synchronize protocol selection over several
hosts. Therefore some sort of signaling mechanism is needed, to communicate
protocol selection decisions to other network users. Also we want to investigate how
our approach can aid in finding the best protocol, in cases where several protocols
satisfy provided requirements equally well. Therefore we want to build upon a
solution initially developed for selecting e.g. security mechanisms[Völker et al.
(2009b)] and extend it to incorporate our feature descriptions.
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Marc T. P. Adam1, Jan Krämer1, Christof Weinhardt1, and Karl-Martin Ehrhart2
1 Institute of Information Systems and Management, KIT
{marc.adam, kraemer, weinhardt}@kit.edu
2 Institute for Economic Theory and Statistics, KIT
ehrhart@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de
Summary. Auction fever is a frequently observed phenomenon in traditional and Internet
auctions. However, traditional approaches of auction theory often neglect the influence
of emotions. In this paper we discuss a unified framework for emotional bidding in auc-
tions and identify challenges for future auction fever research. In particular, we identify
interdependent utilities and product characteristics as important influencing factors for
auction fever, which have only gained little attention in the literature at this stage. Further,
methodological approaches for auction fever research are discussed. While a substantial
part of auction fever literature is based on deception of participants, one has to consider
fundamental drawbacks of this approach. In contrast, we find that applying physiological
measurements in economic laboratory experiments and auctioning real world commodi-
ties is a promising (complementary) approach. Further, letting subjects compete with
computerized agents seems to be an adequate approach for assessing the importance of
interdependent utilities.
1 Introduction
Auctions are nowadays a popular and frequently employed market mechanism in
electronic markets. In particular Internet auctions for consumers have turned out
to be “one of the greatest success stories of web-based services” (Ariely and Simonson,
2003). As the end of 2008, alone the market leader eBay.com reported a total number
of 86.3 million active users worldwide and net revenues of 5.6 billion US dollars
(eBay Inc., 2009). In economic literature, the success of Internet auctions has been
largely attributed to reductions of transaction costs, the large number of potential
buyers, and the independence of time and space (Ockenfels et al., 2006). However,
these characteristics also apply to retail sites as Amazon.com. Further, the popularity
of Internet auctions seems somewhat counterintuitive from a consumer perspective
as several field studies have confirmed that auctions yield on average higher prices
compared to fixed price offers on retail sites (e.g. Lucking-Reiley, 1999; Lee et al.,
2009a).
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1.1 Emotions as a Quality Characteristic of Internet Auctions
An additional explanation for the success of Internet auctions are hedonic or emotional
values bidders derive from auction participation (e.g. Möllenberg, 2004; Stern et al.,
2008). While utilitarian value refers to the utility gained from obtaining the desired
commodity, hedonic value is gained from perceived entertainment and emotional
worth of auction participation. In this regard, Lee et al. (2009b) identify in particular
“thrill of bidding, excitement of winning, stimulation of beating competitors, and enjoyment
of finding rare or unusual items” as sources for hedonic value. This characteristic
clearly distinguishes auctions from fixed price offers and may even be understood
as a quality characteristic of Internet auctions.
Marketing departments of Internet auction platforms have long understood
that emotions plays an important role in attracting consumers. Referring to the
competitive nature of auctions, eBay launched an advertisement campaign in 2007
titled “shop victoriously” stating that “it’s better when you win it” (eBay.com, 2007). In
the corresponding television commercials, bidding in an eBay auction is compared
to sport events such as football matches or dog races. In Germany, eBay even simply
advertises directly the immediate emotions bidders experience upon winning an
auction (see Figure 1). Similarly, the platform swoopo.com advertises with “pulse up,
price down,” referring to the actual physiological arousal bidders can experience on
their platform. Another indicator for the emotions in auctions and their “game-like
action and bidding frenzy characteristic” (Stafford and Stern, 2002) is the terminology
bidders apply for describing the course of action. Contrary to retail websites,
bidders do not just buy commodities, they win or lose them. Correspondingly,
Ariely and Simonson (2003) find in an Internet survey that 76.8% of the respondents
perceive other bidders as “competitors” and refer to auction outcomes as “winning”
and “losing.”
Figure 1: German eBay Advertisement (retrieved from spiegel.de on March 19th, 2008)
This general development can be interpreted as a paradigm shift to “entertainment
shopping” or “auctainment” (Glänzer and Schäfers, 2001). Salient evidence for this
paradigm shift are emerging sites as swoopo.com and dubli.com. These sites aim
at attracting consumers with new (exciting) auction mechanisms and explicitly
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advertise themselves as “entertainment shopping” and “fun shopping” platforms,
respectively.
1.2 Engineering Emotions in Auctions
As outlined above, emotions are an important incentive for participation in Internet
consumer auctions. This, however, raises another question: what is the impact
of emotions on bidding behavior? This question is particularly important for the
market engineer of an Internet auction platform (Weinhardt et al., 2003).
A distinguished strand of the literature analyzes auctions theoretically with
highly sophisticated analytical models (Vickrey, 1961; McAfee and McMillan, 1987).
While these models are undoubtedly an important contribution for the design
and understanding of electronic markets, they seldomly include hedonic values of
auction participation.1 However, results from the laboratory and the field indicate
that emotions induced during the dynamic process of auctions have an impact on
bidding behavior and, subsequently, on market outcome and seller revenue (e.g.
Ku et al., 2005; Lee and Malmendier, 2010). Even slight variations in the auction
mechanism can lead to large disparities in bidding behavior and this change in
behavior is often not (fully) predicted by auction theory.
One phenomenon frequently observed in traditional and Internet auctions which
is often referred to an increased emotionality is “auction fever” (e.g. Ku et al., 2005;
Ehrhart et al., 2008). Under the influence of auction fever, so Murnighan (2002),
bidders’ “adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions block their ability to think clearly,
and they end up bidding much more than they ever envisioned.” This paper focuses
specifically on auction fever. In particular, we identify challenges for future research
in the field of auction fever and discuss related methodological approaches.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses a unified
framework for emotional bidding in auctions. Then, Section 3 outlines challenges for
future research on auction fever and Section 4 discusses methodological approaches.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Emotions in Auctions
2.1 A Unified Framework for Emotional Bidding
Traditional approaches of auction theory neglect the influence of emotions. In
order to coherently approach the interaction of cognitive reasoning and emotional
processing, Adam et al. (2010) introduce a unified framework for emotional bidding
in auctions. The framework is depicted in Figure 2.
The upper part of the framework describes the traditional perspective of auction
theory. Auction theory typically describes auctions as non-cooperative games with
1 See Katok and Kwasnica (2008) and Ehrhart et al. (2008) for different approaches.

















Figure 2: Framework for Emotional Bidding in Auctions
incomplete information (Bayesian games) and provides the auction participants with
a strategy in order to maximize their expected payoff (e.g. McAfee and McMillan,
1987; Krishna, 2002). A strategy is defined as a set of rules, which tells a decision
maker which action to chose at each instant of the game, given her information set
(Rasmusen, 2007). In terms of auctions, a bidding strategy tells a bidder when to
place a bid for what amount, and whether to participate in the auction at all. Often
a particular auction mechanism implicates a set of one or more optimal (symmetric)
bidding strategies. In particular, the rather simple auction mechanisms usually
employed on Internet auction platforms have this characteristic. Depending on the
particular auction mechanism, the induced bidding strategy results in one or more
auction events, which ultimately end in an auction outcome.
The lower part of Figure 2 describes the interaction of the auction mechanism, bid-
ding behavior, auction events, and emotional processing. An emotion can be roughly
defined as a subjectively experienced state that can be described qualitatively and is
accompanied by changes in feeling, physiology, behavior, and expression (Gerrig
and Zimbardo, 2007). As pointed out by Loewenstein (2000), emotions can be
distinguished into anticipated and experienced emotions. An anticipated emotion
refers to the expected emotional processing in response to a salient future event, e.g.
the end of an auction and the anticipated win or loss. In contrast, an experienced
emotion refers to the actual emotional processing, which comprises both immediate
emotions in response to a single stimulus (Loewenstein, 2000) and ongoing current
emotional states (Ding et al., 2005).
Immediate emotions are triggered by auction events and the auction outcome.
Auction events comprise for instance the placement of new bids, entry of new
bidders, becoming the current high bidder, or being outbidden. The auction outcome
induces immediate emotions as “joy of winning” and “frustration of losing” (Delgado
et al., 2008). The processing of immediate emotions can be anticipated by bidders
throughout the process of an auction. The set of possible immediate emotions is
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limited by the auction system2. Therefore, some auction mechanisms pronounce
emotionality stronger than others. For instance, some auction mechanisms only
allow for placing a single sealed-bid. These auctions are often referred to as static
auctions. In contrast, dynamic auctions allow bidders for placing multiple bids and
observing the behavior of other bidders. As argued by Gimpel (2007), auction fever
is particularly a phenomenon of dynamic auctions.
The terms immediate and anticipated emotion refer to momentary (phasic) re-
sponses to a single stimulus. In contrast, a bidder’s current emotional state refers
to her ongoing (tonic) emotional processing. As outlined by Ariely and Simonson
(2003), the current emotional state of a bidder is influenced by the “frequency and
magnitude of anticipated post-auction feelings.” For instance, frequently anticipating the
joy of winning and frustration of losing can increase a bidder’s tonic level of arousal.
But also anticipated and immediate emotions with respect to auction events other
than the auction outcome have an impact on a bidder’s current emotional state.
For instance becoming the current high bidder in an auction and being outbidden
have been identified as salient events (Ehrhart et al., 2008). However, as indicated
in the framework for emotional bidding, the current emotional state can also be
directly affected by the employed auction system. For instance, Malhotra et al. (2008)
denote that “a ticking clock (...) can overwhelm people with the desire to win,” indicating
that a high degree of time pressure in auctions can directly increase the bidders’
individual level of arousal.
2.2 Auction Fever
The controversy about auction fever is probably as old as auctions. Apparently, legal
scholars already debated in ancient Rome whether auctions were void if the winner
was infected by “bidder’s heat” (Lee and Malmendier, 2010). Based on the framework
for emotional bidding, Adam et al. (2010) define auction fever as “a current emotional
state elicited in the course of one or more auctions that distorts a bidder’s preselected bidding
strategy.” This definition comprises not only overbidding in ascending auctions, but
also underbidding in Dutch auctions, repeated bidding, and other changes in the
preselected bidding strategy.
The definition is based on the assumption that bidders commit themselves to a
bidding strategy before the auction starts.3 This is in line with the observation of an
Internet survey conducted by Ku et al. (2005). The authors report that 82% of the
survey respondents set themselves a limit prior to bidding.
2 In this paper, an auction system is well defined by the auction mechanism design and the user
interface design.
3 Note that the preselected bidding strategy does not necessarily need to be derived by means of
auction theory. As already observed by Vickrey (1961), some of the bidders may be “insufficiently
sophisticated to discern the equilibrium-point strategy.” In a rather behavioral approach, one can argue
that bidders may set themselves a limit by estimating a subjective valuation for the commodity
and then heuristically deriving a corresponding bidding strategy (Ariely and Simonson, 2003).
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3 Challenges for Auction Fever Research
Auction fever literature identified in particular perceived competition (e.g. Heyman
et al., 2004; Ku et al., 2005), previous investments (Ku, 2008; Park et al., 2008), and
perceived ownership (Heyman et al., 2004; Wolf et al., 2005) as elicitors of auction
fever. Further, in Internet auctions the elicitation of auction fever is mediated
through the user interface design of the auction system. In this section, two main
challenges for future auction fever research are identified, which have only gained
little focus in the literature at this stage. In particular, we will focus on the role of
interdependencies in bidders’ utility functions and product characteristics of the
auctioned commodities.
3.1 Interdependent Utilities in Auctions
Time pressure, social facilitation, and rivalry have been identified as the main
influencing factors for the degree of competition bidders perceive in auctions (e.g
Ku et al., 2005; Malhotra et al., 2008). In the following we focus specifically on social
facilitation and rivalry.
Social Facilitation and Rivalry
The literature on social facilitation distinguishes two major paradigms: audience
effects and co-action effects (cf. Zajonc, 1965). Audience effects refer to the influence
passive spectators have on human behavior. In the context of auctions, audience
effect are elicited by individuals who observe the course of bidding but are not
actively participating. For instance, this may be an audience watching a charity
auction or the media attention on spectrum license auctions. On the other hand,
co-action effects refer to the influence the presence of other individuals has, who are
also engaged in the same activity (cf. Zajonc, 1965). In a live auction, for instance,
co-action effects are elicited by the presence of other bidders who are bidding on the
same item and bidders who are merely observing the current auction and actually
waiting for a specific item following up.
It is important to highlight that audience and co-action effects already occur
without strategic interaction. Accordingly, social facilitation only refers to the
sheer presence of other individuals, i.e. the awareness of being observed by passive
observers and other bidders. In contrast, the concept of rivalry addresses the fact
that bidders are actually competing for obtaining the very same good. Therefore,
strategic interaction is a necessary condition for rivalry. Rivalry is an inherent
characteristic of live and Internet auctions, as “each bidder competes against others who
want the same item” (Stern and Stafford, 2006).
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Interdependencies in Bidders’ Utility Functions
The degree of rivalry increases ceteris paribus with the number of bidders in an
auction (Heyman et al., 2004).4 However, rivalry can also get more intense, when
a bidder’s utility does not only depend on her own individual monetary gains
and losses, but also on the utilities of other bidders. This concept of utility is
usually referred to as “interdependent utilities” (e.g. Schall, 1972; Bault et al., 2008).
For instance, subjects may develop personal rivalries with other individuals and
perceive feelings of envy or gloating (Smith et al., 1996). In the context of auctions,
the literature has identified in particular “spitefulness” and (nonmonetary) “joy of
winning” as sources for such interdependencies.
A bidder is spiteful, if she derives an additional negative utility when her
opponent wins an auction. This negative utility depends on the monetary profit of
the competitor (cf. Morgan et al., 2003). Morgan et al. (2003) show that symmetric
equilibrium bidding becomes more aggressive in various auctions, if bidders are
spiteful. Therefore, if an agent’s utility depends on the outcomes of other agents,
it can be a (rational) best response to place higher bids. In contrast, a bidder
experiences a nonmonetary joy of winning if she derives an additional positive
utility from the “uniqueness of being first” in the social competition of an auction
(Ku et al., 2005). Morgan et al. (2003) refer to this nonmonetary component as the
“love of winning.” Although there is not much evidence for love of winning in the
literature (e.g. Andreoni et al., 2007; Delgado et al., 2008), most of these studies
investigate sealed-bid auctions. However, there is strong indication to conjecture
that love of winning, and its anticipation, is strongly intertwined with auction fever.
As outlined above, auction fever is frequently described as a phenomenon only
occurring in dynamic auctions (e.g. Gimpel, 2007; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc,
2009).
Immediate emotions induced by the auction outcome are depicted in Figure 3.
Assume a single unit auction, in which the auction outcome reveals which bidder
obtains the commodity for sale and how much she has to pay for it. If a bidder wins
the auction, she may experience a “joy of winning” (Goeree and Offerman, 2003).
This joy does not only comprise her utility from monetary payoffs, but also the
utility from winning the social competition inherent in an auction, i.e. the love of
winning. However, the winner of the auction may at the same time also suffer from
“winner regret.” For instance, in a first-price sealed-bid auction, the winner of the
auction may still have won the auction by placing a lower bid and, thus, won the
auction with a higher monetary payoff (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989). In contrast,
if the bidder loses the auction, she can experience “loser regret” from the missed
opportunity of achieving a monetary payoff and from losing the social competition
(Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007). If bidders anticipate joy of winning and loser regret
4 Recall that an increasing number of bidders decreases the expected payoff of each bidder (Vickrey,
1961).












Figure 3: Immediate Emotions Induced by the Auction Outcome
(As depicted in Adam et al. (2010))
regarding the social competition and reflect these anticipated emotions in their
bidding behavior, then their utilities comprise interdepencies.
Head-to-Head Battles
Bidders’ utility functions which exhibit such interdependencies can result in “head-
to-head battles” (Ku et al., 2008) among a small (sub-)group of bidders. In a survey
among bidders from live auctions, Johns and Zaichkowsky (2003) observe a U-
shaped dependency between the number of bidders and the degree of rivalry. In
auctions with only two active bidders, the authors state that “the bidding war was
more personal.” However, when an auction attracted a large number of active bidders,
there is a “race to bid on and win the item.” Ku et al. (2005) argue that rivalry is
particularly intense when only two bidders compete in a single auction. Based
on data from a laboratory experiment, the authors report that bidders experience
higher levels of self-report arousal and place higher bids in high rivalry treatments,
i.e. when bidders face one single opponent in comparison to facing eight other
individuals. Thus, so the authors conclude, rivalry and arousal seem to be higher
with few rather than with many bidders.
These observations seem to be contradictory to the statement above that rivalry
increases ceteris paribus with the number of bidders. However, when taking interde-
pendent utilities into account, one may conjecture an interaction between the degree
of utility interdependencies and the number of bidders.
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Research Questions on Interdependent Utilities
As outlined above, interdependent utilities (IU) seem to play an important role in
auction fever. In particular, we identify the following research questions concerning
interdependent utilities:
IU1: To what degree does the phenomenon of auction fever depend on interdepen-
dencies between bidders’ utility functions?
IU2: To what extent does the degree of interdependent utilities depend on the
number of active bidders?
IU3: How do audience and co-action effects affect the degree of interdependent
utilities?
Further, the existence of interdependent utilities and the general phenomenon
of auction fever also seems to depend on the commodity for sale. Product char-
acteristics and their influence on auction fever will be discussed in the following
section.
3.2 Product Characteristics
Ariely and Simonson (2003) argue that the occurrence and degree of auction fever is
subject to the specific characteristics of the auctioned item, e.g. “whether the product
offered is such that the allure of its low starting price has the potential to generate emotional
involvement.” At this stage, there has been little research on how the phenomenon
of auction fever depends on product characteristics. Nevertheless, this research
question is important, because the literature on auction fever analyzes auctions
ranging from retail products such as electronic equipment to collectibles as one-cent
coins and fiberglass cows (cf. Ku et al., 2005; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007).
The conjecture that characteristics of the auctioned commodity have an impact on
the degree of auction fever is supported by the observation of Lee and Malmendier
(2010). The authors report that the amount of overbidding in eBay auctions depends
on the product category, with proportions of overbidding ranging “between 30% and
60% for most categories.” The authors define overbidding with respect to simultane-
ouly listed ficed price offers on the same platform. However, the authors do not
address which characteristics of the commodity are responsible for this observation.
Product Value, Scarcity, and Public Interest
We conjecture that in particular the product’s value, scarcity, and public interest
play an important role for the occurrence of auction fever.
First, if the value of the item is comparatively high, this affects bidder’s individual
involvement and, thus, arousal. For instance, Ku et al. (2008) report that bidding
behavior is more aggressive when stakes are high by manipulating conversion rates.
The perceived loss of the current high bidder in the event of being outbidden is
150 Marc T. P. Adam, Jan Krämer, Christof Weinhardt, and Karl-Martin Ehrhart
probably higher when stakes are high. Second, Smith (1990) argues that bidders are
often uncertain about their own product valuation. In this respect, Lucking-Reiley
(1999) notes that this uncertainty inherently increases in Internet auctions, where
bidders’ information regarding product quality and seller reliability is rather limited
and biased.
Third, product scarcity affects rivalry among bidders. For instance, Hou (2007)
argue that a long auction duration only then positively affects the endogenous
number of bidders, if scarcity is sufficiently high and bidders do not have “more
options at any point of time.” Beyond that, Lynn (1992) report that an item becomes
more desirable for consumers if it is scarce. Peters and Bodkin (2007) observe that
eBay bidders derive “joy in finding rare or unusual items.” Finally, a high public
interest can presumably increase a bidder’s prestige when obtaining the auctioned
item, e.g. a charity auction or a unique collectible. Ku et al. (2005) observe charity
auctions and conjecture that the intense media attention may also have “increased
arousal and facilitated higher bidding.”
Research Questions on Product Characteristics
As outlined above, product characteristics (PC) of the auction commodity seem to
play an important role in auction fever. In particular, we identify the following
research questions concerning product characteristics:
PC1: What is the impact of a product’s value, scarcity, and public interest on bidding
fever?
PC2: Which features of a product are responsible for inducing psychological attach-
ment in auctions, in particular with respect to perceived ownership?
PC3: To what extent does the degree of interdependent utilities depend on product
characteristics?
4 Discussion on Methodological Approaches
The last section discussed two main challenges for auction fever research. In
particular, interpersonal utilities and product characteristics have been identified
as important influencing factors for auction fever. In this section we will now
discuss different methodological approaches for analyzing auction fever in economic
laboratory experiments.
4.1 Participant Deception
The literature on auction fever frequently conducts laboratory experiments in which
participants are intentionally deceived in order “not to disturb the emergence of
auction fever” (Ockenfels et al., 2006). In particular, participants are told that they
(1) bid against other human individuals, while they are actually competing with
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computerized agents (e.g. Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2004; Ku et al., 2008),
and (2) that their payment is performance depending although every participant
eventually receives the same payoff (e.g. Ku et al., 2008). While deception of
participants has turned out to be common practice in experimental psychology, it
violates established paradigms of experimental economics (cf. Guala, 2005).
With respect to auction fever experiments, Ockenfels et al. (2006) criticize that
it remains unclear to what extent participants “will actually believe any part of the
information they are given,” if the subject pool has been exposed to deception in
experiments before. Following this reasoning, the deception of participants turns
out to be an inappropriate methodological approach for auction fever experiments.
4.2 Physioeconomics
Hagenau et al. (2007) and Adam et al. (2009) propose a methodology denoted
as “physioeconomics” for measuring the impact of emotions in electronic auctions.
Physioeconomics, so Adam et al. (2009), “extends existing methods of experimental
economics by measuring autonomic nervous system activity using well-established psy-
chophysiological methodology, in order to gain a deep understanding of the dynamic process
of human economic decision-making.”
A subject’s heart rate and skin conductivity are well established parameters in
psychophysiology for assessing her emotional processing. In particular, the (tonic)
skin conductance level and the phasic amplitude of skin conductance responses
are sensitive indexes for the general level of arousal and the degree of arousal
associated with a single auction event, respectively. Phasic heart rate, on the other
hand, allows for evaluating the perceived valence of a certain stimulus with negative
stimuli typically eliciting decelatory responses and positive stimuli relative heart
rate accelerations.
Physioeconomics allows for identifying the intensity of immediate and antici-
pated emotions, as well as for assessing a subject’s current emotional state. Therefore,
it turns out to be a complementary methodological approach for investigating auc-
tion fever in particular and the interactions outlined in the framework for emotional
bidding in general. While a lot of studies on auction fever conjecture an interaction
between emotional processing and bidding behavior, physioeconomics allows for
actually measuring this interaction.
4.3 Human or Computerized Competitors
As depicted in Figure 3, the immediate emotions upon winning and losing an
auction can be distinguished into (1) emotions regarding the monetary payoff and
(2) emotions regarding the social competition.5 Both categories of emotions play
an important role for human decision-making in auctions (e.g. Delgado et al., 2008;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008). However, the phenomenon of auction fever
5 Recall that interdependent utilities are an inherent characteristic of the social competition.
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seems to be particularly depending on emotions regarding the social competition.
For instance, Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2004) argue that for the experience of
auction fever, it is a necessary condition “that an auction participant competes directly
with other human bidders.” Heyman et al. (2004) refer to this phenomenon as the
“opponent effect” and Delgado et al. (2008) argue that actually the “fear of losing the
social competition” inherent in auctions is responsible for overbidding.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) intentionally exclude emotions regarding
the social competition by letting subjects compete with computerized agents. In
contrast to the studies addressed in Section 4.1, subjects are explicitly told that
they compete against computerized agents. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok argue
that “theories [of spitefulness] require inter-personal comparisons and, therefore, cannot
explain similar behavior by subjects who were bidding against computerized rather than
human competitors.” Following this reasoning, the experimenter can investigate the
impact emotions originated in interdependent utilities, by benchmarking human
behavior when bidding against computerized agents with bidding against human
individuals. This seems to be a promising approach for investigating the signifi-
cance of interdependent utilities for auction fever. The actual intensity difference
of emotional processing can then be simultaneously assessed with physiological
parameters and the methodology of physioeconomics.
4.4 Induced Values vs. Real Goods
One major paradigm of experimental economics is the induced value theory intro-
duced in the seminal work of Smith (1976). The induced value theory states that
in order to observe realistic behavior in laboratory experiments subjects need to
be properly incentivized through a proper reward medium that has to fulfill the
requirements of monotonicity, salience, and dominance.6 Typically, experimenters
choose real money as the reward medium and provide a performance depend-
ing payment scheme to incentivize human behavior in the context of an artificial
economic institution.
In contrast, a series of studies on auction fever rewards subjects with a fixed lump
sum, which does not allow for performance depending gains or losses (Heyman
et al., 2004; Wolf et al., 2005).7 Particularly with respect to Figure 3, it remains
totally unclear to what extent emotions elicited by monetary payoffs are reflected
in bidding behavior, if there are neither actual nor potential monetary gains and
losses. Further, is important to keep in mind that the expected utility from winning
6 For a comprehensive survey on the methodology of experimental economics please refer to Guala
(2005).
7 In these studies, subjects are explicitly told that they will receive a fixed show-up fee. In contrast,
the literature addressed in Section 4.1 pretends a performance depending payment scheme,
although all subjects eventually receive the same amount of money.
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an auction is the actual reason for bidders to participate. If this utility is zero by
construction, the explanatory power of such studies seems rather small.8
Another approach is auctioning off real world commodities, or “real goods,” in
laboratory experiments (Kahneman et al., 1990). While the theory of induced values
is a well-established methodological approach to induce real world behavior, one
can also directly auction off real goods. Kahneman et al. (1990) conduct a now
famous auction experiment in which participants can place bids on coffee mugs.9
In another well-known auction experiment comprising real goods, Lucking-Reiley
(1999) conducts a controlled field experiment on eBay. In particular, the authors
auction off collector cards. Ehrhart et al. (2010) conduct a laboratory experiment
comprising real goods to investigate the effect of perceived ownership on bidding
behavior, by auctioning off USB mass storage devices. The authors argue that
it is particularly important to properly choose the auctioned commodity when
conducting economic experiments with real goods. Therefore, before running the
laboratory experiment, Ehrhart et al. initially conduct a survey study to assess
which objects are actually appropriate.
One main advantage, so Ehrhart et al. (2010), for using real goods in auction fever
experiments is that subjects can actually develop a psychological attachment with an
object, which is not or not to this extent the case for money.10 Going one step further,
it would now be particularly interesting to use real world commodities for identify-
ing those product characteristics which actually mediate psychological attachment.
Therefore, we believe that using real world commodities is a promising approach
for investigating auction fever. Once again, the actual elicited emotional state can be
assessed with physiological parameters and the methodology of physioeconomics.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we focused on the question of how to systematically investigate auction
fever and its impact on electronic auctions. Emotions have turned out to be a quality
characteristic of Internet consumer auctions. Therefore, it is vital to know how
electronic auctions can trigger emotions, and, perhaps even more importantly, how
the triggered emotions affect the auction outcome. Following this reasoning, a deep
understanding of how cognitive reasoning and emotional processing are reflected
in bidding behavior is of high relevance for the market engineer.
8 Recall that the non-monetary component of the joy of winning is most likely intertwined with the
phenomenon of auction fever. Therefore, this utility, and particularly its anticipation, arises only
during the dynamic process of an auction.
9 Kahneman et al. (1990) analyze the endowment effect, i.e. effect of actual ownership, by endowing
coffee mugs to one half of the participants (sellers), while the other half (buyers) receives no coffee
mugs. Sellers and buyers can then exchange the coffee mugs through a double-sided auction.
The authors report that the average price a seller is willing to accept (WTA) for a coffee mug is
significantly larger than the average price a buyer is willing to pay (WTP).
10 This is in line with the observation of Wolf et al. (2008), who find that even the time a bidder has
for observing the item plays an important role for developing her attachment.
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Auction fever literature identified in particular perceived competition, previous
investments, and perceived ownership as elicitors of auction fever. Further, in
Internet auctions the elicitation of auction fever is mediated through the user
interface design of the auction system. Additionally, we identified in particular
product characteristics and interdependent utilities as important influencing factors
which have often been neglected in auction fever literature, or only gained little
attention. Although interdependent utilities are an influencing factor for rivalry,
and therefore, for perceived competition, we believe it is important to focus on how
such interdependencies arise and how they interact with other facets of auction
fever.
Summarizing the methodological discussion, one can conclude that applying
physiological measurements in economic laboratory experiments and auctioning
real world commodities are promising approaches, which are complementary to
traditional methodologies in experimental economics. Further, utilizing comput-
erized agents seems to be an adequate approach for assessing the significance of
interdependent utilities for auction fever. In contrast, although a substantial part
of auction fever literature is based on deception of participants and hypothetical
auction scenarios, one has to consider fundamental drawbacks of these approaches.
Therefore, the explanatory power of these approaches seems at least questionable.
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Adam, M. T. P., J. Krämer, C. Jähnig, S. Seifert, and C. Weinhardt (2010): “Emotions
in electronic auctions: Insights from a literature review,” Working Paper, Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology (KIT), pp. 1–50.
Andreoni, J., Y.-K. Che, and J. Kim (2007): “Asymmetric information about rivals’
types: An experiment,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59, pp. 240–259.
Ariely, D. and I. Simonson (2003): “Buying, bidding, playing, or competing? Value
assessment and decision dynamics in online auctions,” Journal of Consumer Psy-
chology, 13, pp. 113–123.
Bault, N., G. Coricelle, and A. Rustichini (2008): “Interdependent utilities: How
social ranking affects choice behavior,” PLoS ONE, 3(10), pp. 1–10.
Delgado, M. R., A. Schotter, E. Y. Ozbay, and E. A. Phelphs (2008): “Understand-
ing overbidding: Using the neural circuitry of reward to design economic auc-
tions,” Science, 321(5897), pp. 1849–1852.
Ding, M., J. Eliashberg, J. Huber, and R. Saini (2005): “Emotional bidders: An
analytical and experimental examination of consumers’ behavior in a priceline-
like reverse auction,” Management Science, 51(3), pp. 352–364.
eBay Inc. (2009): Annual report 2008, http://investor.ebay.com/.
Investigating Auction Fever 155
Ehrhart, K.-M., L. Goebes, and S. Lotz (2010): “Experimental Analysis of the
Pseudo-Endowment Effect with Real Goods,” Working Paper, Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology (KIT).
Ehrhart, K.-M., M. Ott, and S. Abele (2008): “Auction fever: Theory and experi-
mental evidence,” SFB 504 Discussion Paper Series, No. 08-27, http://www.sfb504.
uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp08-27.pdf.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1989): “The effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions,”
Management Science, 35(6), pp. 685–692.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. and E. Katok (2008): “Regret and feedback information in
first-price sealed-bid auctions,” Management Science, 54(4), pp. 808–819.
Filiz-Ozbay, E. and E. Y. Ozbay (2007): “Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory
and experiment,” The American Economic Review, 97(4), pp. 1407–1418.
Gerrig, R. J. and P. G. Zimbardo (2007): Psychology and life, 18th ed edition, Pearson
/ Allyn and Bacon, Boston, Mass.
Gimpel, H. (2007): Preferences in negotiations: The attachment effect, Lecture notes in
economics and mathematical systems, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
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Summary. Standard economic theory offers normative as well as descriptive models to
describe and predict human choice behavior. Here, the role of emotion in decision-making
has been ignored in the past. To make advantageous decisions, a subject must be able
to valuate gains and losses as options to be realized in future outcomes. Additional to
standard economic theory it is suggested that decisions are aided by emotions, in the form
of somatic states, that are elicited during the deliberation of future consequences and that
mark different options for behavior to be advantageous or disadvantageous. To gain insights
in how economic decisions are made and what role anticipated emotions play in economic
decision-making, the somatic marker hypothesis is applied to several standard economic
choice problems. The paper presents an experimental setup to test the role of anticipated
emotions in economic decision-making under risk. The proposed experimental design aims
at measuring the physiological differences of subjects with high and small probabilities
of potential gains and losses in a controlled laboratory experiment with the methodology
of physio economics. The authors present an overview of standard economic theory of
decision making under risk, a review of the role of emotions in decision-making as well
as an introduction into physio economics. The authors further present the design of a
laboratory experiment and the hypotheses to be tested within the experiment.
1 Introduction
In economics it is usually assumed that subjects have stable and well-defined
preferences and make rational choices according to these preferences. Standard
economic theory offers normative as well as descriptive models to describe and
predict human choice behavior. Decision-making under risk is usually modeled
by a choice problem over a set of lotteries, where a lottery is defined as a (known)
distribution of probabilities over a set of outcomes. The standard approach for
decision-making under risk is the expected utility theory by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). The expected utility theory has dominated the analysis of
decision under risk over years and is generally accepted as a normative model. The
predictive quality of the expected utility theory as a descriptive model for decisions
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under risk has often been discussed and criticized, because it is often observed that
subjects do not decide as predicted by expected utility theory. With the prospect
theory Kahneman and Tversky propose an alternative account of decision under
risk. The core idea of the prospect theory is to offer a descriptive model which takes
the observed phenomena in human decision-making into account:
• Certain outcomes are overestimated compared to less probable outcomes.
• Gains and losses are weighted differently, that is subjects show risk aversion
in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face of losses (except for very small
probablities).
• The presentation of a lottery affects subjects preferences.
Standard economic theory ignores the influence of emotions in decision-making.
Research in neuroscience suggests that rational decision-making, in fact, depends on
prior emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level
neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by
emotions. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that
is influenced by marker signals, that express themselves in emotions and feelings.
The theory suggests that decisions are aided by emotions, in the form of somatic
states, that are elicited during the deliberation of future consequences and that
mark different options for behavior to be advantageous or disadvantageous. To gain
insights in how economic decisions are made and what role anticipated emotions
play in economic decision-making, an experimental setup is presented in this paper.
2 Economic Decision-Making under Risk
2.1 Expected Utility Theory
Economic theory usually models decision-making under risk by a choice problem
over a set of lotteries, where a lottery is defined as a (known) distribution of proba-
bilities over a set of outcomes. The standard approach for decision-making under
risk is the expected utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In
case of discrete outcomes, for example, the expected utility is given by the sum of
the probability weighted utilities of the certain (riskless) outcomes. As the name
of the expected utility suggests, a subject‘s decision under risk is based on the
comparison of the expected utilities of different lotteries. That is, the subject decides
in favor of the lottery which provides the highest expected utility. To be more
precise, if the subject faces a binary choice problem of accepting or declining a
single lottery, it is assumed that a subject accepts the lottery if the utility, resulting
from integrating the lottery with ones endowment, is higher than the utility of his
endowment alone. This means that the domain of the utility function is determined
by the final endowment, rather than by gains and losses.
Anticipated Emotions in the Reference-Dependent Valuation of Gains and Losses 161
A subject is called risk averse if he prefers certain outcomes to risky situations.
According to the expected utility theory a subject is risk averse if he prefers the
expected value of a lottery to the lottery itself. That is, in case of risk aversion
the subject‘s utility of the expected values is higher than his expected utility of
the lottery. The degree of risk aversion is measured by the concavity of the utility
function1. Note that also with respect to risk aversion, as mentioned before, the
expected utility theory does not distinguish between gain risk and loss risk.
The expected utility theory is based on four axioms2. A subject is considered
as rational if all four axioms are satisfied. In this case, as von Neumann and Mor-
genstern prove, a subject‘s preferences can be uniquely and completely described
by means of expected utility. Hence, according to von Neumann and Morgenstern,
subjects act rational in a way that they maximize their expected utility.
The expected utility theory has dominated the analysis of decision under risk
over years and is generally accepted as a normative model. Thus, it describes
what a subject should do. However, it is often also applied as a descriptive model,
which means it predicts what subjects in fact do. The predictive quality of the
expected utility theory as a descriptive model for decisions under risk has often
been discussed and criticized, because it is often observed that subjects do not decide
as predicted by expected utility theory. As is well known, Allais (1953) presents
empirical examples, known as Allais paradox, where systematical violations of the
axioms of the expected utility are observed (see next section). These examples and
further observations of systematic violation lead to alternative and complementary
theories of decision-making under risk, where one of the most famous is the so-
called prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
1 More precisely, the (Arrow Pratt) measure of risk-aversion (according to the economists Kenneth
Arrow and John W. Pratt) is defined as ru(c) = − u
′′(c)
u′(c) , where u(c) denotes subject‘s utility of the
certain outcome c and u’(c) and u”(c) the first and second derivative of the utility function u(c).
2 The 4 axioms of expected utility theory:
• Completeness: For every A and B either A  B, A ≺ B or A ∼ B holds.
Completeness assumes that a subject has well defined preferences to compare and evaluate two
alternatives.
• Transitivity: For every A, B and C with A  B and B  C we must have A  C.
Transitivity assumes that, as a subject decides according to the completeness axiom, the subject
also decides consistently.
• Independence: Let A and B be two lotteries with A  B, and let t ∈ (0, 1] ⇒ tA + (1− t)C 
tB + (1− t)C for all C.
Independence assumes that the preference order of two lotteries mixed with a third one maintains
the same preference order as when the two are mixed independently.
• Continuity: Let A, B and C be lotteries with A  B  C ⇒ ∃t ∈ (0, 1) with tA + (1− t)C ∼ B.
Continuity assumes that when there are three lotteries (A, B and C) and the subject prefers A to
B and B to C, then there should be a possible combination of A and C in which the subject is
then indifferent between this mix and the lottery B.
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2.2 Human decision-making in selected choice problems
The application of expected utility theory to choices between lotteries is based on the
principles of expectation, endowment integration and risk aversion. In this section,
several phenomena that violate these principles are presented and illustrated by
examples of empirical tests.
The following observed phenomena systematically occur in human decision
behavior.
• Certain outcomes are overestimated compared to less probable outcomes.
• Gains and losses are weighted differently, that is subjects show risk aversion
in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face of losses (except for very small
probabilities).
• The presentation of a lottery affects subjects preferences.
Examples for these phenomena are presented by a series of choice problems
in Table 1 and it is further illustrated where the principles of the expected utility
theory are violated.
Expected utility theory predicts that the utilities of outcomes are weighted by their
probabilities. Problem 1 to 6 are choice problems that prove as counter-examples to
this principle because subject‘s preferences systematically violate it. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) refer these examples to the certainty effect, because certain outcomes
are overestimated. The pair of Problem 1 and 2 is a variation of the well-known and
often discussed Allais paradox. As shown in Table 1 in Problem 1 and 2 subjects
prefer lottery B over lottery A. In Problem 2 subjects prefer lottery A’ over lottery
B’, which are extensions of Lottery A and B. More precisely, in Lottery A’ and B’
the common consequence of a 66% chance for winning 0 MU (Monetary Units) has
been added. The additional common consequence leads to a shift of preferences
as probability is moved from one common consequence to another. It seems that
a lottery loses attractivity if gains are not certain anymore. The preference order
of Problem 1 (assumed that u(0) = 0) implies that 0.34u(2400) > 0.33u(2500) while
the preference order in Problem 2 implies the opposite. This shift of preferences
violates the independence axiom of the expected utility theory.
The same phenomenon of certain outcomes being overweighted is shown in
Problem 3 and 4. These examples are also based on an example by Allais. Here
most subjects prefer Lottery D over Lottery C but Lottery C’ over Lottery D’. This
shift of preferences is caused by adding a common ratio to Lottery C and D. That
is, Lottery C’ can be expressed as (C, 0.25) and lottery D’ can be expressed as (D,
0.25). The preference order of Problem 3 (assumed that u(0) = 0) implies that u(3000)u(4000)
¡ 45 while the preference order in Problem 4 implies the opposite. This shift of
preferences also violates the independency axiom of the expected utility theory.
Anticipated Emotions in the Reference-Dependent Valuation of Gains and Losses 163
Table 1: Example lotteries of the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
(Number of subjects is denoted by N and the percentage who chose each option is given in [])
Certainty Effect
Problem 1: A: (2500, 33%; 2400, 66%; 0, 1%) ¡ B:(2400, 100%)
N = 72 [18] [82]
Problem 2: A’:(2500, 33%; 0, 67%) ¿ B’:(2400, 34%; 0, 66%)
N = 72 [83] [18]
Problem 3: C:(4000, 80%) ¡ D:(3000, 100%)
N = 95 [20] [80]
Problem 4: C’(4000, 20%) ¿ D’(3000, 25%)
N = 95 [65] [35]
Possibility
Problem 5: E:(6000, 45%) ¡ F:(3000, 90%)
N = 66 [14] [86]
Problem 6: E’:(6000, 0,1%) ¿ F’:(3000, 0,2%)
N = 66 [73] [27]
Reflection Effect
Problem 3’: C”(-4000, 80%) ¿ D”(-3000, 100%)
N = 95 [92] [8]
Problem 4’: C”’(-4000, 20%) ¡ D”’(-3000, 25%)
N = 95 [42] [58]
Problem 5’: E”(-6000, 45%) ¿ F”(-3000, 90%)
N = 66 [92] [8]
Problem 6’: E”’(-6000, 0,1%) ¡ F”’(-3000, 0,2%)
N = 66 [30] [70]
Isolation Effect
Problem 11: In the first step it is decided if a subject is rejected with a
probability of 75% with an outcome of 0 or with a
probability of 25% the subject can can choose between the following lotteries.
(4000, 80%) ¡ (3000,100%)
N = 141 [22] [78]
Problem 12: In the first step a subject is allocated with 1000.
In the second step he has to choose between the following lotteries:
(1000, 50%) ¡ (500, 100%)
N = 70 [16] [84]
Problem 13: In the first step a subject is allocated with 2000.
In the second step he has to choose between the following lotteries:
(-1000, 50%) ¿ (-500, 100%)
N = 68 [69] [31]
The axiom of independence is not only violated if certain outcomes are involved
in choice problems. The pair of Problem 5 and 6 illustrates where the independency
axiom is violated if the chance for winning is reduced to a possibility for winning. If
probabilities for winning are very small, most subjects prefer those lotteries with
the higher gains, even if the probability for winning is smaller. In Problem 5 most
subjects prefer Lottery F over E because the probability for winning is higher. As in
Problem 6 the probability for winning is very small but there is still a possibility for
winning, subjects prefer Lottery E’ over F’ because the outcome is higher.
The reflection effect (Problem 3’ to 6’) describes the phenomenon that preferences
for lotteries change when the signs of these lotteries are inverted. Preferences
for lotteries with positive outcomes (gains) are contrary to the preferences for lot-
teries with negative outcomes (losses). As described above, the preference order
in Problem 3 and 4 violate the expected utility principle of expectation. Certain
outcomes are overestimated which implies risk averse preference to a sure gain over
a larger but probable outcome. Subjects‘ choice in Problem 3’ and 4’ includes a
preference order that implies that certain losses are overestimated, which violates
the independency axiom. The shift of preferences in Problem 3’ to 4’ implies risk
seeking preference against a sure loss. This violates the principle of risk aversion of
the subjects.
As mentioned in the previous section, the domain of a utility function, as as-
sumed by expected utility theory, is determined by the final endowment rather than
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by gains and losses. As the before illustrated examples show, certain outcomes
are overweighted and subjects are risk averse in the face of gains and risk seeking
in the face of losses. In Problem 11 to 13 it is illustrated that subjects preferences
shift when, due to another framing of the choice problem, one of these components
becomes more obvious. Kahneman and Tversky refer these observations as the
isolation effect. In Problem 11, choice between Lottery G and H has to be made
before it is decided if the subject is rejected or not. This is the same situation as
in Problem 4. However, subjects‘ preferences are opposite in Problem 11. The
first step of the choice problem is not taken into account, the subject only looks
at the supposed certain outcome of 3000 MU. Other two-step choice problems
are presented in Problem 12 and 13. Both situations are identical with regard to
the expected outcome. But the framing of the lotteries is different. Problem 12 is
seen as a chance to gain and Problem 13 is seen as a chance to avoid a loss as the
reference-point, the subjects endowment, changes. This seems to show, that the
basis for the valuation of ones utility is not the final state of endowment but the
change of the endowment.
With the prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky propose an alternative account
of decision under risk. The core idea of the prospect theory is to offer a descriptive
model which takes the observed phenomena in human decision-making into ac-
count. That is, the prospect theory includes more degrees of freedom. In general,
this does not improve the quality of a model but in this case the explanatory value
and predictive quality of the model is increased very much.
Prospect theory differentiates between two phases in decision-making: editing
and evaluation. The purpose of the editing phase is to organize and reformulate
given lotteries which results in a simpler or better known presentation of lotteries
and to set a reference point which defines the domain of gains and losses. Further
the edited lotteries are evaluated and the lottery with the highest value is chosen.
The overall value of a lottery V is expressed in terms of two scales, Π and v.
The first scale Π associates a decision weight to each probability p, that is it
reflects the impact of a probability to the overall value of a lottery. The second
scale v assigns a number v(x) to each outcome x, which reflects the subjective
value of the outcome. As outcomes are defined relative to the reference point,
v measures the value of deviations from that reference point (gains and losses).
In prospect theory it is differentiated between strictly positive, strictly negative
and regular lotteries3. For a regular lottery the value of the lottery is given by
V(x, p; y, q) = Π(p)v(x) + Π(q)v(y) with v(0) = 0, Π(1) = 1 and Π(0) = 0.
This value function generalizes expected utility theory by relaxing the expectation
principle.
3 A lottery is given in form of: (x, p; y, q). A lottery is strictly positive if x, y > 0 and p + q = 1,
strictly negative if x, y < 0 and p + q = 1. A lottery is regular if it is neither strictly positive or
negative.
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For a strictly positive or negative lottery the overall value of the lottery is presented
differently: V(x, p; y, q) = v(y) + Π(p)[v(x)− v(y)]. The value of such a lottery
represents the value of the riskless component plus the difference of values between
the outcomes multiplied with the weight of the more extreme outcome.
3 Emotions in (economic) decision-making
As mentioned before, in economics it is assumed that subjects have stable and
well-defined preferences and make rational choices according to these preferences.
Allais described several phenomena that are not consistent with this assumption
and Kahneman and Tversky extended the theory of decision-making under risk
by integrating these phenomena into their model. It seems that human decision
making is influenced by other factors than only rational utility maximization.
The psychology and neural processes that underly human behavior in (economic)
decision-making is investigated to give answers to the questions about what drives
subjects while they valuate gains and losses in order to make advantageous decisions.
The role of emotions in economic decision-making is investigated by different
disciplines and methods.
3.1 Characteristics of emotions
In the nineteenth century the scientists James (1884), Lange and Kurella (1887) devel-
oped a new definition and explanation of the nature of emotions. The James-Lange
theory refers to a hypothesis, which states that within subjects, as a response to
certain stimuli, the autonomic nervous system creates physiological reactions like
muscular tension, a rise in heart rate, perspiration, and dryness of the mouth. Emo-
tions are expressed by feelings which come about as a result of these physiological
changes, rather than being their cause. James (1884) explains his concept as:
”My theory [...] is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception
of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur
is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and
weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are
angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of
sequence is incorrect [...] and that the more rational statement is that we feel
sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble [...]
Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be
purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We
might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem
it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or angry.”
According to the James-Lang theory emotions are associated with distinct pat-
terns of somato-visceral activity. There have been conducted several experiments
which give evidence for the existence of distinct patterns of peripheral activity
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associated with basic emotions. Basic emotions are for example happiness, sadness,
disgust, anger, surprise and fear. The mentioned experiments investigate response
patterns of the autonomic nervous system as a result to different stimuli as for
example voluntary facial expression, visual and olfactory stimuli or film clips (see
Table 2). Response of the autonomic nervous system is expressed by different
physiological reactions. These reactions are for example changes in heart rate, skin
conductance, skin temperature, respiration frequency etc. There is also a lot of
critiques towards the evidence of distinct response patterns. Cacioppo et al. (2000)
state, according to a meta-analysis of the studies investigating the physiological
responses observed during basic emotions, that these studies only provide equiv-
ocal evidence. Rainville et al. (2006) propose two reasons for the limited result in
finding distinctive physiological patterns regarding basic emotions. First, there is
inadequate elicitation of the target emotion to be investigated. Second, there is
incomplete physiological characterization of the following somatic states. As there is
such a controversial discussion about the existence of distinct physiological patterns
associated with basic emotions there clearly is the need of further investigation.
Table 2: Selected Literature on Psychophysiological Parameters
(HR = heart rate, SC/SR = skin conductance/resistance, SP = skin potential)
(BP = blood pressure, ST = skin temperature, RF = respiration frequency, MT = muscle tension, P = pulse, PF = blood flow, ECG = electrocardiography)
Author(s) Published in HR SC/SR SP BP ST RF MT P BF ECG
Vianna et al. (2009) International Journal of Psychophysiol-
ogy, Vol. 72
X X
Rainville et al. (2006) International Journal of Psychophysiol-
ogy, Vol. 61
X X X
Christie and Friedman (2004) International Journal of Psychophysiol-
ogy, Vol. 51
X X X
Vernet-Maury et al. (1999) Journal of the Autonomic Nervous Sys-
tem, Vol. 75
X X X X X X
Ekman et al. (1983) Science, Vol. 221 X X X
Averill (1969) The Society of Psychophysiological Re-
search, Vol. 5, No. 4
X X X X X X
Collet et al. (1997) Journal of the Autonomic Nervous Sys-
tem, Vol. 62
X X X X X
Levenson et al. (1990) Psychophysiology, Vol. 27, No. 4 X X X
3.2 Methods on investigating the role of emotions in decision-making
Understanding how the brain deals with uncertainty and how subjective economic
preferences are represented neurally are two of the central motivating problems
of the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics. Valuation of gains and losses in
risky situations play an important role in human decision-making in order to make
advantageous decisions. As mentioned before subjects do not maximize their utility
by weighting outcomes with probabilities and they would not accept the same
amount of money for a good they own that they were willing to pay for the same
good. As these irregularities occur systematically the question ”Why?” needs to be
answered. In recent years the belief came up, that emotional processing plays an
important role in decision-making.
There are different methods to investigate the role of emotions in human decision-
making and the impact on economics. The underlying neuronal processes of
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decision-making in different situations within different backgrounds are investi-
gated. Some selected literature on investigating the role of emotions in (economic)
decision-making is listed in Table 3. The most common methods on investigating the
Table 3: Selected literature on investigating the role of emotions in (economic) decision-
making
(fMRI = functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, EEG = Electroencephalography, LS = Lesion Study)
(MEG = Magnetoencephalography, PPM = Psychophysiological Methods, TMS = Transcranial Magnet Stimulation)
Author(s) Published in fMRI LS PPM
D’Acremont et al. (2009) Neuroimage, Vol. 47 X
Martino et al. (2009) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol.29, No.12 X
Christakou et al. (2009) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 29, No. 35 X
Krajbich et al. (2009) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 29, No. 7 X
Bault et al. (2008) Plos One, Vol. 3, No. 10 X
Xue et al. (2009) Cerebral Cortex, Vol. 19 X
Rao et al. (2008) Neuroimage, Vol. 42 X
Miu et al. (2008) Biological Psychology, Vol. 77 X
Clark et al. (2008) Brain, Vol. 131 X
D’Argembeau et al. (2008) Neuroimage, Vol. 40 X
Tom et al. (2007) Science, Vol. 315 X
Berntson et al. (2007) SCAN X
Weller (2007) Psychological Science, Vol. 18, No. 11 X
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 28 X
Fellows (2006) Brain, Vol. 129 X
Van’t Wout et al. (2006) Exp Brain Res, Vol. 169 X
Huettel et al. (2006) Neuron, Vol. 49 X
Denburg et al. (2006) International Journal of Psychophysiology, Vol. 61 X
Hsu et al. (2005) Science, Vol. 310 X
Oya et al. (2005) PNAS, Vol. 102, No. 23 X X
Shiv et al. (2005a) Cognitive Brain Research, Vol. 23 X
Shiv et al. (2005b) Psychological Science, Vol. 16, No. 6 X
Bechara et al. (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X X
Smith and Dickhaut (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X
Leland and Grafman (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X
Houser et al. (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X
Crone et al. (2004) Psychophysiology, Vol.41 X
Maia and McClelland (2004) PNAS, Vol. 101, No. 45 X
Sanfey et al. (2003) Science, Vol. 300 X
Lo and Repin (2002) Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, Vol. 14, No. 3 X
Breiter et al. (2001) Neuron, Vol. 30 X
Bechara et al. (1999) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol.19, No. 13 X X
Bechara et al. (1997) Science, Vol. 275 X X
Bechara et al. (1994) Cognition, Vol. 50 X
role of emotions in human decision-making are lesion studies, psychophysiological
measures and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Early investigation on the role of emotional processing in human decision-making
consider patients with lesions in different regions of the brain to compare their
behavior with healthy subjects or with their behavior before the lesion. One of the
most famous studies in brain lesions is the case of Phineas Gage. Damasio (1994)
tells the story of Phineas and conducts similar studies with patients with several
different lesions. This lets him draw conclusions which part of the brain is responsi-
ble for decision-making and how stimuli are processed in order to make decisions.
Bechara et al. (1994) develop the so-called Iowa-Gambling task to investigate human
decision-making under uncertainty by comparing patients’ with healthy subjects’
behavior in conducting the Gambling-Task. Bechara et al. (1997) and Bechara et al.
(1999) extend their investigation by measuring psychophysiological responses of the
subjects to draw conclusions of emotional processing in human decision-making.
Damasio (1994) develops the somatic marker hypothesis, a neuroanatomical and
cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. Bechara
et al. (2005) develop a neuroeconomic model within the somatic marker hypothesis.
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The method of fMRI is applied to identify the neural process underlying the
process of valuation of uncertain decisions. This valuation includes the value of
the different options as well as the associated risk level. Xue et al. (2009) show
that the dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex convey different decision sig-
nals, where the relative strengths of these signals determine behavioral decisions
involving risk and uncertainty. Additional to the investigation of the involved brain
regions in risky decisions, an interesting question to answer is how the human
brain learns which decisions are risky. D’Acremont et al. (2009) use four different
versions of the Iowa gambling task to investigate this question. It has often been
assumed that decision-making under ambiguity is a special, more complex form
of decision-making under risk. Huettel et al. (2006) show that decisions under risk
and ambiguity are supported by different distinct mechanisms. It is well know
that gains and losses are valuated differently while decision-making. Tom et al.
(2007) investigate the neural basis of loss aversion. They find that there is increasing
activity in several brain regions if potential gains increase but there is decreasing
activity in the same brain regions when potential losses are taken into account.
The method of fMRI is not very practicable to combine with the methods of
standard economic research, as for example controlled laboratory experiments.
As mentioned in the last section, emotions are associated to distinct patterns of
physiological states. By measuring different psychophysiological parameters while
decision-making one can identify those patterns and draw conclusions from the
processes of the brain while decision-making. This methodology, further referred to
as physio economics, can easily be combined with standard economic laboratory
experiments and is described in detail in the next paragraph.
3.3 Physio economic methodology
The methodology of physio economics suggests that the responses of skin conduc-
tance and heart rate can be considered as a good proxy for emotional processing
influencing the economic decision-making of subjects (Adam et al., 2009). Physio
economic measurement has some advantages compared to the before mentioned
neuroscientific methodologies. The measurement complexity to obtain skin conduc-
tance and heart rate is relatively low compared to standard economic laboratory
experiments. The interest of research of physio economics can be described by the
following framework (see Figure 1. The framework was developed by Adam et al.
(2009) to describe the decision-cycle in an auction based situation. The cycle is
generally applicable for decision situations. The framework describes the relations
between expertise and personality of a subject with respect to environment, strategy,
events and outcome of a decision situation. The research field of physio economics
aims at investigating the role of experienced as well as anticipated emotions and
their impact on economic decision making.
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Figure 1: Basic Framework
4 An experimental approach to anticipated emotions in the
valuation of gains and losses
Research in neuroscience suggests that rational decision-making depends on prior
emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level
neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making under risk and its
influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a
process that is influenced by marker signals, that express themselves in emotions
and feelings (Bechara et al., 2005). According to the authors, an emotion is defined
as follows:
An emotion is defined as a collection of changes in body and brain states
triggered by a dedicated brain system that responds to specific contents of
ones perceptions, actual or recalled, relative to a particular object or event.
The event that predictably causes an emotion is an emotionally-competent stimulus.
The body responses referred to the stimulus result in a specific somatic state, that
includes physiological reactions. These reactions are for example, as described
before, changes in heart rate, skin conductance, respiration etc. A stimulus can be
a primary or secondary inducer. In the investment world, primary inducers are
reactions to market events, secondary inducers are for example thoughts about
what to do next or about consequences of a decision. Primary inducers result in
experienced emotions while secondary inducers result in anticipated emotions.
The observations of Kahneman and Tversky captured aspects of human economic
choice that were contrary to standard economic theory. However, the prospect the-
ory does not explain why humans choose the way they do.
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4.1 Anticipated emotions in the valuation of gains and losses
According to the somatic marker hypothesis subjects decisions are driven by somatic
reactions. Hereby you can differentiate between positive and negative somatic
reactions, whereas positive somatic reactions serve as a start-signal for a decision
and negative somatic reactions serve as a warning-signal against a decision. What
the common economic models of decision-making under risk, as mentioned before,
do not explain is: Why do subjects evaluate gains other than losses, for example:
Why are subjects risk averse facing gains and risk seeking facing losses? Why do
states of optimism lead to different choices than states of pessimism? Why, when
the market is crashing everyone rushes to sell, and when it is growing, everyone
rushes to buy? To answer these questions, it is suggested that prior to every
cognitive processing there is an unconscious valuation of possible outcomes by
somatic markers. This unconscious preparing by the body may help to identify
which alternatives are advantageous and which are not. In other words, prior
to every decision there is an unconscious valuation of different alternatives. The
valuation results in physiological reactions, like for example changes in heart rate or
skin resistance. This means, the body enters different somatic states confronted with
different decision situations. These somatic states are reactions to the anticipated
outcome of different alternatives and guide the subject to advantageous decisions.
4.2 Hypotheses
The idea of research in the presented experimental setup is to apply the somatic
marker hypothesis to economic choice problems such as presented in the prospect
theory to gain insights in emotional processing of decisions. As mentioned above,
in human decision making there are observed several effects e.g. the certainty effect
and the reflection effect. This means people tend to overweight sure outcomes
compared to less probable alternatives. More precisely sure gains are preferred and
sure losses are avoided. This is expressed by a different risk attitude towards gains
and losses. People are risk averse in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face of
losses. We expect that different valuation of gains and losses as well as different
valuation of probabilities is associated to prior emotional processing expressed by
different emotional states. Further we expect that subjects’ risk attitude changes
depending on previous gains and losses, as the current emotional state changes
and thus the expectations on future outcomes. The hypotheses to be tested in the
experiment are described as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects show different patterns of physiological states (e.g. higher ampli-
tude of skin conductance) towards sure alternatives of a lottery and less probable alternatives.
Hypothesis 2a: Subjects perceive gain risk other than loss risk.
Hypothesis 2b: There are different patterns of physiological states towards anticipated posi-
tive and negative consequences.
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Hypothesis 3a: The valuation of advantageous decisions is associated to prior emotional
processing.
Hypothesis 3b: The characteristics of the patterns of physiological states (e.g. amplitude of
skin conductance) are associated to the subjects’ choice and risk attitude.
Hypothesis 4a: Subjects’ risk attitude changes with previous experiences.
Hypothesis 4b: Subjects’ physiological reactions differ with respect to the order of positive
and negative outcomes.
Hypothesis 5: The impact of a previous decision on the current emotional state is stronger if
the outcome of the previous decision is presented to the subject immediately after the choice
was made.
4.3 Experimental design
In the beginning of the experiment, the subjects take a seat at their computer ter-
minal and are connected to the measurement system. After a calibration phase to
adjust the measurement system and an explanation of the experiment’s rules, the
participants are assigned to one of four different treatments. Physiological measure-
ment of skin conductance and heart rate allows to test the subjects perceiving of risk
related to the decision between different lotteries. In each treatment subjects have
to make ten independent risky decisions. Each decision is presented as a lottery,
containing two alternatives with different outcomes with different probabilities. For
instance, in each period the subjects are presented with two alternatives to chose
between. Each component (i.e. alternatives) of a decision is presented sequentially
on the computer screen with a delay of 5 seconds. When both alternatives are
fully displayed the subjects have to chose between the two alternatives by clicking
the referred button. Each alternative contains different possible outcomes given in
monetary units, realized with different probabilities. The outcome can be positive,
negative or zero. The probabilities range from 100 percent to 1 percent. In every
treatment the realized outcomes of three experiment rounds are chosen by chance
to be payed to the subjects additional to a show-up fee in the end of the experiment.
To control for the effects related to the subjects personal risk attitude, subjects have
to fill out a questionnaire and a risk-aversion test, which is based on Holt and Laury
(2002).
The treatments differ by the order in which the decisions are presented to the
subject and the presentation of the results of the decisions. The decisions to be made
by the subjects in the experiment are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. In Table
4 it is shown that in the first six periods, the possible realizations of the lotteries
do not contain any negative outcomes, while in the last four periods the possible
realizations of the lotteries do not contain any positive outcomes. In the following
description of the treatments this order of decisions is referred to as Order 1.
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Table 4: Experiment Decisions (Order 1)
Decision Alternative 1 Alternative 2
1 (2500 MU, 33%; 2400 MU, 66%; 0, 1%) (2400 MU, 100%)
2 (2500 MU, 33%; 0 MU, 67%) (2400 MU, 34%; 0, 66%)
3 (4000 MU, 80%; 0 MU, 20%) (3000 MU, 100%)
4 (4000 MU, 20%; 0 MU, 80%) (3000 MU, 25%; 0 , 75%)
5 (6000 MU, 45%; 0 MU, 55%) (3000 MU, 90%; 0 MU, 10%)
6 (6000 MU, 1%; 0 MU, 99%) (3000 MU, 2%; 0 MU, 98%)
7 (-4000 MU, 80%; 0 MU, 20%) (-3000 MU, 100%)
8 (-4000 MU, 20%; 0 MU, 80%) (-3000 MU, 25%; 0 MU, 75%)
9 (-6000 MU, 45%; 0 MU, 55%) (-3000 MU, 90%; 0 MU, 10%)
10 (-6000 MU, 1%; 0 MU, 99%) (-3000 MU, 2%; 0 MU, 98%)
Table 5: Experiment Decisions (Order 2)
Decision Alternative 1 Alternative 2
1 (-4000 MU, 80%; 0 MU, 20%) (-3000 MU, 100%)
2 (-4000 MU, 20%; 0 MU, 80%) (-3000 MU, 25%; 0 MU, 75%)
3 (-6000 MU, 45%; 0 MU, 55%) (-3000 MU, 90%; 0 MU, 10%)
4 (-6000 MU, 1%; 0 MU, 99%) (-3000 MU, 2%; 0 MU, 98%)
5 (2500 MU, 33%; 2400 MU, 66%; 0, 1%) (2400 MU, 100%)
6 (2500 MU, 33%; 0 MU, 67%) (2400 MU, 34%; 0, 66%)
7 (4000 MU, 80%; 0 MU, 20%) (3000 MU, 100%)
8 (4000 MU, 20%; 0 MU, 80%) (3000 MU, 25%; 0 , 75%)
9 (6000 MU, 45%; 0 MU, 55%) (3000 MU, 90%; 0 MU, 10%)
10 (6000 MU, 1%; 0 MU, 99%) (3000 MU, 2%; 0 MU, 98%)
In Table 5 it is shown that the decisions are presented the other way round. In
the following description of the treatments this order of decisions is referred to as
Order 2. Figure 2 to Figure 5 give a graphical illustration of the structure of each
treatment.
Figure 2: Treatment 1
In Treatment 1 (Figure 2) and Treatment 2 (Figure 3), the order of the decisions
corresponds to Order 1. We expect that there might be a difference in risk attitude
if previous decisions and realizations are taken into account for future decisions
as there might be a change in the current emotional state (Hypotheses 4a and
4b). For this reason, we change the order of decisions in Treatment 3 (Figure 4)
and Treatment 4 (Figure 5) to Order 2. The result of each decision is displayed
immediately in the end of each period in Treatment 1 and 3. We hypothesize that
the presentation of the result has an impact on the intensity of the change of the
current emotional state (Hypothesis 5) and therefore on the subjects risk attitude.
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Figure 3: Treatment 2
Figure 4: Treatment 3
Figure 5: Treatment 4
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To control for these effects, in Treatment 2 and 4 the results of each decision are
only displayed in the end of the experiment.
The physio economic decision cycle for this experiment is shown in Figure 6. We
expect that the different treatments have a different impact on the evaluation of
the presented lotteries because of different emotional processing (Hypotheses 3a
and 3b) and different emotional states. We assume that according to the current
emotional state the risk attitude of the subjects changes. The evaluation of a lottery
by a subject is conscious as well as unconscious. Deciding conscious means that a
subject actively thinks about the possible outcomes of a lottery and calculates the
risk. We assume, however, that decisions are aided by emotions, elicited during the
deliberation of the possible outcomes, that mark the different options as advanta-
geous or unadvantageous. This emotional deliberation during decision-making is
unconscious. We expect that the confrontation with a decision elicits immediate
emotions as a direct reaction to this event but also elicits anticipated emotions.
Anticipated emotions express, by imagining future outcomes, how it would feel
like to receive a future gain or loss. Emotional reactions towards sure alternatives
might be stronger than towards less probable alternatives. Further, we hypothesize
that physiological patterns of anticipated emotions towards certain outcomes or less
probable outcomes are different (Hypothesis 1) as well as physiological patterns
of anticipated emotions towards gains or losses are different (Hypotheses 2a and
2b). Immediate emotions as well as anticipated emotions have an impact on the
current emotional state, which changes the subjects’ risk attitude. We expect that in
Treatment 3 and Treatment 4 the subjects are in a different current emotional state
than the subjects in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. If the result of a decision is dis-
played immediately, there is an impact on the immediate as well as the anticipated
emotions. This again leads to a different current emotional state, as we expect that
there is a difference in Treatment 1 and 3 and Treatment 2 and 4.
Figure 6: Experimental Framework
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5 Conclusion and Outlook
The presented experimental design contributes in special to gain insight into the
subjects’ valuation of gains and losses dependent on the associated probabilities.
With the methodology of physio-economics the role of (anticipated) emotions is
investigated to draw conclusions from the impact of prior emotional processing on
economical decisions. As Kahneman and Tversky point out in their prospect theory,
subjects valuate gains and losses related to a reference-point. The reference-point
assigns what is seen as gain or loss individually to a subject. As losses are valuated
differently compared to gains, subjects’ risk attitude and therefore decisions depend
on where the reference-point is set. It is assumed that the reference-point is not
only set according to the status quo but also according to expected future gains
and losses. In future research, based on the results of the present experimental
setup, the impact of the current emotional state on the calculation and shifts of
the reference-point will be investigated. The shift of reference-point might cause
different effects in decision-making. The so-called pseudo-endowment effect, as
one possible approach to explain the so-called auction-fever, is caused by a shift
of reference-point resulting in higher willingness to pay. Auction-fever combines
different approaches to explain effects on the development of prices in auctions.
Insights from the proposed experiment and further research can contribute to
extensions of the classical economic theories and models where descriptions and
explanations are not conform with actual observations of human behavior.
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Summary. The introduction of new mobile phone tariffs with cost caps raises some in-
teresting questions about consumer perception of additional flat rate value components,
especially the so called taxi meter effect. The paper presents a seminal experimental setup
to test if consumers feel negatively if costs are realized per unit of time. Additionally the
design allows to assess the interplay of the so called insurance and taxi meter effect. With
this results an even better understanding of cost cap tariffs and potential tariff switching
behavior in mobile telecommunications would be possible. In contrast to a flat rate pricing,
the cost cap tariff allows for cost insurance, while maintaining the taximeter property as
long as the cost cap is not reached. The proposed experimental design aims at measuring the
physiological differences of participants with a flat rate tariff in comparison to a pay-per-use
and a cost cap tariff in a controlled laboratory experiment with the methodology of physio
economics. The authors present a brief summary of the literature about tariff bias research,
a review of the related methodology as well as an introduction into physio economics. It
follows an outline of the laboratory experiment and the hypotheses that can be tested with
this experimental setup.
1 Introduction
Nowadays consumers face a sheer endless variety of tariff alternatives when de-
ciding for a telecommunication or information service. Competing firms engage
in price competition, since there is not much scope for quality differentiation. In
the early days of mobile telecommunication services in Germany consumers could
not opt for a flat rate plan. Network providers offered usage based tariffs with a
fixed fee per billing period. Prices per minute were usually higher at daytime, since
network providers established tariffs similar to the peak load pricing scheme in
classic network industries. Additionally users were charged comparably high rates
for calls terminated into a concurring networks.
1.1 Tariffing Mobile Telecommunication
So called ”Two-part tariffs” have a long tradition in telephony (Littlechild, 1975).
Their popularity stems from the fact that a large portion of the provider’s costs
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are fixed costs related to the build up, maintenance and operation of the network
infrastructure, which can be recovered by the fixed component of the two-part tariff
(Valletti, 2003). On the contrary, the marginal costs of calling, which are constituted
through switching or interconnection fees, for example, are relatively small and
can be recovered by the variable component of the two-part tariff. In fact, if the
telephony provider holds a monopoly, which has been the case for the fixed-line
providers for most of the twentieth century, two-part tariffs can even achieve to
extract customer rent completely, comparably to perfect price discrimination (Oi,
1971).
Later on the network providers focused almost simultaneously on three part tariffs
witch are defined by a usage allowance, a corresponding access price and a marginal
price for any usage in excess of the allowance. This innovation allows them to
price discriminate between consumers based on the expected amount of usage.
Therefore providers discriminate not solely over the average usage, but also over
variation of usage (Lambrecht et al., 2007). A clever design of the set of offered
allowances can exploit consumer uncertainty of future demand and lurks them
more likely into more expensive tariffs with a higher amount of included minutes.
Obviously this pricing scheme is not linear since the average price per minute in
different combinations of allowance and access price can vary. It is not surprising
that network providers were enthusiastic about this form of price discrimination.
Despite the intensive marketing campaigns consumers did not fully accept this tariff
scheme until now.
Following the decision of E-Plus (KPN) to grant mobile discounters access to their
network, the other operators1 jumped on the bandwagon soon. Competition led to
an enormous variety of tariffs in the market and prices for mobile telecommunication
services dropped rapidly. Today every network provider offers all-net flat rates,
defined by a fixed price for all calls originated and terminated inside Germany.2
Since a few months a new tariff model changes the market again. A new innovative
cost cap tariff has been introduced to the German mobile market in 2009 by o2
(Telefonica).3 The cost cap tariff is a new type of two-part tariff that constitutes
a hybrid between a pay-per-use and a flat rate. It is a pure uniform pay-per-use
tariff until the total costs exceed a predefined cost cap, at which the tariff effectively
becomes a flat rate. o2 claims that the cost cap tariff is a great success and has
significantly contributed to attracting new customers (Briegleb, 2009). Since the
current cost cap equals the actual market price for an all-net flatrate this tariff
obviously became a weakly dominated alternative.
1 T-Mobile, Vodafone and o2 (Telefonica)
2 Except for all premium- and international calls, roaming, all forms of data connections as well as
short- and multimedia messaging.
3 The tariff, which is called “o2 o”, has officially been released on May 5, 2009.
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1.2 Flatrate and Pay-per-use Bias
Economic theory assumes that consumers, independent of the tariff alternatives
and characteristics, maximize their utility when selecting a pricing scheme for
telecommunication or information services. Therefore a chosen tariff usually should
lead to the lowest possible bill given the anticipated usage volume of a service.
Economically this corresponds to a maximization of the consumer rent. In reality
people often behave differently from what theory suggests. Existing research
shows that consumers are often biased in favor of flat rate tariffs (e.g. Nunes, 2000;
Miravete, 2003; Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Gerpott, 2009; Grubb, 2009). The so
called ”flat rate bias” describes the phenomenon that consumers tend to choose
a flat rate even if a pay-per-use pricing scheme would be cheaper with regard to
their usage volume. This behavior has been shown in context with all-you-can-eat
buffets (Just and Wansink, 2008), gym subscriptions (Della Vigna and Malmendier,
2006), Internet access plans (e.g. Train et al., 1989; Kridel et al., 1993; Lambrecht
and Skiera, 2006a) and mobile calling plans (e.g. Mitomo et al., 2007; Gerpott, 2009).
Flexibility is the core property of pay-per-use tariffs. A so called ”pay-per-use bias”
could be identified in a few studies (e.g. Kridel et al., 1993; Prelec and Loewenstein,
1998; Miravete, 2003; Schulze and Gedenk, 2005). Consumers value the option of
consuming less in one billing period without being committed to a high fixed fee.
This can sometimes result in decisions for a usage based pricing scheme, even if a
flat rate would be cheaper in the long run. Nevertheless this phenomenon seems
to be far less widespread than the flat rate bias. With respect to information and
communication services, the literature has identified four distinctive effects that are
supposed to drive the flat rate bias:
Effects causing a Flat rate Bias
According to the insurance effect risk-averse consumers who cannot predict their
future demand correctly choose a flat-rate to insure against the risk of high costs
in periods of higher than average usage. The convenience effect may stem from
consumers who want to avoid the effort of finding an alternative tariff. Telecom-
munications companies try to leverage this effect by offering dominated tariff
alternatives. Consumers with potentially high search costs or a high degree of
convenience end up with such a dominated tariff more likely. Due to incorrect
anticipation of future demand consumers may tend to overestimation of service
usage and therefore choose a flat-rate more frequently. If consumers enjoy the usage
of a telecommunication service more if they use a flat-rate this is called the taxi
meter effect. The intuition behind the taxi meter effect is borrowed from the analogy
of using a cab in a foreign city. It is commonly described as the reduced joy of
consuming one unit of the service because of the immediately perceived cost of
consumption due to the taxi meter. Since a flat rate has marginal costs of zero per
unit of time the joy of consumption is higher. This prevention of immediate cost
reception is interpreted as one component of additional value, favoring the decision
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for a flat rate. The taxi meter effect can be explained by the theory of mental ac-
counting (Thaler, 1985, 1999). Consumers assign costs to different mental accounts,
dependent on the time of cost realization. The price of a flat rate is accounted in the
beginning of a billing period, since it is comparable to sunk costs. Therefore usage
is perceived as costless or free. In contrast to that a usage based tariff is perceived
differently, since costs are realized per time unit. This immediate accounting of
costs reduces the joy of every consumed unit. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006b) are the
first controlling for all four different effects supposed to cause the total flat-rate bias
and point out the importance of measuring all effects simultaneously. This paper
tries to shed light on two effects that are assumed to lead to biased decisions. The
authors propose an experimental design to test isolated for this effects which can be
interpreted as additional value components of a flat rate tariff.
2 The methodology of tariff choice bias analysis
The literature about tariff biases is best categorized by the methodology that has
been used to conduct the economic analysis itself, but also by the type of underlying
theoretical model.
Econometric analysis based on historical usage data identifies ex-post suboptimal
tariff decisions as biased. Every consumer who could have saved money in another
but his own tariff is labeled as potentially biased. In contrast to this approach of
mapping ex-post usage data on different ex-ante tariff alternatives, choice models
are designed to capture the decision process of consumers itself. Those econometric
models incorporate various independent variables like price and amount of usage
to estimate the given tariff decision of a consumer. A tariff bias is incorporated into
the model as a unique tariff inherent variable. If such a variable turns out to be
significant a tariff decision is assumed to be influenced at least to some degree by
other than rational parameters.
Nevertheless many of those classic econometric analyses propose only intuitions
and guesses for the biases found in the data. The predominant explanation is the
inability of consumers to anticipate their own amount of usage correctly in given
period of time. This leads to the methodological discussion of how to analyze the
phenomenon. Econometric analysis of usage data appears to be the right tool if one
tries to confirm the mere existence of such biases and perhaps to quantify the extent.
It seems more challenging to identify and confirm influence factors witch lead to
such biases. Since the necessary information cannot be derived by analyzing usage
data, researchers have to rely on other methodological tools. Questionnaires are
one source of data to identify the influence factors of tariff decisions. Some authors
conduct so called ”quasi experiments”. As an extension of a classic questionnaire
they formulate hypothetical situations and induce a usage level to measure how
subjects think they would behave in the given situations. This quasi experimental
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methods obviously lack the controlled environment, as well as the direct monetary
incentives that are provided in a classic economical laboratory experiment.
3 An experimental approach to the taxi meter effect
The introduction of new mobile phone tariffs with cost caps raises some interesting
questions about consumer perception of additional flat rate value components,
especially the taxi meter effect. In telecommunications the best analogy to a costly
taxi ride, as described in section 1.2, might be a service hotline call where consumers
usually have to pay a higher than usual fee and have to wait in a queue before
they receive service. The question arises if consumers experience the taxi meter
effect even if they are insured against high costs and how this affects their perceived
feelings during the consumption as well as the tariff selection process itself. In
contrast to a flat rate pricing scheme, cost cap tariffs allow for cost insurance, while
maintaining the taximeter property as long as the cost cap is not reached. Therefore
this pricing scheme allows the experimenter to control for the interdependency of
this two effects. The experimental design proposed in this article aims at measuring
the physiological differences of participants with a flat rate tariff in comparison
to a pay-per-use and a cost cap tariff in a controlled laboratory experiment with
the methodology of physio economics. Especially the existence of the taxi meter
effect has never been verified and examined in an experimental setup. Krämer and
Wiewiorra (2010) already showed in a seminal study of end user cost cap tariffs
that consumers seem to perceive the taxi meter property differently under a cost
cap and a pay-per-use tariff. The following experimental setup will propose several
design parameters to isolate the tariff properties driving the taxi meter effect.
3.1 Physio economic measurement
Human decision-making is not a purely cognitive driven maximization of utility.
Human behavior is to some extent influenced by emotions and perceived feelings
(Loewenstein, 2000). The field of psychophysiology focuses on the relationship of
cognitive and emotional processes, physiological states and the human behavior
itself. The methodology of physio economics in particular suggests that the re-
sponses of heart rate and skin conductance can be considered as a good proxy for
emotional processes influencing the economic decision making of human beings
(Adam et al., 2009). This approach has several advantages in comparison to the
quasi experimental methodology mentioned in section 2. Questionnaire data in
general deal with the severe problem of social desirability (Crowne and Marlowe,
1960). Respondents tend to answer questions in a way they assume to appear as
socially suitable. Physiological parameters instead measure the activation of the
autonomic nervous system and therefore cannot directly be influenced by free will.
Physio economic methods add to the field by obtaining objective data not relying
on self reported information. Furthermore the measurement complexity to obtain
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heart rate and skin conductance in relation to standard computer based laboratory
experiments is relatively low.
3.2 Isolation of tariff inherent properties
The authors intend to compare pay-per-use, cost cap and flat rate tariffs with each
other. Therefore the theoretical differences between them have to be outlined first.
Table 1 shows the identified effects and their impact on the the two fundamental
pricing schemes and the hybrid cost cap tariff. In a controlled laboratory environ-
ment convenience of participants can be ruled out as a possible effect favoring a
flat rate tariff, in particular because there are no additional search costs involved
and the complexity of the presented information will be low due to the simplified
experimental design. Overestimation can be ruled out if the experimenter decides
beforehand to inform the participants about the maximum time of one experimental
run. Therefore only the remaining effects influence the taxi meter property and a
potential switching decision of the participants.
The flexibility effect can’t be fully ruled out in the lab without violating the insur-
ance property. If one would announce the exact duration of one run beforehand
there is no longer any need for insurance, but also no desire to remain flexible in the
cost dimension. The insurance, as well as the flexibility property on the one hand
is incorporated by two of the three tariff schemes, the cost cap and flat rate tariff
and the cost cap and pay-per-use tariff respectively. The taxi meter property on the
other hand is not eliminated by the pay-per-use and the cost cap tariff. Therefore
this particular design and the right set of presented information can rule out all
effects except for the insurance and flexibility effect potentially influencing the
physiological reactions to the taxi meter property.
Table 1: Potential effects on the choice of different tariff schemes
Pay-per-use Cost Cap Flatrate
(PPU) (CC) (FR)
Insurance - + +
Convenience - ? +
Overestimation - + +
Taximeter - ? +
Flexibility + + -
3.3 Basic experimental design
Physiological measurement of skin conductance and phasic heart rate allow the
experimenter to test whether consumers feel negatively if costs are realized per unit
of time or not. Participants have to accomplish a simple, but time consuming task
in the laboratory. For instance they have to listen to a sound recording and are
Consumer Perception of Time-Based Pricing 185
advised to stop the playback the moment they can answer a question which answer
is presented somewhere during the record. At the beginning of the experiment
all participants get a basic amount of experimental monetary units and will be
connected to the physiological measurement equipment. After a calibration phase to
adjust the measurement devices and a standardized explanation of the experimental




The first computer screen explains the pricing procedure to the participants. While
flat rate users pay the costs for the flat rate at the end of one experimental run,
participants in the other groups pay for each time unit immediately and can monitor
the duration as well as the cumulating costs on the screen. Additionally it is possible
to signal every new time unit with an audio sound. This feature is implemented
into some mobile phones, but almost vanished from the market.4 For traceability
the maximum costs under a cost cap tariff equals the price for a flat rate and
the price per time unit has to be chosen in direct relation to the duration of one
experimental run. Therefore all participants should end up with the same costs
for one run. With a classic pay-per-use tariff consumers are not insured against
high costs and therefore one expects to measure the pure taxi meter property in this
group. Flexibility can only have an effect on a potential tariff switching decision, not
on the perception of the taxi meter property itself, because flexibility is ensured by
both the classic pay-per-use and the hybrid cost cap tariff. Therefore the treatment
as shown in figure 1 is analogous to a taxi ride with a taxi meter directly visible







Figure 1: Treatment - Pay-per-use
amount of experimental monetary units they can loose in one run. In this setting
one measures the physiological reactions to the taxi meter property under insurance
against high costs. In an additional treatment one can eliminate the taxi meter
property completely by introducing a classic flat rate tariff, as shown in figure 3.
With this setup one measures the effect of insurance without the taxi meter property.
The price of the flat rat, as well as the remaining part of the endowment is presented
on the computer screen, but during the experiment participants occur no additional
costs. As already mentioned in section 1 compared to a cost cap tariff an equally
4 If there is a significant physiological reaction to additional audio signals this might be a reason
why mobile telecommunication operators intervened to abolish this feature.







Figure 2: Treatment - Cost cap
priced flat rate is a weakly dominated alternative. Nevertheless this benchmark
treatment allows us to check whether the mental accounting of cost caps results in
similar physiological responses as to a pay-per-use pricing or more like to a flat







Figure 3: Treatment - Flatrate
laboratory participants have to fill out an additional computer based questionnaire
as shown in figure 1, 2 and 3 based on the survey design already successfully used
in Krämer and Wiewiorra (2010).5 To further assess if risk-aversion has an influence
on physiological reactions a risk aversion test based on Holt and Laury (2002) will be
conducted at the end of all treatments along with the computer based questionnaire.
Participants will be paid immediately by the experimenter to obtain reliable data.
To control especially for Neuroticism, the experience of negative emotions and
environmental stress, one of the ”big five” factors of personality6, the respective
questions of the short version of the revised NEO personality inventory, namely
”NEO-Five Factor Inventory” (NEO-FFI), will be presented to the participants in a
computer based version after the risk aversion test. As mentioned before, there are
several parameters that can be modified to gain deeper insights into the taxi meter
property. One can aggravate the per unit cost signal by an audio sound. Therefore
the immediate cost perception is increased. Another important parameter is the
cost per minute. It has to be tested, if an increase of the costs per minute relate to
the physiological responses of the participants.
Hypotheses - Basic Experimental Design
Hypothesis 1
Participants under a pay-per-use tariff show a significantly higher amplitude of skin con-
ductance and a relative deceleration of the heart rate in response to the discrete events of
interval based costs presentation.
5 The questionnaire collects data on the respondents’ actual mobile telephony tariff characteristics
(such as contract duration, tariff model, average monthly bill, maximum bill, price per minute
etc.). Participants will be explicitly notified that from this point on, they are asked about their real
actual mobile phone usage.
6 Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience
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Hypothesis 1b -The physiological responses to the discrete events of interval based costs
presentation is significantly higher, if the signaling of costs is not only visual, but audio-
visual.
Hypothesis 1c -The physiological responses to the discrete events of interval based costs
presentation is significantly higher, if the costs per unit of time are increased.
Hypothesis 2
The average physiological response to the discrete events of interval based costs presentation
under a cost cap tariff is significantly lower compared to the average physiological response
under a pay-per-use tariff.
Hypothesis 2b - The individual physiological responses to the discrete events of interval
based costs presentation under a cost cap tariff depend significantly on the individual mental
accounting of the cost cap. (i.e. sunk-costs or insurance)
Hypothesis 3
Participants under a flat rate tariff show no significant physiological response to the discrete
presentation of elapsed time units.
3.4 Extended experimental design
The basic experimental design presented so far aims at validating the mere existence
of the taxi meter effect and the identification of influence factors on its magnitude.
However it remains unclear whether the taxi meter effect has also a significant
effect on the tariff switching behavior of consumers. Besides that, consumers could
experience the taxi meter property differently dependent on their old tariff scheme.
Especially the perception of cost caps might be influenced to some extend by a
”mental accounting habit”. One can assume that consumers switching from a flat
rate to a cost cap tariff are already used to account costs as sunk and therefore
show lower physiological responses to the discrete events of interval based costs
presentation compared to consumers switching from a classic pay-per-use tariff to a
cost cap tariff. To answer this questions a switching decision has to be implemented
in the experimental design as shown in figure 4. Again participants in the pay-
per-use group pay each time unit immediately and can monitor the duration as
well as the cumulating costs on the screen, while flat rate users pay the fixed fee at
the end of one run. Initially participants are assigned to one of the three available
tariff schemes. After the first run all participants can switch the pricing scheme.
The general procedure is identical to the basic experimental design as described in
section 3.3.
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Hypotheses - Extended Experimental Design
Hypothesis 4
Participants under a pay-per-use tariff in the first run with high physiological responses to
the discrete events of interval based costs presentation are significantly more likely to switch
the tariff scheme.
Hypothesis 4b - Participants under a cost cap tariff in the first run with high physiological
responses to the discrete events of interval based costs presentation are significantly more
likely to switch to a flat rate tariff.
Hypothesis 4c - Participants under a cost cap tariff in the first run with high physiological
responses to the discrete events of interval based costs presentation are significantly less
likely to switch to a flat rate tariff in the second run, than participants under a pay-per-use































Figure 4: Treatment - Switching
4 Conclusion and Outlook
The presented experimental design contributes to gain insight into newly intro-
duced cost cap tariffs and allows for a deeper understanding of the flat rate bias.
In general the experiment adds to the field of consumer perception of time-based
pricing schemes. Even though the current framing aims at mobile tariffing the
results can be generalized to other industries as well. While mobile operators are
interested in higher revenues through increased demand, regulators and politicians
are sometimes interested in lowering demand or in protecting consumers against
unintended high costs. The former could be relevant in electricity markets where
smart metering is about to be introduced. Therefore a more immediate cost percep-
tion might have beneficial effects on energy consumption. The latter has already be
implemented by a regulatory rule to cap data-roaming costs for all mobile telephony
customers in the European Union (Labs, 2010). If consumers indeed experience a
Consumer Perception of Time-Based Pricing 189
lower disutility of the taxi meter property due to the insurance effect, a cost cap on
data-roaming could even increase demand without any changes in the price per
unit of service. The same intuition holds for cost cap tariffs in general. Therefore
the open question remains whether cost caps have an indirect effect on demand
too. If consumers are more relaxed and unsolicitous due to the insurance property,
this could cause an increase of service usage even without reaching the cost cap.
Consumers could end up paying more on average compared to a classic pay-per-use
tariff even if the cost cap never becomes binding.
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Summary. Within its Strategy for Sustainability, the German Federal Government aims to
reduce the land utilization to a maximum of 30 hectare per day in 2020. From an economic
perspective, market-based-instruments such as cap-and-trade schemes are promising policy
mechanisms to achieve this goal efficiently. Market-based instruments are relatively new
mechanisms for the management of natural resources and the environment, for which
regulatory approaches have largely failed. First field experiments have revealed that the
implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme to limit the land utilization is very complex.
Based on the results of a field experiment, we conducted a lab experiment with different
student groups, who played the role of municipalities, and analyzed the effect of framing
the task. The study reveals that the total incomes of the municipalities for reaching the
target can be higher in the cap-and-trade system than in a comparable command-and-
control system. Concerning the framing, we could not observe any impact on the market
outcome. However, the spatial planning students were further away from the theoretical
optimum than the economics student group. As in the field experiment, the complexity of
the trading system and the design of decision support tools are linked to a higher market
outcome in the economics student group. As a result, an extensive preparatory phase
for practical decision makers in municipal administrations might be necessary in order to
assure sufficient competence and acceptance for the new instrument.
1 Introduction
In Germany, there is an ongoing conversion of agricultural land into residential and
commercial uses. Negative ecological and economic consequences related to this
trend compromise the ecological function of space as a resource for humans, animals,
and plants. One of the reasons for the continuous consumption of land is the tight
financial situation of many municipalities (Jörissen and Coenen, 2007). At first
glance, the development of new areas in the outer area appears attractive because it
is often cost neutral or even linked with proceeds from selling land. Moreover, a
larger estate per capita ratio is expected to attract the settlement of young families
with a positive impact on the redistribution of income taxes. However, the urban
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sprawl also increases the long term costs of the public infrastructure and, thus,
amplifies the financial burden in the long run (e.g. Gutsche, 2006; Preuß, 2009;
Siedentop, 2007).
Another challenge is the large number of protagonists, who are involved in the
process of land utilization, and the reconciliation of their interests. The Federal
Government and the Federal State provide an economic and legal framework but
cannot directly control the land consumption. The municipalities are responsible for
spatial planning and are allowed to draw up their own spatial development plans.
Thereby, the local municipalities have almost full planning sovereignty within their
territory. Still, decisions result from a complex interaction between planning and
political bodies of the municipalities as well as investors and conservationists.
The above described situation in Germany give rise to a discussion about in-
novative planning approaches and new policy instruments. The present land use
planning policy has only been partially successful in limiting land consumption
and urban sprawl. Within this context, the Strategy for Sustainability of the Federal
Government states the intention to develop a practical programme for housing and
transport-related land utilization while considering ecological, social, and economic
objectives (Bundesregierung, 2002, 2004). Furthermore, the Federal Government
has set an ambitious 30 ha per day goal in its 2002 Strategy for Sustainability to
reduce the usage of new areas by 2020. In this programme, land-related financial,
fiscal and development policy instruments will be examined to minimise the urban












































Figure 1: Land Development in Germany
During the last years, the development of new areas has slightly declined, but there
is still a big gap between the current development of 113 hectare per day and the
national objective of 30 hectare per day in 2020 (Figure 1). Von Haaren and Michaelis
(2005) argue that previous legal adjustments of the German planning policies had
only little impact on the current land development and are not sufficient to assure a
sustainable development in Germany. It seems to be necessary that the Federal Gov-
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ernment implements an effective medium- and long-term policy for a sustainable
development on the basis of new economic instruments, as legal instruments alone
are apparently not sufficient to reduce land consumption (Bundesregierung, 2004):
”Subsidies, taxes, duties and development programs need to be examined with respect
to their potential contribution to land consumption reduction. To that end, social,
economic and financial effects must also be considered.”
In addition to the examination of other land-related financial, fiscal and development
policy instruments, the Strategy for Sustainability of the Federal Government fo-
cused its attention on inter-disciplinary methods to achieve a stronger link between
the existing ecological and planning approaches.
2 Tradable Development Rights in Germany
Market-based instruments (MBIs) are relatively new economic instruments for
the management of natural resources and the environment (Whitten et al., 2003).
Compared to other regulatory approaches, MBIs ensure that any improvement of
environmental protection and quality is reached at the lowest overall costs. In addi-
tion, a cap-and-trade system specifies in advance a precise target for environmental
protection and the system ensures that the target is reached. Thus, a cap-and-trade
system is not only efficient in economic terms; it is also effective with respect to
environmental protection. MBIs have been gaining more and more acceptance as
policy mechanisms in different areas and have already been applied to different
environmental issues. Cap-and-trade systems have become a leading policy option
in controlling air emissions and are also being used in fisheries regulation (e.g. EU
CO2 Emission Trading Scheme).
The use of tradable development rights (TDRs) under a cap for land development
is considered as a promising policy instrument to reduce the development of new
settlement and commercial areas in Germany (Rolfe and Windle, 2006; Henderson
and Wang, 2007). Within such a scheme, the right of a local authority to develop
new areas would require to submit a certificate for cancelation. By restricting the
total number of permits, the extension of new areas is limited in advance. The
certificates can be freely traded between municipalities. If a local authority wants to
develop a new area and does not have sufficient certificates, it has to buy them on a
market. Alternatively, a municipality with a surplus of certificates can sell them.
The actual price of the certificates is then determined by supply and demand.
Example: Instead of developing a new area with 5 ha associated floor-space, a city
could provide an appropriate site in the inner zone by converting a fallow. In
the former case, the proceeds of selling the real estate would cover all costs of the
development, but the city would have to submit corresponding development rights
for cancellation. In the later case, the infill development is more cost-intensive, but
the city could sell (or would not have to buy) development rights on the market.
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A system with tradable development rights is quite similar to an emission trading
system (e.g. EU ETS). Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the Develop-
ment Rights Trading and compares the trading rules with the Emission Trading
Mechanism. In emissions schemes companies are the participants that have to
realize a total cap (emitted emission permits) at minimal costs. The goal is to reduce
the CO2-emissions by using alternative fuels or by increasing the energy efficiency
of installations. In contrast, in a system with development rights the municipalities
would be the participants and the main goal is the reduction of land use. The
municipalities should be able to provide the floor space by closing gaps in the inner
areas of a city to achieve a total reduction goal, which is determined by the total
amount of emitted certificates.
Table 1: Emission Trading vs. Trading Development Rights
Characteristics Emission Trading Development Rights Trad-
ing
Participants Companies Municipalities / Local au-
thorities
Goal Reduction of CO2 emis-
sions
Reduction of new land use
Certificates Emission permit (1 ton
CO2)
TDR (development of 1
hectare area of settlement)
Objective Realizing total cap (CO2
emissions) at minimal cost
Realizing total cap (devel-
opment of new land) at
minimal cost
Constraints Production of given output
(electricity, heat, concrete)
Provision of floor space
(residential, commercial)
Reduction Alternative fuels, increas-
ing energy efficiency instal-
lations
Closing gaps, conversion of
fallows, smaller/denser de-
velopment areas
However, a system of Tradable Development Rights (TDRs) can give rise to hosts of
constitutional and planning policy concerns (e.g. Bovet, 2006; Schläpfer, 2007; Süss
and Gmünder, 2005). For instance, when using the certificates the existing planning
guidelines have to be considered. In the fields of spatial planning, construction
planning law, nature conservation and specialized planning law many legal and
planning instruments to protect the open space and to assure a sustainable urban
development already exist. As mentioned above, the biggest problem might to be
the planning sovereignty of the municipalities, which is guaranteed by the German
constitution. Therefore, it is difficult for the Federal Government to set tight limits
on the quota for developing new areas in a system with TDRs. Thus, TDRs must be
considered as a supplement to the system of existing planning instruments.
Unfortunately, recent case studies have revealed that the design and implemen-
tation of a cap-and-trade scheme in land development is complex (Radermacher,
2004; Henger and Schröter-Schlaack, 2008; Walz and Ostertag, 2007). Experiences
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with existing schemes have also shown some practical difficulties, which implemen-
tations must take into consideration (Schleich et al., 2006). Thus, new planning
instruments should be carefully investigated before actually applying them in prac-
tice. Alongside theoretical analysis, it is important that supplementary areas of
research also include numerous practical projects and research programs before
continuing to pursue some of these approaches in real practice. Results of pilot
projects, which currently run in some municipalities, should be evaluated, and
discussed with the potential market participants. With respect to the use of land,
exemplary projects and case studies have been already conducted at the national
level (e.g. Gutsche, 2007; Preuß, 2006; Walz, 2005). In the future, more simulations
and regional reference cases should be pursued.
Experience with cap-and-trade systems has led to a rich empirical and exper-
imental academic literature on the subject. Focusing on the market design, the
theoretical literature allows to make predictions about the market outcomes of
different designs in particular situations (Roth, 1988; Smith, 1994). Empirical experi-
ence with real-world environmental markets give evidence of how well the theory
fits with actual results. Another way to do that, is to test and refine environmental
markets in the laboratory - the so-called test bedding method (Plott and Porter, 1996;
Plott and Cook, 2005). For evaluating environmental policy instruments, different
experimental methods have been recently used (Shogren, 2005). In the laboratory, a
group of human participants are sitting in front of a set of computers and are linked
with each other by specialized software. The participants have to cope with decision
tasks, which include carefully controlled incentives, choices, information, and other
characteristics. By varying one design parameter between different experimental
sessions, while holding all other factors constant, the experimentalists can test how
that treatment variable affects the market outcome. Typically, students are recruited
for the experiments. They receive a payment based on their performance in the
experiment. These economics experiments are increasingly used for investigating
public policy and economic theories.
Ostertag et al. (2009) have investigated a potential TDR system in a controlled
field experiment with actual German municipalities based on real data. They
find that such a system may be well suited to effectively reduce the use of land.
While the total cost of the society are lower than under a command-and-control
benchmark, the participants failed to reach the efficiency gains that would have
been possible in theory. Possibly, the participants in the field study did not perfectly
align their actions to the respective monetary valuation. Against this background,
this study uses a lab experiment to investigate whether the particular context of
trading development rights rather than other economic goods impacts the observed
behavior. Moreover, we analyse whether municipal planners behave differently than
more economically trained subjects. Thus, the following questions are addressed:
• Do planning experts behave less efficiently than economic experts?
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• Is it relevant for the development of a strategy, for the efficiency, and for the
scheme design, if participants are trading with rights for land development
instead of neutral goods?
Experimental economic research usually abstracts from a particular context and
confronts subjects in the lab with a stylized model of a decision making situation
(Evans et al., 2008). The underlying assumption is that fundamental principles can
be investigated by a context-free design. However, this leads to an abstraction of
context-dependent effects. Furthermore, the standard subject pool in experimental
economic research are students. Due to the fact that students represent only a small
group of the population, results from experiments with students cannot always be
transferred to other groups of the society (e.g. Henrich, 2001). Therefore, experts or
students from specific fields have been recruited in recent experimental economic
research, because they are already experienced in a certain field of application
(Carpenter et al., 2005).
3 Experimental Design
The above mentioned field study Ostertag et al. (2009) was clearly framed in a land
development context and the subjects were experts in this field. In order to test
whether the background of the participants and the framing of the context related
to the deviation from the theoretical prediction, we conducted a respective control
experiment in the laboratory. The experiment applied a balanced 2x2 design of two
treatments and two subject pools. In the treatment ”FR” the decision situation was
framed with full context information: Participants made decisions over development
projects and traded development rights. In the treatment ”NE” participants decided
over investment projects that required some certificates. Instructions were given in
an abstract and neutral language.
Both treatments were conducted with two subject pools, students from the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (”KA”) and students from the University of
Applied Sciences for Economics and Environment in Nürtingen-Geislingen (”NU”).
The participants from Karlsruhe were mainly recruited from economics study
programs. Consequently, a basic knowledge in economics can be assumed. The
students from Nürtingen have a background in spatial planning and landscaping
and acted as planning experts. Both treatments were run with both groups and two
sessions for each combination. The following four working hypotheses guided the
design:
Efficiency I The description of the context negatively influences the efficiency of
trading.
Efficiency II Economic experts behave more rational (in economic terms) than
planning experts, i.e. they achieve the required reduction of land use at lower
cost.
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Price Discovery I The description of the context negatively influences the price
discovery process.
Price Discovery II Prices in the sessions with the economic experts are closer to
the theoretical prices than with the planning experts.
The sessions with the students from Nürtingen-Geislingen were conducted in
January 2009. A mobile computer lab from the the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
was used for this purpose in order to have the same environmental conditions in
Nürtingen and in Karlsruhe. Subsequently, the remaining sessions were conducted
in the computer lab at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. All students received
a financial compensation for their participation in the experiment that depended on
individual results. The payments ranged from 6.30 euros up to 20.80 euros with an
average of 14.30 euros.
3.1 Rules
In the laboratory experiment we simplified the rules of the field experiment and
run each experimental session within a time slot of around 90 minutes. In a session,
eight students participated and acted on behalf of one municipality each. One
session was divided into seven planning periods. Additionally, two test runs were
carried out at the start of a session, to allow the participants to get used to the
handling of the software. The participants had the task to develop settlement and
commercial areas in each planning period to provide additional space for living
and business.
At the beginning of each period the participants were able to sell or buy certifi-
cates on a market place. Then, they had to select one of 14 development projects,
of which seven were inner-city projects and the other seven involved new land
use in the outer area. The inner-city development projected incurred costs that
differed from project to project and from municipality to municipality. Overall
costs ranged between 27 and 968 monetary units. However, these options did
not require development rights, since these areas are already inner-city settlement
and transport areas. As an alternative, a participant could develop 2 ha of new
settlement area. This areas was assumed to be cost-neutral which means it did
not generates expenses for the municipality. This works on the assumption that a
municipality can pass the development cost of a new settlement area to the property
owner. Due to the fact, that one development rights certificate legitimized the
conversion of 1 hectare forest area or agricultural land into new settlement and
transport areas, two development rights certificates were needed to develop a new
settlement area. The development implementation generated income regardless of
the type of development option. Each participant received 1,000 monetary units
income for carrying out a development option.
At the beginning of a planning period, each participant received one certificate.
The totally emitted development rights allowed the participants to implement on
average half of their outer-city projects. If one development option was carried out
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in a planning period, it could not be used again in the following periods. Each
municipality was able to sell its certificate or buy a second certificate on the market.
In case a participant developed a new settlement area without having the necessary
certificates, sanction payments for each missing certificate were done. The validity
of the certificates was limited to one planning period in order to avoid hoarding
of certificates. Hence, supplementary certificates expired at the end of a planning
period. By this design option, the participants were required to submit limit orders
to avoid expired certificates or sanctions. After the collection of the limit orders
the platform calculated the market price by means of the principle of largest, best
execution. Then, the certificates were transferred between the municipalities and
the participants could select a development option.
4 Results
In the following, the results of the different treatments are presented and evaluated
with respect to the overall economic efficiency and the strategies of the participants.
In order to calculate the achieved cost savings and the efficiency of the trading
system we compare the observed costs generated by the municipalities in the
simulation runs with the theoretical optimum (cost minimum).1
4.1 Monetary Consideration and Efficiency
Figure 2 contrasts the aggregated simulation results and the optimum scenario
including trade (OIT) and the optimum scenario excluding trade (OET). The game
results represent the sum of the final accounts and comprise costs and returns of
the actions, sanction payments, revenues and expenditures from certificate buying
and selling, as well as interest payments. In the optimum trading scenario, four
certificates should be traded in each planning period. In this case, the municipalities
are able to develop in total four new settlement areas and four inner areas per
round without the payment of sanctions or the expiration of certificates. Due to the
positive interest rate, municipalities choose the cheapest inner-city developments in
the optimum scenario first. In the optimum scenario without trade, it is assumed
that all municipalities choose inner-city developments in each planning period and
that all certificates expire. Similar to the optimum trade solution, the cheapest
inner development options are chosen first. So, the scenario which includes trade is
the best-case scenario, and the excluding trade scenario is the worst-case scenario.
These scenarios benchmark for the results of the laboratory experiment.
The average result of all runs amounts to 56,707 mu, which is 10.8% less than the
result of the optimum scenario with trade (63,624 mu). Remarkably, the result of the
1 The following abbreviations are used: The abbreviation ”NE” comprises all four neutral runs
(hence two runs in Karlsruhe and two runs in Nürtingen). ”FR” includes the corresponding runs
of the development context. In contrast, the abbreviations ”NU” (for Nürtingen) and ”KA” (for
Karlsruhe) sum up the results of the runs for the respective student group.
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Figure 2: Simulation Results
students from Karlsruhe (59,683 mu) is 11% higher than the result of the students
from Nürtingen (53,732 mu). More precisely, the efficiency rate
Efficiency =
Optimum Excluding Trade - Simulation Result
Optimum Including Trade
shows how much of the cost savings potential of the optimum including trade has
been realized compared to the optimum excluding trade. Table 2 summarizes the
efficiency rates of the sessions in Nürtingen and Karlsruhe, and in a framed and
neutral treatment.
Table 2: Efficiency Rates
NU-Ne NU-Fr All
Nürtingen (NU) 50.43% 50.25% 50.34%
Karlsruhe (KA) 78.06% 82.37% 80.22%
All 64.24% 66.31% 65.28%
The table shows that the available potential was not completely utilized taking
into account the theoretical possibilities. The efficiency rate of the students from
Karlsruhe (80.22%) is about is about 60% higher than the efficiency rate of the spatial
planning students (50.34%). The statistical evaluation of the simulation results
reveals significant differences between the two student groups.2 Consequently,
the economic experts achieve the reduction goal at lower costs. However, the
2 Student’s t-test for paired samples: n = 32, t = 2,686, p-value = 0.012.
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efficiency rates of the neutral treatment and the framed treatment with 64.24%
and 66.31%, respectively, are almost at the same level. No significant differences
can be observed.3 Therefore, the way of describing of the actual situation has not




















Figure 3: Average Cost of Inner-City Developments
In each round, the average costs of the students from Karlsruhe are below those
of the group from Nürtingen. On average, the costs are 22% lower - with the highest
difference in round six (36%). Considering the aggregated values of the framed and
the unframed treatment, there are no significant differences between the average
costs, except for round six. However, the average costs for land recycling increase
over the course of the simulation. Sanction payments arose only in the second
run for the students from Nürtingen and in the second run for the students from
Karlsruhe. No sanctions were paid in the neutral treatments. Overall, the sanctions
have little influence on the simulation results. Comparing the total costs, the costs in
the Nürtingen sessions are 49.8% higher than the comparative value of the students
from Karlsruhe. Some of the cheapest inner-city options remained unused in the
group from Nürtingen. The results of the framed runs are 7.1% higher than the
results of the context-free runs. Therefore, the description of the actual situation
and the related recycling costs have fewer impact on the choice of development
options than the knowledge of the experts, or respectively the background of the
participants.
3 Student’s t-test for paired samples: n = 32, t = 0.183, p-value = 0.856.
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4.2 Trade and Price Discovery
The price curve in Figure 4 shows that the price of the certificates in each planning
period is above the theoretical market price. The market price for development
rights is also increasing significantly within the course of the simulation run.4
However, the difference between the theoretical market price and the price in the
sessions of the economic experts is decreasing over the course of the simulation and
is reaching its minimum with 150 mu in the last round. This reduction of deviation



























Figure 4: Development of the Market Price
The market prices of the planning experts are on average 350 mu above the
price of the theoretical optimum, without converging to the theoretical solution.
The Nürtingen groups’ market prices for certificates are in each round above the
respective prices of the groups from Karlsruhe. Hence, the certificate prices of the
groups from Nürtingen are further away from the reference price than the certificate
prices of the groups from Karlsruhe. The development of the market price is more
closely correlated with the price of the previous rounds (rKA = 0.802, rNU = 0.626)
than with the average costs accrued in a period (rKA = 0.485, rNU = 0.341). However,
differences between trading with development rights and trading with neutral goods
cannot be identified.
Figure 5 contrasts the traded volume of the different treatments with the mini-
mum trading volume. The minimum trading volume is the amount of certificates
(in ha) that has to be traded in order to achieve the cost optimal result. The reference
scenario has a minimum trading volume of 28 ha certificates. With 22.5 ha (KA-NE)
4 Page trend test: n = 7, c = 8, L = 1005, p-value ≤ 0.001.
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and 21.5 ha (KA-FR), the results of the students from Karlsruhe are closer to the
theoretical reference value than the students from Nürtingen with trade volumes of
18.5 ha (NU-NE) and 16.5 ha (NU-FR). Regarding the trade volume, there are no
important differences between trading with development rights and trading with
neutral goods either. Because of the small trading volume, efficient development
option activation was not feasible, as inner-city development potentials could not
be chosen where they would have been most favorable from an overall perspec-
tive. A further implication of the small trading volume directly results from the
experimental design: If an insufficient number of certificates is traded, in tendency,
more certificates expire unused. If a municipality only holds one certificate, it has to
choose inner-city developments in order to avoid sanctions. Because of the banking
restrictions, the certificate would expire at the end of the round as it cannot be




























Figure 5: Trading Volume
The planning experts representatives have designated fewer new areas than the
economic experts representatives. Two reasons are possible: On the one hand, the
efficient use of development rights requires an adequate trade volume in order to be
able to select the appropriated inner- and outer-developments. On the other hand, a
participant could have decided to choose, for instance, an inner-city development at
the beginning of the trading phase and realized it independently from the certificate
stock. In this case, the ex-ante decision to definitely carry out land recycling in
combination with a too aggressive ask price of the corresponding sell, could be
the cause for inefficient results. Sell and buy orders, as well as associated ex-post
decisions (after trade) regarding the selection of development options, enhance the
probability of an efficient result.
The experimental design and the inter-temporal decision making of the par-
ticipants influence the use of certificates and the development of new areas (see
Figure 6). The decision making of the participants (before or after the trading





























Figure 6: Use of Certificates per Simulation Run
phase) directly influences the trade volume, because accordingly fewer orders are
registered. Due to the experimental design, the trade volume influences the number
of settlement areas: The more certificates were traded, the more areas could be
developed and the less certificates expired at the end of one planning period.
4.3 Analysis of Limit Prices
At the beginning of each planning period, all participants were able to quote a sell
price for their own certificates and a buy price for additional certificates. Since at
the beginning of a round each participant had only one certificate, it was necessary
to buy an additional certificate for an outer-development. The development of the
averaged limit prices of the participants during the experiment are demonstrated in
Figure 7. During the actual experiment, average limit prices are increasing.5 The
average limit price for a buy order amounted to 288 mu in the first round. Within
the course of the experiment, the average price increased to 421 mu (+46.4%) in
round seven. The limit prices of the students from Nürtingen (379 mu) are on
average 20.7% above the values of the students from Karlsruhe (314 mu).
Figure 8 illustrates the development of the average sell orders. The limit prices
of the sell orders increase relatively slightly compared to the buy orders and range
between 400 mu and 500 mu. Nonetheless, there is an upward trend.6 The limit
prices of the last round (450 mu) are on average 12,6% higher than in round one
(399 mu). Similar to the buy orders, the prices of the planning experts are above
the limit prices of the economic experts. The differences between the two groups
are even more evident comparing the sell orders. The average limit price of the
economic students from Karlsruhe amounts to 359 mu. The prices of the planning
experts from Nürtingen (518 mu) are on average 46.6% higher.
5 Page trend test: n = 7, c = 8, L = 1020, p-value ≤ 0.001.
6 Page trend test: n = 7, c = 8, L = 947, p-value ≤ 0.01.

















































Figure 8: Sell Orders
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5 Conclusion
In this article, we presented the results of a laboratory experiment, which was
conducted as a complement to the field study by Ostertag et al. (2009). Within
the laboratory experiment, city planning development was simulated with eight
decision makers over seven planning periods. In contrast to the field experiment,
the laboratory experiment was based on virtual data. In order to address specific
research questions, a simplified scheme for trading development rights in the
laboratory experiment was developed. Thereby, the influence of external factors was
minimized. Still, the experimental design and the given data reflects the principal
mechanism of development rights trading and allows the test of the hypotheses.
Achieving an ecological, quantitative reduction goal was not the focus of the
laboratory experiment. However, the given overall reduction goal was met and even
surpassed. Similar to the field experiment, the theoretical potential to minimize
costs while providing the required floor space was not completely taking into
account. Furthermore, the cheaper development actions were carried out first and
the increasing market prices reflected the increasing abatement costs. The results
underpin the findings of the field experiment and the results of economic and
planning experts differ significantly regarding the efficiency rates and the price
discovery process. The difference to the theoretical optimum of the economic
experts was smaller than the difference of the planning experts, which means
that the economic experts achieved the reduction goal at lower costs due to more
efficient abatement strategies. High sell orders in the group Nürtingen, driven by
an endowment effect, led to a higher price level in this sessions. Therefore, working
hypotheses Efficiency II and Price Discovery II were confirmed. Against this, the
description of the actual situation did not influence the efficiency of the trading
system. Within the scope of the laboratory experiment, it did not matter whether
it was dealt with development rights or with neutral goods. Hence, the working
hypotheses Efficiency I and Price Discovery I are not supported.
Some results of our experiment suggest that a trading system will not automat-
ically result in the expected cost savings and efficiency gains. In all simulation
runs including the field and the lab experiments, the overall incomes were lower
than expected and we observed a gap between actual and optimal prices. Ac-
cording to economic theory, the primary allocation of the certificates should not
affect the efficiency of the trading system. If the initial allocation is inefficient,
the secondary market should correct this situation by reallocating the certificates
to the ”right” municipalities. How fast the market can achieve a constellation,
where no pareto-efficient transactions are possible, depends on the design and the
trading rules of the secondary market as well as on the trading behavior of the
participants. Wrongly chosen development options, as observed in the planning
experts groups including field and lab sessions, may support high market prices,
slow down the price discovery process and may reduce the efficiency of the trading
system. Furthermore, the participants’ lack of experience with this new instrument
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stresses the need for the local authorities to acquaint themselves with the rules
and the range of possible strategies in a system with TDRs as a supplement to the
existing planning regulation systems. It is necessary to consider these factors along
with the institutional and legal requirements when choosing a market design for
tradable development rights in Germany. For this reason, we suggest to conduct
additional surveys and field studies which focus on the mentioned observations
and to investigate and test a market for Tradable Development Rights and new
decision support tools in other planning simulations.
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Summary. An Electronic Market is the result of a market designing process. Due to the
complexity of this process, electronic markets are major financial investments for their
operators. The development of electronic markets is often based on innovative and creative
work. However, an electronic market as such is not protected as intellectual property (IP).
In this article, the protection of single electronic market elements, especially the protection
of the central market element, the economic mechanism, is questioned, if not denoted
otherwise according to German law. The criteria which determine the existence of IP will
be presented. Using these criteria, it will be shown whether single market elements can be
expected to be classified as IP at present and where further approaches can be found.
1 Motivation
Market engineering deals among other things with the creation (the designing) and
advancement of electronic markets. Core area of such markets is the elaborated
allocation design, using a mechanism, which leads the junction of supply and
demand. The economic term ”mechanism” here describes any process that takes as
inputs the bids and produces as its output the decision as to which bidder receives
the item and how much any of the bidders will be required to pay1.
The development of electronic markets as a whole platform, as well as the
development of its inner economic design, happen innovatively and often need
major investments.
In order to foster innovation in the area of electronic markets, financial benefits
for the innovator have to be secured. This may be achieved by restricting the
competitors’ possibility to copy single market elements or even a whole market
concept. The whole structure of an electronic market and its elements, from single
basic ideas to the whole system which contains rules and software, are in legal terms
intangible items. To restrain the possibility to copy intangible goods, intellectual
property rights are used.
The question is whether electronic markets, as results of a market designing
process, are subject to the legal protection of intellectual property rights. To answer
1 McAfee, McMillan in: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Jun., 1987), p. 699.
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this question, the definitions of electronic markets and mechanisms will be analyzed
with respect to their fulfillment of the legal conditions of IP: The analysis starts by
determining whether electronic markets and mechanisms qualify as intangible good
and continues by examining elements of statutory definitions of certain protective
laws because of which those intangible goods intensify to IP.
For all kinds of IP protection, there are additional conditions besides the kind of
IP like newness, level of creativity, distinguishability, etc. This article contains the
examination of the applicability of certain protection rights. To simplify matters it is
assumed that these additional conditions are fulfilled by the objects of investigation,
if not explicitly stated otherwise.
2 Electronic Markets and their Mechanisms
There are different opinions about the exact definitions of electronic markets2.
All definitions have in common that electronic markets are inter-organizational
information systems used by actors in defined roles with a specific mechanisms to
trade products and services. The actors can participate using the roles of suppliers,
consumers, or brokers3.
Schmid4 shows the following characteristics of electronic markets:
• Electronic assistance of the coordinating mechanisms of a market. That results
in appearance of complete electronic coordination (e.g. pricing) or of simple
coordination assistance (e.g. price information).
• Simplification of the acts of information search and information analysis. The
information asymmetry between market participants should be lowered by a
higher degree of market transparency.
• Decrease of the spatiotemporal distance. The disappearance of spatiotemporal
frontiers allows for a spontaneous market participation of the actors, independent
of their particular time and location.
• Equality of the market partners. This should be achieved through the voluntary
participation of the partners in market action and the openness of the market
access.
• Participants in electronic markets are human actors. Accordingly, the market
action is influenced by human interpretation of the market situation.
To achieve the goals that are pursued by a specific electronic market, market
designers may design various market elements. From an economic point of view,
the central design element is the economic mechanism.
2 Schoder in: Kurbel/Becker/Gronau/Sinz/Suhl, Enzyklopädie der Wirtschaftsinformatik-
Online-Lexikon, keyword ”Elektronischer Marktplatz” - http://www.
enzyklopaedie-der-wirtschaftsinformatik.de - in the version of 01/13/2010 10.55 pm.
3 Kollmann, E-Business, 2nd edition Wiesbaden 2007, p. 390.
4 Schmid, Elektronische Märkte - in: Wirtschaftsinformatik 35 (1993), no. 5, p. 465.
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3 Electronic Markets and Their Mechanisms as Intangible Items
In search of the answer to the question, if and how far electronic markets in general,
and economic mechanisms in particular within the scope of IP are legally protected,
one has to ascertain that electronic markets, respectively economic mechanisms, are
intangible items which possibly intensify to IP.
3.1 “Intangible Items”
Intangible items or intangible assets are immaterial economic goods5. These goods
can be subject of protection intensified to industrial property rights or copyright
but also mere ideas, goodwill or know-how6. Intangible goods are all immaterial
items, independent of their legal protection, as long as the item is the result of
an innovative and commercial-mental act of creation7. The attribute of being an
economically tradable good does not account for also being legally protected. For
instance know-how very often is traded, but it is not legally protected by the rules
of IP by implication.
3.2 Electronic Markets as Intangible Items
Electronic markets are intangible items. They consist of a multitude of elements8,
whose combination makes the market design. Electronic markets are results of
market designing processes with the objectives that have been discussed above,
namely creating market transparency, lowering the transaction costs and influencing
the bidder’s behavior9. The specification of the market design may include pure
economical but also political parameters10. The implementation of the specification
is an innovative act that resorts to scientific disciplines like mathematics, economics,
psychology, computer science and even cultural sciences. Therefore, electronic
markets as result of an innovative commercial-mental creation are immaterial goods.
That classification is independent of the legal protectability of the goods and their
potential intensifying to IP.
3.3 Economic Mechanisms as Intangible Items
Designing electronic markets requires in the first instance the design of a mechanism
which influences the buyers’ and bidders’ behavior. The design of the economic
5 Putzo in: Palandt - Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 68th edition München 2009, § 453
ref. 9.
6 Westermann in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 5th edition München 2008, § 433 ref. 16 f.
7 textitAxter/Schütze in: Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff Kartellrecht, 2nd edition München
2009, Europäisches Recht (Art. 81-86) 3. Teil ref. 1.
8 In detail vide infra.
9 The influence to the bidder’s behavior is not necessarily centered to profit maximization. Multi-
tude of auction theoretical approaches aim to the target of achieving economically worthwhile
(”efficient”) prices and avoiding ruinous bidder’s competition - cf. Berninghaus/Erhart/Güth,
Strategische Spiele, 2nd edition Berlin 2005, p. 556 ff.
10 E.g. state auctions of transmitter frequencies, mining rights or oil production rights.
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mechanism as a single market element is like the design of the whole market result
of an innovative commercial creation. Therefore, the designed mechanisms are also
intangible items.
4 Intellectual Property on Electronic Markets and Their
Mechanisms
4.1 “Intellectual Property”
According to civil law the term intellectual property or IP describes the perpetua-
tion of a right of factual and lawful dominant behavior over an intangible item11.
Intangible items as such are not subjects of rights. Furthermore, intangible items
differ from immovable and movable objects (”chattels”). The specific characteristic
of intangible items is their ubiquitary and non-rivaling usability: Intangible items
can be used in different places during the same time without mutual exclusion12.
Offhand there cannot be ownership of “mere” immaterial goods in terms of
perpetuation of a lawful dominant behavior; even if a person exercises actual
physical authority over such an immaterial good, e.g. through nondisclosure of
know-how. Therefore, strengthening or intensifying of immaterial goods to IP
is needed. This intensification which is called a lawful autonomisation does not
arise from the BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - German Civil Code)13. The lawful
autonomisation of immaterial goods to the absolute right of IP is primary legislated
by the (special) statutes of industrial property and copyright14.
The term intellectual property (IP) therefore represents absolute subjective rights
(rights entitled to one person with legal effect against everybody) over autonomized
immaterial goods. Therefore, intellectual property in German is also called ”Imma-
terialgüterrecht” (intangible property right)15. IP underlies the numerus clausus
(”Typenzwang”) and the principle of certainty. That means that IP is limited to
the rights given by the legislator. The law has to define exactly the purpose of the
particular intangible property right16.
In German law literature, the term ”intellectual property” is disputed17. As far
as the intellectual property only refers to the incorporeal nature of a legal issue, it
conforms to the term immaterial property right. If intellectual property in contrast
11 Bassenge in: Palandt - Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 68th edition München 2009,
Überbl. v. § 903, ref. 1.
12 Dreier in: Dreier/Schulze UrhG, 3rd edition München 2008, Einl. ref. 14.
13 Jauernig, BGB, 13th edition München 2009, Vorbem. zu §§ 903-1011 ref. 7.
14 Ohly JZ 2003, 545; Götting GRUR 2006, 353.
15 Creifelds, Rechtswörterbuch, 19th edition München 2007, keywords ”Immaterialgüterrechte” and
”Geistiges Eigentum”.
16 Ohly in: Festschrift Schricker, 2005, p. 105-121; declining the terms ”numerus clausus” and
”Typenzwang” but agreeing with regard to the contents: Kraßer, Patentrecht, 6. edition München
2009, 1. Kapitel § 2 I. Nr. 4.
17 Cf. Ohly JZ 2003, 545 ff; Götting GRUR 2006, 353 ff.
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means that the legal issue is created by human mind, it only covers a part of
immaterial property rights. Trade mark rights and rights of company symbols as
well as some of the ”neighboring rights” codified in the UrhG (Urheberrechtsgesetz
- German Copyright Act) are not accorded due to human intellectual activity but
due to entrepreneurial effort18. This distinction must not conceal the danger of
confusion between the similar terms of intangible goods (= incorporeal items) and
intangible property rights (= legally protected interest = IP). This distinction is often
blured, especially in English, where occasionally the terms IP and intangible goods
are often used interchangeably, which is dogmatically incorrect.
According to legal traditions of continental Europe, IP is divided in results of
commercial innovation on the one hand and artistic-literary innovation on the other
hand. The distinction is reflected in the two fields of law: intellectual property
rights and copy right. The term intellectual property consolidates both fields of law.
This consolidation became internationally accepted19. In its official definition of IP
the World Property Organization (WIPO) adheres to the bisection20
“Intellectual property (IP) refers to creations of the mind: inventions, liter-
ary and artistic works, and symbols, names, images, and designs used in
commerce. Intellectual property is divided into two categories: Industrial
property, which includes inventions (patents), trademarks, industrial designs,
and geographic indications of source; and Copyright, which includes literary
and artistic works such as novels, poems and plays, films, musical works,
artistic works such as drawings, paintings, photographs and sculptures, and
architectural designs. Rights related to copyright include those of performing
artists in their performances, producers of phonograms in their recordings,
and those of broadcasters in their radio and television programs.”
In the context of intellectual property, procurable rights are copyrights, patents,
Geschmacksmusterrecht (design law), Gebrauchsmuster (utility patent), trademarks,
etc. Those rights are partially comparable to ownership rights. They are temporary,
exclusive rights and entitle their holder to parry the use of his work by a third
party. A major difference between intellectual property and ownership rights is the
temporal limitation. German patent rights are temporary limited up to 20 years
after the application day (§ 16 sec. 1 sentence 1 PatG - Patentgesetz - German patent
law); copyrights are temporary limited up to 70 years post mortem auctoris (§ 64
UrhG). There is an exception for trade mark rights that can be renewed without any
temporal limitation.
18 Kraßer, 1. Kapitel § 2 II. Immaterialgüterrecht. Geistiges Eigentum (cf. footnote no.16).
19 Sambuc in: Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig UWG, 2nd edition München 2009, ref. 180.
20 http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ - in the version of 12/30/2009 4.00 pm.
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Historic Development21
From the beginning of human creativity limitation of knowledge was considered.
The very thought of limitation was originated not only from the idea to give
the creator authority over his work but also from the aspect to grant the creator
monetary advantages. The problem here is the unlimited existence of IP after it was
created (vide supra).
Already in the ancient world and later in the Middle Ages there were temporal
and spatial limited rights of utilization in particular cultures, e.g. in the guild
system or for recipes.
These ideas were only rudimentary approaches to the idea of IP. Usually the
protection of works was achieved by concealing the work, by only transfering it
to followers or offspring, or by recording it in writings which were not readable
for most people at that time. In that period it was for example legal to copy each
book to which one could get access by transcribing it. Due to the considerable
effort which was needed for obtaining such a copy and due to the small number
of people that were able to write, there was no need for legal protection to control
reproduction.
Furthermore, there was no need for authors to gain monetary outcome by trading
licenses or rights. Authors were financed by monasteries, of which they where
members, or by patrons, often profane monarchs, that engaged academics. The
need for IP protection changed with the invention of letterpress printing in 1452/54
and the spread of the procedure. Well known philosophers like Pufendorf, Fichte,
and Kant argued for the protection of mental works and justified their idea of
intellectual property with a natural justice basis22.
The first patent law was established in Venice in 1474; early legal norms about the
relationship of authors and publishers can be found in the Allgemeines Preußisches
Landrecht (ALR - General state laws for the Prussian states) from 1784. The
development of the legal norms continued until today’s status quo. In 1965 the
copyright law was comprehensively recodified in the Federal Republic of Germany
for the first time after World War II and was changed several times since then. The
last changes were introduced by the so called ”Dritter Korb” 2008 and consider the
difficulties arising from progressive digitalization23.
Today’s Reasons for Protection of Intellectual Property
Today the following reasons motivate the protection of intellectual property24.
Competitiveness is supported by the protection from imitation, the assurance
of the pioneers’ earnings and the initiation of cooperation or licensing. In this
context, intellectual property is condition to take actions against product piracy. By
21 Ahrens, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, Tübingen 2008, p. 38 f.
22 Dreier, Einl. ref. 54 (cf. footnote no. 12).
23 Cf. Dreier, Einl. ref. 23 ff (cf. footnote no. 12).
24 Rebel, Gewerbliche Schutzrechte, 5th edition Köln 2007, p. 1 ff.
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application of regististration rights25, the subjects of protection are presented to
the public, advancing aspects such as deterrence of imitators, gaining of company
reputation and promotion.
Market members can read up on registered rights, publicity is generated. Where
licenses for existing proprietary rights are accessible one can safe on nonneeded
research and development costs. Registered rights initiate new product inventions,
problem solutions and avoid risks of collision with existing rights.
Employee invention law and its codified duty to register work-related inventions
prevent overreaching the employees and create an incentive for being innovative
at the same time. These targets are achieved with very low costs for the registry
compared to the high expenditure for research and development, manifacturing
preperations, advertising, sales launching, etc. Beyond that the legal protection
mechanisms enable a much cheaper opening up of new markets and market devel-
opment: Costs for market development of protected products are lower, because the
launch of protected products is easier, and therewith, cheaper than of non-protected
products.
These targets are archieved by the rights of intellectual properties: By excluding
third parties from using protected goods (absolute rights), intellectual property
rights generate man-made shortage of infinitely available goods. So the marketabil-
ity of the product is created. This is the only means of creating economic benefits
for the creator. The economic benefit is incentive for innovation, investment, and
creation of new immaterial goods.
What is regarded as Intellectual Property?
The precise subject of protection is defined by the relevant protection laws’ area of
application26. Intellectual property in the form of copyright contains not only the
protection of personal mental creations in the field of literature, science and art, but
also the protection of certain mental works that are no creations27. Furthermore,
computer programs are protected through copy rights for historical reasons28 (vide
infra).
The most famous of the traditional commercially used industrial property rights
are patent rights for technical inventions that are new, beyond the state of the
art, and results of an inventive step. Further industrial property rights include
25 Registration rights need application and recordation in a register to become valid. Mostly relevant
is the application of patents. On the contrary copy rights arise contemporanous to the act of
creating and need no application or recordation. Besides copy rights only special rules of the
German Trademark Act and the Gemeinschaftsgeschmacksmusterrecht (design protection rules of
the Europian Union) need no application process.
26 Ilzhöfer, Patent-, Marken- und Urheberrecht, 7th edition München 2007, ref. 12.
27 That does not regard new creations but the (re-)discovery of existing incorporal goods, their
rendering and realization. Beneath this there are scientific editions, interpretations of an exec-
utive artist, wors of photography and achievment of sound carrier producers, film producers,
broadcasting companies and databank producers.
28 Dreier, Einl. ref. 27 (cf. footnote no. 12).
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trademark law for the protection of trademarks, company symbols, and geographical
indication of source labels, the Geschmacksmusterrecht (German design law) which
protects aesthetical arranged forms like patterns of cloth, pieces of jewelry, vases,
etc., and other rights that are not relevant in the present context, like plant variety
protection rights that protect new species of plants, or topography protection rights
for three-dimensional structures of microelectronic semi-conductor circuits29.
4.2 Intellectual Property in Electronic Markets
There is no legally normed protection right that protects electronic markets as a
whole. Since intellectual property rights are subjects of numerus clausus (vide
supra) there is no possibility of “creating” new protection rights through further
development of the law. Thus, an electronic market as such is not protectable.
The integrated concept of an electronic market can be perceived as an idea.
However, there is no possibility to protect pure ideas30. Consequently a protection
of electronic markets can only be considered by protecting the sum of its single
elements. The protectability of single electronic market elements has to be examined
individually.
4.3 Intellectual Property in Single Electronic Market Elements
The outer appearance of an electronic market consists of several elements. Every
element can be separately protected as IP. Such elements are the name of the market
place provider (e.g. ”eBay Inc.”), the name of the market place (e.g. ”eBay”), its
internet domain (e.g. http://ebay.com), the logo of the marketplace, its slogan (e.g.
”Buy it, sell it, love it”), or the design of the internet presence. While elements of the
outer appearance of the market can be assigned relatively easy to existing protection
rules (the name of the market place as commercial firm name according to § 37 sec.
1 HGB31 - Handelsgesetzbuch or German Commercial Code; name and logo of the
market place according the German Trademark Act; also the domain according to
the German Trademark Act or by registration at the responsible domain registrar32;
the slogan according to the Trademark Act or under certain circumstances according
to the Copyright Act; the internet presence design according to the Copyright Act)
the question is considerably more complex for the protection of elements of the
inner structure of an electronic market.
The inner structure of the electronic market place represents the real result
of the market designing process. It contains the technical, legal, and economic
29 Götting, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, 9.Aufl. München 2007, § 1 Rn. 7 ff.
30 Cf. § 1 para. 3 no. 3 PatG; for the protection of ideas in the context of copyright vide infra.
31 § 37 sec. 1 HGB ”Wer eine nach den Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts ihm nicht zustehende
Firma gebraucht, ist von dem Registergericht zur Unterlassung des Gebrauchs der Firma durch
Festsetzung von Ordnungsgeld anzuhalten.”.
32 DENIC (Deutsches Network Information Center) for domains under the top level doman (TLD)
”.de”, VeriSign Inc. for domains under the TLD ”.com”, etc.
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implementation of the market place design. While the economic market design
represents the functional core of the market place, the legal framework is the
verbalization of the economic design parameters, as well as the technical framework
is the realization of the functionality of the online software application.
The technical implementation is protected as software according to the § 69a
UrhG33. That protection only covers a specific programming solution. According to
the copyright, there is no protection of the idea behind the software.
The copyright also protects the database which may be part of the technical
framework as a database work. The paragraphs to be considered are §§ 4 sec. 2 and
87a ff UrhG that are independent with regard to their contents. § 4 sec. 2 UrhG
protects the creative selection and arrangement of a database work, § 87a ff UrhG
protects the investment of a database maker in assembling the data34. In this respect,
both rules are independently applicable for a database behind an electronic market
place. While § 4 sec. 2 UrhG requires a personal mental creation, §§ 87a ff UrhG
protects databases that are no personal mental creation, as far as these comply with
the requirements of the § 87a UrhG. Namely, these requirements are a collection of
works, data or other independent elements arranged in a systematic or methodical
way, whose elements are individually accessible either by electronic or by other
means, and whose obtaining, verification or presentation requires a qualitatively or
quantitatively substantial investment.
The legal framework for the particular allocation or pricing mechanism describes
the action alternatives and rules for persons acting on the market place. That
legal framework is agreed upon by the market place provider and the other acting
persons35. The rules representing the legal framework are drafted for multiple
usages from the provider party and usually the other party has no possibility to
negotiate the conditions. So the rules have to be qualified as AGB (Allgemeine
Geschäftsbedingungen - general terms and conditions)36. Terms and conditions
can be subject of copyrights if they fulfill certain conditions - e.g. if the wording is
remarkably better than standard phrases or if the terms and conditions are based
on a special mental concept or an extraordinary structure37. Again, the protection
refers to the ”construction” of the terms and conditions - not to the represented
content.
Therefore, a legal protection of the elements representing the economic design
is possible. This protection refers only to the implementation of the design, in
particular the software framework, the aligning database, and the legal framework.
33 Cf. in detail Karl Der urheberrechtliche Schutzbereich von Computerprogrammen, München 2009,
p. 189.
34 Dreier, Vor §§ 87a ff ref. 1 (cf. footnote no. 12).
35 That agreement and the imperatively resulting disclosure of the rules for the participation on the
market place allow inferences of the participant about the design of the pricing mechanism. That
is the main reason for the impossibility to protect the inner market design by nondisclosure. So
without legal protection the participants can use that knowledge anywhere.
36 Cf. § 305 sec. 1 BGB.
37 LG (regional court) München I GRUR 1991, 50, 51 - Geschäftsbedingungen.
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The idea of the design per se is not protected. So the protection of the economic
design per se is still to be examined.
Besides the regulations concerning the market participants (e.g. restrictions
because of the professionalism of the participants - b2b, b2c or c2c market places),
the customers’ structure (e.g. ”PowerSeller”, closed, membership-based or open
market platforms), and often confidence-building systems (e.g. rating systems38),
economic market design contains most importantly the economic mechanism. The
economic mechanism - in most cases of current market platforms in the shape of an
auction design39 - is the real inner core of an electronic market. Using game and
auction theoretical findings the mechanism is adjusted to the needs of the particular
market place. The practical implementations underlie pre-existing scientific findings
as well as extensive models and experiments that are partially tailored to the
particular use case40, and that partially can also be used in other cases.
4.4 Intellectual Property in Economic Mechanisms
A mechanism describes a market economic ruling automatism that regulates the
pricing by co-operation of supply and demand. By pricing the production factors
are conducted to the location of most efficient usage and goods are conducted to
the location of best provision of benefits (optimal allocation of resources). Through
this the efficiency of the political economy is achieved41.
Economic mechanisms may occur for example in the form of a specific auction
design or in the form of a simple salesroom. A pricing or allocation mechanism can
develop spontaneously. An example could be the development of a black market
under an inefficient planned economy. The creation of such mechanisms in the case
of electronic markets often is result of innovative action, as in the example which is
presented and discussed in here.
Economic mechanisms are results of creative and constructive acting; indepen-
dent of whether they were developed from a combination of coincidence and
empiricism, or from pure innovatively created. As such they are incorporeal goods.
Only the protectability in terms of IP is problematic (vide supra).
To examine if and how far a legal protection for mechanisms exists, the first step
consists in determining into which protection laws’ scope economic mechanisms
fall. Every protection law defines its own legal scope. Candidates in the present
case are the protection of economic mechanisms as technical findings - therefore the
extent of protection of (utility) patent law is affected42. Furthermore, the protection
38 About third party rating systems cf. Balboni, Trustmarks in E-Commerce, Den Hague 2009, S. 26 ff.
39 The term ”auction” in this context means the economic definition of a pricing by bidding
independent how the winner is identified contrary to the legal sense of the term ”auction” where a
knocking down in the end is mandatory, § 156 BGB and § 34b GewO (Gewerbeordnung - German
Trade, Commerce an Industry Regulation Act) - cf. BGH (Bundesgerichtshof - German Federal
Court of Justice) CR 2002, 213.
40 Berninghaus et al., p. 413 ff (cf. footnote no. 9 in the end).
41 Roth, VWL für Einsteiger, Stuttgart 2006, p. 19.
42 Cf. § 1 PatG; § 1 GebrMG.
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can be seen as a work of language or as an illustration of a scientific or technical
nature - therefore the protection of copyright is extended43. The application of both
of the named scopes of protection is imaginable under certain conditions.
Technical Invention
If a protection is aspired in combination with an implementation in a technical
(computer) system the scope of (utility) patent law is affected44. Conditions for
that protection are newness, technical character (”Technizität”), involvement of
an inventive step, and commercial usability. While most of the conditions do not
cause any problems, proving the technical character of software-referred inventions
often is a challenge. Even though in the last years a liberalization of the traditional
perception, according to which software is only a behavior guideline and not a
technical invention, can be observed, a separate checkup is still required concerning
the technical character of the software-related invention. That checkup consists
of two steps. First, the connection of the underlying algorithm of the program
to a conventional technical area (physics, chemistry, biology, engineering science)
is questioned. If the connection exists, the technical character will be assumed.
If the algorithm has no technical character other characteristics are required that
legitimate a patent protection considering objective target of German patent law45.
Usually this is the case if the software is solving technical tasks46.
As an example for the protection of allocation mechanisms by patent law and
utility patent law the utility patent for a computer system of the UBS AG to carry
out financial transactions47 shall be named here. The system is protected as a whole
including the functionality of the underlieing algorithm, but only in combination
with the technical arrangement including the computer components. That means
that the utility patent only is effective as long as the exact combination of allocation
algorithm, software and hardware should be protected. In the named case a
Computersystem zur Durchführung einer Finanztransaktion (computer system to
carry out a financial transaction) is protected, that consists of an Indexdatenbank
(index data base), a Postendatenbank (entry data base) and a Transaktionseinheit
(transaction unit). Already a comparatively small change of the setting eliminates
the possibility to enforce the patent rights, e.g. the using of a similar working but
independently programmed software running on another computer system than
the one described in the patent. The patent protection only is efficient against a
one-to-one copy of the whole system. A similar protection problem exists for other
trading systems like XETRA or Eurex48.
43 Cf. § 2 sec. 1 UrhG.
44 Cf. Gebrauchsmusterschrift (utility patent specification) DE 200 20 859 U1 of the DPMA (Deutsches
Patent- und Markenamt - German Patent and Trademark Office).
45 Ilzhöfer, Rn. 108 (cf. footnote no. 26).
46 BGH GRUR 2000, 498 - Logikverifikation.
47 Gebrauchsmusterschrift DE 200 20 589 U1 of the DPMA.
48 For the functionality of computer stock markets cf. Kümpel, Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht, Köln
2004, ref. 17.538 ff.
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Copyright Protection
Object of investigation of this article is the protectability of the mechanism itself.
On its own the economic mechanism is no technical invention. A patent or utility
patent protection only is applicable if the economic mechanism - in the shape of
software - was implemented in a technical system. That causes, as aforementioned,
a very limited protection just only in combination with the technical system, the
mechanism was implemented in. A protection of the mechanism itself can be
granted by the copyright as long as the mechanism is qualified as work of language
or illustration of scientific nature (vide supra).
Thus, the evaluation scheme for copyright49 is applicable.
First of all, those objects have to be excluded that are not protectable by copy-
right50, even though they fall in the scope of copyrights: copyrights are not appli-
cable for mere ideas, themes, or motives for lack of manifestation. Also there is
no protection for free research findings (in detail vide infra). For the generally not
protectable content a protection of the specific embodiment has to be considered51.
Methods, styles, (fashion) trends in the spirit of a time are also not protectable.
While trends and styles are not protected, the works, that follow or change these
trends, are52. If the arrangement of a work is predetermined, or simply a technical
must, it is also not protected53. The arrangement and choice of already known
design elements is also not protectable - even though the ”Kleine Münze”54 is
fulfilled in this case if the compilation is notably well-arranged55.
Irrelevant for the identification of existing copyright protection are criteria like
expense, costs, or extent of a work56.
After excluding the non-protectable elements, one has to determine if and how
the representational work differs from other works of the same kind. That rating
should respect the work as a whole but also the single elements of the work57.
By judging the example of mechanisms of electronic markets one has to pay much
attention to the aspect of differences to former existing markets. It is easily possible
that the newness of a platform is only represented by other market elements than
the economic mechanism, which may be the same as in some pre-existing platforms.
Even pretended new inventions, which are discussed in some disciplines like the
49 Schulze in: Dreier/Schulze, UrhG, 3rd edition München 2008, § 2 ref. 36.
50 Schulze, § 2 ref. 36 (cf. footnote 49).
51 Schulze, § 2 ref. 42 (cf. footnote 49).
52 Schulze, § 2 ref. 45 (cf. footnote 49).
53 Schulze, § 2 ref. 47 (cf. footnote 49).
54 Kleine Münze is the lowermost limit of the creative expression that is needed for protectability of a
work.
55 Cf. OLG (Oberlandesgericht - Higher Regional Court) Nürnberg GRUR-RR 1980, 227, 230 -
Dienstanweisung; LG Köln GRUR 2001, 152 - multiple-choice-Klausuren.
56 Schulze, § 2 ref. 53 ff (cf. footnote 49).
57 Cf. Schulze GRUR 1984, 400, 402 ff.
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legal estimation of internet auctions some years ago58, are no creative improvements
from an economic point of view.
Nevertheless, especially in the field of strategic games new economic mecha-
nisms are invented, based on knowledge from models, experiments, and empirical
research.
After the differentness and newness of the work is ascertained, it has to be
determined which kind of work named in the Copy Right Act is appropriate
for the specific work in question. However, the Copy Right Act enumeration is
non-exhaustive59.
The assignment of the work to a certain kind of work is meaningful if the kind
of work requires special rules for application. Different kinds of works that have
to be considered are named in § 2 sec. 2 no. 1-7 UrhG. The named kinds of works
have in common that they require the existence of a personal mental creation for
protection60. In the case of designed markets, the classification as work of language
or as illustration of scientific nature comes in to consideration.
Work of Language
The protection of works of language implies the protection of the self-created
illustration in the first place. The self-created relevance is easier to achieve for
the author of an imaginary work like a poem or a novel than for example for the
originator of a scientific work which is limited in phrasing and structure by the
scientific context61. Anyhow the protection of a work of language also involves the
protection of the content62. But in the first place, the protection concerns the specific
linguistic arrangement.
For the illustration of an economic mechanism, linguistic methods and descriptive
methods of mathematics are used. In principle, both illustration methods have
the protectability as a work of language in common. This protectability does not
depend on the kind of language that is used in the description. However, the strictly
formal mathematical description of a scientific finding does not allow for creative
arrangements. Therefore, a copyright protection for mathematical descriptions will
hardly be achievable63.
Even if one uses the possibilities of mere descriptive linguistic methods to
illustrate scientific findings, the scope of creativity is more limited because of the
obligatory use of technical terminology than it would be the case writing a prose
58 Cf. BGH CR 2005, 53 - eBay auctions are no auctions with respect to the legal definition.
59 Schulze, § 2 ref. 78 (cf. footnote 49).
60 Cf. therefore Loewenheim in: Schricker, Urheberrecht, 3rd edition 2006, § 2 ref. 4 f.; v. Moltke, Das
Urheberrecht an den Werken der Wissenschaft, 1992.
61 Schulze, § 2 ref. 83 ff (cf. footnote 49).
62 Fabelschutz (“protection of the tale” = protection of the story/content) cf. Oechsler GRUR 2009,
1101, 1104.
63 Schulze, § 2 ref. 93 (cf. footnote 49).
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text. So it is nearly impossible to achieve a copyright protection for scientifically
characterized works of language64.
Illustration of Scientific or Technical Nature
The protection of illustrations of scientific or technical nature covers only form and
arrangement65. Scientific cognition, doctrines, and theories are not protected with
regard to the content66. The reason therefore is that they are not created by scientists
or researchers. They are not result of a creative act but they already existed, and
have only to be revealed or “simply” be found67. Scientific findings belong to
cultural public property which every creator builds on and which shall be common
knowledge68. Scientific doctrines shall be free and public domain69. This strong
opinion is based on the ideal of freedom of science and free access to scientific
findings, even if in practice the existence of that ideal is more and more doubted70.
The argumentation that scientific findings are not based on creative but empirical
action seems to apply to natural sciences at first sight. But already when looking
at applied sciences, one becomes aware that scientific knowledge is also used for
problem solving as a creative act. An example is the usage of scientific findings taken
from game theoretical research to create an allocation mechanism71. The mechanism
design is a creative act that falls under the scope of protection of illustrations of
scientific nature.
Even in the stage of acquiring scientific knowledge - in the above-mentioned
example during the gaining of insights about the behavior of players in specific
situations - models and experiments are used that emulate reality, but simplified
through certain hypotheses72. The setting of such models or such experiments is a
creative act on its own. That creativity to configure the experimental parameters
affects the results and is reason for some misinterpretation73. It remains arguable,
whether the described creativity in setting and configuration of the measurement
method really leads directly to a creative result. The opinion that creatively chosen
measurement methods do not lead to a creative result but still to an empiric finding -
independent of its defectiveness, reduction or shorting caused by the chosen method
- is justifiable.
64 Analyzing the legal situation identical, but critical: Haberstumpf ZUM 2001, 819, 821.
65 BGHZ 39, 306, 311 - Rechenschieber; BGH GRUR 1981, 352, 353 - Examensarbeit.
66 Schulze, § 2 ref. 41, 93 ff (cf. footnote 49).
67 Schulze, § 2 ref. 41 with further cit. (cf. footnote 49).
68 BG GRUR 1981, 352, 353 - Examensarbeit.
69 BGHZ 39, 306, 311 - Rechenschieber.
70 Hilty GRUR 2009, 633-644, 635.
71 Berninghaus et. al., (cf. footnote no. 9 in the end). p. 86 ff.
72 Brodbeck in: Baudson/Dresler, Kreativität und Innovation, Stuttgart 2008, p. 16.
73 Berninghaus et. al., (cf. footnote no. 9 in the end). p. 86 ff; p. 414; with the extensive result to deny
economics their scientific status: Brodbeck (cf. footnote 72), p. 16.
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The reason for the very common point of view, science is no matter of creativity,
perhaps arises from the effort of especially empiric scientific disciplines to delete all
hints of creativity in their methods before publishing74.
Considering the above discussion and all the presented arguments, the prevailing
view is that only the representation of the findings, and not for the content itself, is
protectable75. The precise illustration can be protected, if it is adequately individual,
e.g. if it is extremely understandable or if it is explained in a different, not pre-given
way76. Problematic here is the borderline between not yet protected content and the
protected precise illustration. This problematic borderline is very obvious in cases
where courts use content criteria to affirm individuality of the illustration77.
In these cases, the borderline between content and illustration is crossed. Main
argument of critics of this judicature is a very formal one. They point to Art. 9 sec.
2 TRIPS78:
“Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, proce-
dures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”
The applicability of that rule in national German right is controversial79 and in
all probability has to be seen as a declaration of political intent80. At least that
argument cannot set strong priorities against the habit of high courts in Germany
to verify the individual illustration using the content. But nevertheless, the usage
of the content to test the criteria of individuality does not create protection for the
content. To recapitulate copyright protection of a pricing or allocation mechanism
is possible as illustration of technical nature. This protection indeed only covers the
form of the illustration, not the mechanism itself. Currently, mechanisms are seen
as mere ideas that are not protectable in themselves.
Board Games as Example for Protection of mere Ideas
The refusal of the protection of scientific findings and in particular of ideas has to
be questioned dogmatically. The protection situation of electronic markets and their
mechanisms is comparable to the (not approved) protection of board games that is
74 Joerges Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1977, p. 383.
75 Schulze, § 2 ref. 43 (cf. footnote 49).
76 BGH GRUR 1986, 739, 741 - Anwaltsschriftsatz; LG München I GRUR 1991, 50, 51 -
Geschäftsbedingungen.
77 Cf. overview of such cases in: Oechsler (cf. footnote no. 62), p. 1103.
78 TRIPS - Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
79 Again a systematic argument argues against the direct application. In Art. 9 sec. 1 S. 1 TRIPS the
Art. 1 - 21 of the RBÜ (Revidiertes Berner Übereinkommen - ”revised accommodation of Bern”)
are declared applicable. That means that for member states of TRIPS that were members of the
RBÜ before Art. 9 sec. 2 TRIPS cannot limit the binding effect of the RBÜ. That is the case for the
Federal Republic of Germany.
80 Cf. Oechsler (cf. footnote no. 62), p. 1103 with further cit.
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subject of the current legal discussion81. The discussion already started with the
introduction of the German copy right, but currently revived82.
The analogy arises from the similar construction of board games and electronic
market places. While in the case of electronic markets the economic market de-
sign and especially the mechanism find their representation in the form of the
programmed market place software and the terms and conditions, the game idea
underlying a board game is represented in the game articles (boards, figures, cards,
etc.) and the rules of the game. In analogy to the protection situation for electronic
markets and games shown above, the protection is not applicable to the rules and
ideas of board games with regard to the content, but only to the illustration of
the rules if they are individual enough83. This opinion is based on the opinion
that board games are neither works of language, nor literature, nor illustrations
of scientific or technical nature regarding to the German UrhG84. These grounds
are unpersuadable, because of the non-terminal character of the legal enumeration
of kinds of works in § 2 sec. 2 UrhG. Other discussants justify their point of view
with the argument that game rules are only information and ideas that could not be
protected85.
The differentiation between precise (and possibly protectable) illustration of
a board game and the idea behind it is one, that is also applicable to electronic
markets. In the field of board games, opinions arise that doubt the general refusal
of the protection of mere ideas - at least if these ideas were manifested86. After
the manifestation within a certain work an idea has to be protected formally and
with regard to the content as essential component of the protected work. The
coverage of that protection depends on the affected work. However, the discussions
about the technical and scientific relevant arrangement have to distinguish between
economic mechanisms and board game ideas. But one can find arguments making
worth considering a more detailed examination of the flat negation of a copyright
protection for ideas.
5 Conclusion
The constraint of the protection of economic mechanisms only indirectly using
the illustrating form of its scientific or lingual representation or respectively in
combination with a technical implementation as (utility) patent is dissatisfying.
81 Substitutional for the current discussion: Oechsler (cf. footnote no. 62), 1101; Risthaus WRP 2009,
698; Schricker GRUR Int. 2008, 200.
82 Starting with a judgement of the BGH GRUR 1962, 51 and renewed because of LG Mannheim
NJOZ 2008, 3351.
83 Ulmer, Urheber- und Verlagsrecht, 3rd edition Berlin 1980, p. 132; Schulze (cf. footnote no. 49), § 2
Rn. 104.
84 Ulmer (cf. footnote No. 83), p. 132.
85 Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 4th edition Tübingen 2007, p. 168.
86 Schricker (cf. footnote no. 81), 203 with further cit.
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This is especially true with respect to creativity, invention, and investment that are
inherent in economic mechanisms.
It has to be kept in mind that economic mechanisms are, despite the afore-
mentioned efforts during their creation, only one element of technical systems
respectively of electronic markets. The mechanism itself is ”just” a scientific finding
or an idea, which cannot be protected by itself according to the presently prevailing
view.
If a protection of the mechanism is aspired at present, one has to use the indirectly
operating protection rights.
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1 Introduction
The half-life period of knowledge becomes shorter and shorter. This does not only
affect private companies but also the state and its entities. Particularly municipali-
ties with their immediate relations to citizens are continuously facing public tasks
connected with lots of information and the need for accurate and quickly accessible
knowledge such as economical or environmental data (e.g. concentration of air pol-
lutants) or similar parameters. The necessity of faster and more flexible reactions on
the part of the state demands an intelligent generation, collection and management
of information. Such information management consists of operative and strategic
action on a higher hierarchical level, oriented at the aims of the organization and
focused on the planning and controlling of information and information processes
within the organization extending to its external communication.1 Information
management provides for the allocation of information infrastructure serving the
capture, generation, consolidation, saving and transfer of information. It aims at
utilizing knowledge that diffusely exists but has not been established yet in a useful
way. Hereby, the decision making of both central and peripheral entities shall be
supported.2
What does that mean for the information management of municipalities and their
supervisory authority? The supervisory agency represents a focal point of infor-
mation as it controls the municipalities. Therefore it needs information. At the
same time, the supervisory agency controls many different municipalities, so it also
handles superior knowledge in comparison to the single municipality. Experience
teaches that there is an information asymmetry between the single municipality and
the supervisory authority. The supervisory authority has available more personnel
1 Compare Sigrid Schaefer, Controlling und Informationsmanagement in Strategischen Un-
ternehmensnetzwerken: Multiperspektivische Modellierung und interorganisationale Vernet-
zung von Informationsprozessen, Wiesbaden 2009, p. 94; compare Vladislav Rajkovic/Blaz
Zupan, Knowledge Management as a Challenge for Public Administration Reengineering, in: Joze
Florjancic/Karl Pütz (Eds.), Informatics and Management, Frankfurt/Main 2004, p. 129 (129).
2 Compare Schaefer, see above note 1, p. 94; compare Rajkovic/Zupan, see above note 1, p. 129.
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know-how than the single municipality and in addition it can resort to the above-
mentioned experience of other municipalities by its control activity. To reduce this
problem, the supervisory authority can provide information by means of databases.
From the normative/legal point of view it is questionable whether there are rights of
the municipalities or third parties that are opposed to the distribution of municipal
data by a database. One of these rights might be Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law
(Grundgesetz). In other words: Is the supervisory authority subject of obligations
of secrecy, which debar it from providing such data within a database?
The following contribution examines the conditions and limitations of the distribu-
tion of municipal data by the supervisory authority. As such a distribution of data
is often called for, it is important to demonstrate which rights and obligations have
to be considered. The legislature has so far exercised restraint in this field and the
upcoming debate is expected to expose interesting developments. Therefore this
contribution wants to raise some general questions in order to fuel the discourse
without attempting to give conclusive answers.
2 Visiting the field of information - the duties of municipalities
To examine the above-mentioned questions appropriately it is necessary to know
which kind of information is generated, collected and distributed by the munici-
palities that is of interest for a database. In other words, the territory of municipal
activity has to be set out. What is the municipalities´ character and how can their
position within the state organization be described?
2.1 The competence of municipalities
Municipalities perform two different tasks within the state organization. On the
one hand they take care of all activities rooted within the municipal community.
Municipal administration concerns people in a very immediate way. Everybody of
us is living in a municipality and takes advantage of it. The tasks of a municipality
are not limited, not strictly listed.3 On the contrary, everything which concerns
the municipality is the duty of the municipality (so-called principle of universal-
ity4).5 If problems arise, they are firstly perceived on the administrative grassroot
level, and they call for a solution which must first and foremost be provided by
the municipality. According to the principle of subsidiarity only in case of the
municipalities´ overload with a specific task or if superior aspects and interests call
for a more extensive or more standardized solution, then the Länder or the Federal
Government are competent for the administration within the municipalities.6 These
3 Compare the German Constitutional Court Decision, BVerfGE 79, 127 (127).
4 E. g. § 1 sect. 3 BauGB: ”The municipalities are obliged to construct the local building plans. . . ”
5 Compare the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in its ground-breaking
decision of 1958, BVerfGE 8, 122 (134).
6 German Constitutional Court Decision, BVerfGE 79, 127 (127).
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duties, as described in the following, and connected to the local community, are
called both ”autonomous tasks” or ”tasks within the jurisdiction of an autonomous
municipal administration”.7
On the other hand they also perform administrative tasks that fall into the area of
responsibility of a higher level, that means the Länder or the Federal Government.
They are doing this by executing the corresponding laws of the Länder and the
Federal State. These duties are transferred to the municipalities for reasons of
expedience. Therefore they have to be controlled by a higher authority to establish
equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory and to maintain legal
or economic unity in the national interest.8 The municipalities fulfill these duties
because they work and act close to the citizens and therefore close to the problem.
Moreover they can react more flexible to local specifics than a federal government
can. This is why the Länder or the Federal Government transfer a designated part
of their duties to the municipalities. In other words, the Länder make use of the
advantages of a locally situated, close to the problem working apparatus while at
the same time retaining the control and possibility of intervention.
After all, one can differentiate between two fields of municipal duties: There are the
autonomous tasks and the transferred duties.9 The distinction between these two
types of duties is not always easy. This distinction is, however, important for the
question to what extent the municipality can act autonomously while performing
its tasks, and to what extent the state authorities have the competence to instruct
and direct. For the data questions of interest here, this means: Who ”owns” the
data – is the municipality owner of its data or is it the supervisory authority and
what rights can be claimed by the municipality?
2.2 The role of the municipalities within the state framework
a Municipalities - integral part of the state but yet independent entities
After having described the tasks of municipalities, their position within the state
framework has to be considered to elaborate possible municipal rights that are
opposed to the distribution of data by the supervisory authority.
To properly sort the municipalities and the municipal self-administration into the
state framework, one has to consider two aspects often opposed to each other.
From the viewpoint of polity, municipalities have to be classed with the Federal
States. That means that the municipalities are not a ”third level” besides the Federal
State and the Länder with own sovereignty. This structure can be derived – inter
alia – from the fact that according to Art. 106 sect. 9 German Basic Law (the
German Constitution, Grundgesetz), revenues and expenditures shall be deemed to
be revenues and expenditures of the federal states.10 For this reason municipal tasks
7 Diana Zacharias, Nordrhein-Westfälisches Kommunalrecht, Thüngersheim/Frankfurt a. M. 2004,
p. 58f.
8 Compare the rule of Art. 72 sect. 2 German Basic Law.
9 Zacharias, see above note 7, p. 57.
10 Zacharias, see above note 7, p. 25.
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are essentially defined by the field of duties of the Federal States. The municipalities
are part of the state administration and thereby executing state sovereignty.
On the other hand, the municipal entity is built on democratic elements – compare §
1 of the Local Government Law of Baden-Wuerttemberg (Gemeindeordnung Baden-
Württemberg) – and is a paragon of civil self-administration. Also historically,
the tasks of government were first and foremost lodged with the local community.
It is not surprising, that Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law and § 2 of the Local
Government Law of Baden-Wuerttemberg guarantee to municipalities the right to
regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility, within the limits prescribed by
the laws.
b Municipal Supervision
To ensure the lawfulness of municipal acts – both in the field of self administration as
well as if they act as a part of the state administration municipalities must be super-
vised by state authorities. Municipal supervision is the downside of the municipal
autonomy11: The considerable independence of local authorities is counter-balanced
by a strict control of the legality (and more) of their actions. Municipalities shall
not become autonomous entities in the sense that they may act free of legal bounds,
and therefore, they need control.
According to a more modern understanding however, the supervisory authority
is a partner of the municipality and has the duty to support the municipality by
practicing its self-administration (e.g. § 118 III Local Government Law of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, § 11 Local Government Law of North Rhine-Westphalia, Art. 108
Local Government Law of Bavaria). The structural inability of municipalities to
adopt a highly professional organization providing highly professional services
calls for support by an institution that is able to provide exactly that.
In order to achieve the goal of legal and efficient dealings on the municipal level,
municipal supervision is granted a wide array of potential means to assist and
control the municipalities.
Among these different means, the informational means are of high relevance. In
most cases they are of a preventive nature. Preventive in this context means, that
the supervising authority becomes involved before the legally binding act of an
autonomous body12. Typical is the instrument of ”prevent consulting” by the su-
pervising authority. Preventive Consulting is supposed to guarantee (or at least to
allow) lawful administration from the very beginning and prevent later possibly
more invasive action of the authority.13 Consulting also allows for considerable
discretion rather than the invasive, publicised measures. Consulting is therefore
generally in the interest of both involved actors. The supervising authorities have
11 German Constitutional Court Decision, BVerfGE 6, 104 (118).
12 Compare Christoph Gröpl/Arnold W. Sonntag, Zeitschrift für Landes- und Kommunalrecht
Hessen - Rheinland-Pfalz - Saarland (LKRZ) 2009, 326(326).
13 Winfried Kluth, in Hans J. Wolff/Otto Bachof/Rolf Stober, Verwaltungsrecht Band 3, 5th Ed., § 94,
n. 137.
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the advantage that they are able to concentrate and to coordinate special knowl-
edge that could not be provided by the individual municipalities.14 Legally, the
necessity of this method is construed as follows: By providing information to the
municipalities, the right of self-administration according to Art. 28 sect. 2 German
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) is preserved because the municipalities are not forced to
accept the opinion of the supervisory authority, but rather have their discretion in
decision-making preserved.
Complementary to the consultative rights of the single corporation, the supervising
authorities have information rights: Only they allow for the supervisor to know the
relevant facts and to decide whether consultation (or more) is necessary. Therefore,
the supervisory authority is entitled to get information concerning specific matters
of the municipality. Examples of the exercise of these rights are: written questions,
access to files or other enquiries addressed towards the municipalities. The authority
can also conduct on-site inspections of the municipal administration or convene the
municipal council or the mayor.15
In summary: The relationship between the supervisory authority and municipality
is characterized by consultancy and inspection.
The emphasis of this contribution shall be on possibilities of the supervisory au-
thorities to provide information – that would not be available otherwise – to their
subordinate, supervised municipalities. Some of the technical possibilities will be
demonstrated first before the technical and particularly the legal limitations will be
examined.
3 Collection and distribution of information - devices and process
The 16 different local government laws of the Länder (Gemeindeordnungen) consti-
tute, that the supervisory authorities provide advice to the municipalities concerning
their tasks to support their constitutionally guaranteed self-administration. This
rule affects not only the functional supervision but also the legal supervision. The
advice can concern legal, personnel, economic or technical matters. In many cases
the authority provides specific information to help the municipalities in their de-
cision making process. An example for this can be the management of private
public partnerships. Therefore, the supervisory authority is challenged to gain and
to distribute information effectively. Appropriate information in good time can
prevent many inconveniences and invasive procedures to correct serious mistakes
by the municipal administration.
Within the field of the innumerous municipal competence areas, a number of cases
arise that require special expert knowledge. For example, when the municipality
takes on new tasks or if it plans to introduce new operating procedures like the in-
tegration of specific permission proceedings to one central procedure. Attending to
14 Kluth, see above note 13, § 94, n. 137.
15 Kluth, see above note 13, § 94, n. 142.
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such innovations, a municipality can conclude private consulting contracts. But the
law provides for the opportunity to gain knowledge within the state system: It can
address the supervisory authority and ask for their experiences, their knowledge,
their qualification.
In case the supervisory authority processes information and provides consultancy,
it has to find instruments to do this effectively. These instruments differ according
to the type of knowledge processed.16 As far as so-called ”tacit knowledge”17 is
concerned, a continuous dialogue between the supervisory and the supervised
authority is irreplaceable. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is difficult to make
explicit by means of writing it down or verbalizing it and to transfer it to another
person.18 Things are different if they concern explicit knowledge. This is the type
of knowledge that has been or can be articulated, codified, and stored in certain
media.19 As far as this kind of knowledge is concerned – in other words the actual
facts –, the straight implementation of offered technical solutions to simplify the
procedure is conceivable. To some degree, the municipal authority can act like the
top level management of a private company and introduce new procedures in a
strictly hierarchical manner. But in other respects it is to a certain extent restricted
because it is bound to the rules of public law, for example by the principle of
proportionality, which runs like a golden thread through the public law.
This contribution especially seeks to analyze local databases as a means of providing
information by the supervisory authority.
3.1 Technical aspects
For the sake of illustration, it shall be assumed that a supervisory authority es-
tablishes a database containing information on all the private public partnership
projects of its supervised municipalities. Access to that database is available only to
the municipal administrations supervised by that specific authority. The database
covers details about the legal design, the financial scale, the public task of that
project etc. The technical frame of this device can be described as follows:
Access to information is marked by online access – for the sake of currentness –,
thus independent of distance, time and hierarchy for all the concerned participants.
The outreach of a single actor is significantly enlarged. The municipality can re-
trieve information about and interact with partners within and beyond the borders
of its territory by using electronic information and transaction possibilities. This
16 Compare Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Informationsgewinnung im dezentralen Mehrebenensys-
tem, in: Jan-Bern Oebbecke (Ed.), Nicht-Normative Steuerung in dezentralen Systemen, Stuttgart
2005, p. 253, (259f).
17 Jennifer E. Rowley/Richard Hartley, Organizing Knowledge: An Introduction to managing access
to information, 4th. ed., Hampshire (GB), Burlington (USA) 2008, p. 7.
18 Compare Rowley/Hartley, see above note 17, p. 7.
19 Compare only Rowley/Hartley, see above note 17, p. 7; fundamentally to the differentiation
between tacit and explicit knowledge: Ikujiro Nonaka/Hirotaka Takeuchi, The knowledge creating
company – how Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation, New York et al. 1995.
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potential of interactivity was essentially facilitated by the introduction and common
acceptance of the Internet protocol IP (Internet Protocol) standard. Electronic com-
munication between persons, data, processes and objects is managed by shaping
contents into IP-standardized data packages and exchanging them between senders
and receivers. Therefore, a major part of vendor-dependant incompatibilities of var-
ious technical devices designed to manage information is eliminated. The described
conditions are the ground which makes IT-data bases possible.
There exist one not to be underestimated consequence for the digitalization of inter-
action between municipalities and their supervising authorities: Crucial elements
of information management in a supervisory process now can be implemented
into complete solutions provided by the supervisory authority including all the
necessary data, linkages, interfaces, processes and objects20. A system can work by
searching the internet sites of the municipalities every day. The single municipality
can chose the deepness of the search and can define the prioritization system of the
search results. The responsible civil servant is enabled to have a direct access to the
requested site and does not depend on the complicate system of postal requests for
information or research projects. In addition data bases of private parties that are
already existing and made public could be used.
3.2 Normative aspects
After having described the potential technical background of such an information
system, this contribution now turns to the legal questions that are linked to such a
device.
a Requirement to establish data base information system?
The first question arising is that whether there exists a legal obligation for the
introduction of such databases.
aa Efficiency and effectiveness requirements
It could be obligatory for the reason of economy. The principle of cost-effectiveness
and thrift according to § 7 Federal Budget Code (Bundeshaushaltsordnung) is a
general principle for all public entities and thus also applies to municipalities and
their supervisory agencies. This rule is a consequence of the principle of proportion-
ality as state-spent money originates from taxpayers who must not be unnecessarily
charged. The principle of cost-effectiveness and thrift contains two aspects: First
the aspect of applying small means aiming at a certain desired result (principle of
minimality) and secondly, the aspect of getting the best result possible by applying
a certain amount of means (principle of productiveness). What are the consequences
20 Heinrich Reinermann, Elektronisierung des staatlichen und kommunalen Leistungsverkehrs,
in: Wolfgang Büchner/Alfred Büllesbach (Eds.), E-Government - Staatliches Handeln in der
Informationsgesellschaft, Köln 2003, p. 143 (145).
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of these principles for the application of databases? The establishment of a database
as described could take the place of an individual, time-consuming one-on-one
consultation. Rather than having to consult with each municipality interested in
a Public Private Partnership, the authority could first refer the interested party
to this database for primary information. The authority could then restrict itself
to particular information that is not generally available or tacit knowledge. This
is particularly time-saving for the authority, as it can concentrate on the difficult
questions of consulting that need human, especially legal knowledge.
If the necessary budget of a public procurement project such as a Public Private Part-
nership reaches or exceeds specific values, it has to be licensed by the supervisory
authority. Therefore there are mandatory consultations between the municipality
and its supervising authority in advance. Without an electronic database, the respon-
sible civil servant of the supervisory authority would have to look for reference data
of other municipalities and their experiences with such projects in regard to costs
and the different legal arrangements. In time-consuming elaborate correspondence
the responsible civil servant would have to explain the different legal models of
Public Private Partnership and the associated advantages and disadvantages.
bb Expedience
In addition to the above mentioned cost-effectiveness, there is expedience, which as
a principle also binds public activity. Expedience means, that administration has to
omit all unnecessary means that are not appropriate to the affected interests.21 The
increase of information that has to be elaborated within the municipalities demands
the ability to access data from databases. It is not necessarily the supervisory
authority who provides the data but the principle of expedience suggests this kind
of solution because it is the supervisory authority that has the human resources and
material to manage such a project.
cc Summary
There are some legal reasons that suggest the obligation of electronic online data
bases but these arguments have to be balanced against counter-arguments like the
costs connected with such a device, for example the maintenance charges.
b Restrictions on establishment of data based information system
At a first glance, providing data by using databases seems to serve important legal
interests and appears to have significant advantages – which could not be drafted
here in full extent. However, there are some implicit restrictions for the legal validity
and factual success of this procedure.
21 Ferdinand Kopp/Ulrich Ramsauer, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, Kommentar, 10th Ed., München
2008, § 10, n. 16.
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aa Acceptance, legitimization and technical restrictions
On the factual side, an important issue is the necessity of confidence in new media
which needs to be built on both sides: on the part of the municipalities as well as
on the part of the supervisory authorities.22 The supervisory authority must create
the interfaces to enable it to accept reports in digital format. The municipality on its
part has to trust provision of consultation and to regard it as equal to a personal
contact.
While picturing the single municipalities to build up and work with the databases,
another condition comes into play. It is the uniformity of technical systems and
applications. Within a company, this might be easily realized but looking at the
number of municipalities things appear quite different. Without a preparing process
the supervisory authority will not be able to collect data by using just one system
for every municipality because of the diversity of different existing systems and
their incompatibility. The autonomy of the municipalities resulted and results in
technical infrastructures built up independently of each other. The only link – in
other words the common denominator – are some rules provided by data protection
and privacy law.
In order to gain the ability of using information effectively, a stronger intercommu-
nication in this field is necessary. In addition, standards have to be developed and
accepted to reach an overall satisfying performance.23 Relevant questions in this
context are those of security, storage and especially access security.
bb Standard setting and Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law
The legal problem with the requirement of identical or similar standards touches
on Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and its guarantee of self
administration. This right can be described as the general clause for municipal
independence and freedom of action concerning their area of competence. In this
field, state authorities are not allowed to control and to regulate municipalities
without a normative grounding. Therefore municipalities cannot be obliged to use
one certain IT-standard (e.g. set by the district government) if only their genuine
tasks (Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben) are affected, because the supervision is restricted
to a legal supervision in this field. Binding standards concerning the concrete
conduction are unlawful. Even if only tasks are concerned where the municipalities
perform for the Länder or the Federal Government, the obligation of a certain
standard is problematic. In early decisions, courts ruling on the question of identical
procedural standards required by the supervisory agencies, partly held, that in
the field of these transferred tasks the supervisory authority has an unlimited
right of instruction24. But today, most lawyers claim the limitation of the right
22 Dirk Hoffmann, Kommunen im E-Government - Einblicke in die aktuelle Situation, in: Wolfgang
Büchner/Alfred Büllesbach (Eds.), E-Government - Staatliches Handeln in der Informationsge-
sellschaft, Köln 2003, p. 157 (161).
23 Hoffmann, see above note 22, p. 161.
24 See Bavarian Administrative Court, Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter (BayVBl.) 1977, 152 (153); Ernst
Forsthoff Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts, Vol. 1, 10th Ed. München 1973, p. 479.
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of instruction to the subject-matter-field. In personnel and organizational aspects,
the municipalities must retain their power to decide.25 But bearing in mind that
databases provide a certain level of administration quality, the determination of a
uniform IT-format concerns subject matter and expedience. It is therefore a question
of functional supervision in which the supervisory authority is competent to define
a certain standard.
cc ”Cost-benefit-analysis”
Another legal restriction – due to § 7 Federal Budget Code (Bundeshaushaltsor-
dnung) – arises in the conduct of a cost-value-weighting before building up a
database. The relevant factors within such an analysis are not only monetary figures.
Saving on money, personal cost and organizational structures is in general regarded
as a valid benefit but also factors such as time, acceleration and transparency have
to be taken into account. On the other hand saving time does not necessarily mean
cost reduction, for example if a database is only used a very limited number of
times each year. Another issue is the elimination of errors to guarantee lawfulness
of public acts. Here, a lot of questions still remain to be resolved.
4 Opposing Rights
After having examined the provision of information by IT-databases and arguments
against such a line of action, this paper will analyze relevant legal arguments
pertaining to the single municipalities. Although the supervisory authority can
be described as a partner of the municipality, municipalities often hesitate to pass
on information about their concerns to the supervisory authority. What are the
reasons for such a thinking? Legal arguments can be procedural rules which bind
the supervisory authority or subjective rights of the municipality. For this purpose
it should be distinguished between the generation of information and the provision
of information to other municipalities.
4.1 Generation of information
One of the first questions of the supervisory authorities, that want to introduce a
data base must be the method of generating information. Although the 16 Länder
have some differences in their local government laws, the relation between the
supervisory authorities and the single municipalities is construed quite similar.
According to most of the local government laws (e.g. § 120 Local Government Law
Baden-Wuerttemberg, § 129 Abs. 1 Local Self-Administration-Code of the Saarland,
Art. 111 Bavarian Local Government Law), the supervisory authority is allowed
to request information about any municipal matter if it is necessary to fulfill its
25 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, in: id. (Ed.), Besonderes Verwaltungsrecht, 12th Ed., Berlin, New
York 2003, section 1, n. 44.
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supervising tasks. Supervisory authorities are authorized to visit and inspect on-site,
to demand oral and written reports and to access records and other documents.
Notwithstanding, it is necessary that the supervisory authority claims a specific
cause for its information request. This does not extend to the necessity of a special
suspicion concerning a specific unlawful act of the municipality. The request of
information is a normal act of supervision and therefore does not need a reason of
justification on the same level like a state intervention in fundamental rights would
require. Nevertheless, an all-encompassing inquiry would be unlawful because of
its disproportionality26.
Therefore, the request for information is primarily a question of discretionary power.
This means that there seems to be no limitation of the actual scope of information
requests aside from restrictions of discretion.
In general, a request for information will be covered by the supervisory competence.
A limit must, however, be assumed, if the information request turns out to be
vexatious.27 This is the case for instance, if – without any concrete indication of
an unlawful municipal act and without any specific legal refrence – information is
demanded, which cannot be provided without tedious efforts.28 This would violate
the right of self-administration of the municipalities according to Art. 28 sect. 2
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and could be contested in administrative court.29
Furthermore, in case that personal data are concerned the generation of municipal
data is also restricted by § 4 ff. of the Federal Data Protection Act.
As a result, one could argue, that for the information request mainly a limitation
of chicanery exists. A request must not be obviously and far beyond the scope
necessary for an ordinary supervision.
4.2 The distribution of data
If the supervisory authority provides the collected information to other autonomous
municipalities, the state no longer acts as a safe institution for information but
rather as a distributor within its administrative competence.30 Therefore, the next
step of the legal test would be to check for potential obstacles to the distribution of
data.
26 Gröpl/Sonntag, see above note 12, p. 327.
27 Gröpl/Sonntag, see above note 12, p.327.
28 Martin Bauer/Thomas Böhle/Gerhard Ecker, Bayerische Kommunalgesetze - Kommentar, 4th.
Ed., München updated: 09/2009, Art. 111 BayGO n. 2.
29 Compare Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, in Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter (BayVBl.) 1977, p. 129 (129).
30 For the public sphere compare Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Protection of Confidential Business
Data in the Age of Convergence, in: Stefan Seifert/Jan Krämer (Eds.), International Workshop on
Communication Regulation in the Age of Digital Convergence: Legal and Economic Perspectives,
Karlsruhe 2009, p. 29 (35).
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a Right of self administration according to Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law
The right of self administration according to Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law could
be an obstacle to data generation and distribution by the supervisory authority.
Municipalities are endowed with the right to regulate all local affairs on their own
responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws.31 Claiming the right from
Art. 28 sect. 2 German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) to prevent the distribution of
data would be possible, if hereby the autonomous fulfillment of its tasks would
be endangered. In general, this would not apply for administrative procedures
that are already settled. In procedures that are still going on, the competence of
independent decision makings could be excessively restricted.
b Secrecy/ Data Protection
Concerning the information that the supervisory authority gets from its supervised
municipalities it is bound to the same rules of secrecy and data protection as the mu-
nicipalities.32 File contents that concern third parties, (e.g. prospective constructors
applying for a building permit) could not be published within databases designed to
support municipal planning procedures. Concerning personal data, the limitations
of the Federal Data Protection Act have to be observed. In addition, the secrecy
in tax matters according to § 30 General Tax Code (Abgabenordnung) must be
complied with although it has to be considered that this rule is only applicable for
concrete personal data and not for details that are made anonymous for statistical
purposes.
Here, a constructive view on databases could consider procedures of pseudonymity
or anonymity, as for other municipalities, the exact information might not be
necessary.
c Art. 12, 14 German Basic Law for Municipal Enterprises
Substantially more extensive are obligations of secrecy, if data of municipal enter-
prises are affected. Opposing rights can particularly emerge concerning commercial
data, if a municipality acts as a public company. It is a consequence of Art. 19 sect.
3 German Basic Law, that the company can claim the right of protected ownership
from Art. 14 German Basic Law if the influence of the municipality is not dominat-
ing. In these cases commercial and business secrets, which are protected under Art.
14 German Basic Law constitute the limitation for the distribution of municipal data
in databases that are accessible for other municipalities.
31 According to the prevailing opinion, the right of self administration is neither a fundamental right
nor similar to a fundamental right. Nevertheless, it is a subjective right with a scope of protection
directly derived from the constitution, compare Michael Nierhaus, in Michael Sachs, Grundgesetz,
3rd Ed. München 2003, Art. 28 n. 34.
32 Richard Kunze/Otto Bronner/Alfred Katz, Gemeindeordnung für Baden-Württemberg - Kom-
mentar, 4. Ed. Stuttgart, updated: 07/2008; § 120 n. 12.
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5 Conclusive Remarks
To keep the municipalities empowered to fulfill their original and delegated tasks,
a well-organized supervision is necessary. This supervision does not only have
the competence of legal and functional control, but additionally has to provide
consultation to its supervised municipalities. Information plays a central role in
fulfilling these various tasks in a communicative structure between municipalities
and supervising authority. The law has so far neglected implications for the
generation and the transfer of information gathered in the course of this relationship.
One of the ways of making use of technical possibilities and enhancing the quality of
control, consultation and supervision is the establishment of a database accessible by
municipalities. Its advantages are obvious: More efficiency, less double information,
quicker access – and the use of well-established instruments from electronic markets.
These advantages might even call for databases as a legal obligation. But there are
some downsides to be considered, as well. The implementation of such data bases
for the purpose of information generation and distribution faces actual and legal
difficulties. Particularly monetary reasons but also duties of secrecy binding the
supervisory authority can act as limitations to such a provision of information.
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Summary. Through the internet, information and knowledge in general have become easily
accessible for many people. The free encyclopaedia Wikipedia is a prime example for
the assembling and sharing of knowledge. In her research on collective action regimes
governing common limited resources, Elinor Ostrom found out that groups or communities
successfully organising their use of a common resource over long time periods tend to
display similar characteristics irrespective to the nature of the resource. She summarizes
these characteristics into eight design principles for successful regimes governing physical
common pool resources. In her later work she discusses the possible application of her
model for governing the knowledge commons, which, as an immaterial good, will not be
depleted when used. This article follows up on this idea and compares Ostrom’s design
principles to the case of Wikipedia and in particular the counter-vandalism policy to act
against deliberate attempts to place false information into the online encyclopaedia. The
thesis will be that Ostrom’s design principle can be used as a valid framework to analyse the
case of Wikipedia as outlined here and that these principles can provide useful parameters
for other online communities dealing with the knowledge commons.
1 Introduction
Information and knowledge have become far more accessible in the digital age.
Knowledge is considered a public good and, thanks to the internet, it is easily
available for many. In this way, knowledge can be considered as a commons. There-
fore it is reasonable to assume that characteristics of self-organised communities
using the traditional commons might also be applicable to, or at least interesting
for understanding, virtual groups organizing knowledge on the internet. One of
the most prominent examples in this respect is the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia,
where many individuals work and operate together to create, deliver and archive
information and build one of the most considerable and accessible knowledge
resources in the world.
Elinor Ostrom’s focus of research lies on the organization of the usage of the
commons in communities. The nature of the commons analyzed by her was
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originally grounded to limited natural resources. In her research based on various
case studies, she forms a theoretical approach on collective actions and social rules
in communities using common goods. (Ostrom, 1990, 2000) She found certain
design principles for common action that indicate that some aspects of organisation
are more effective than others for the long-term perspective on the efficient and
sustainable use of the commons.1
Together with Charlotte Hess, Ostrom later widens the scope of the commons
also to the realm of knowledge. She claims that there is a possibility to adapt the
design principles developed for natural resource commons to the collective action
of creating, organizing and archiving knowledge. Knowledge is a public good, as it
is cumulative and potentially everyone can access it. As such it can be analysed on
the aspects of traditional forms of commons. (Hess and Ostrom, 2007, pp.3-14)
The design principles of collective action shall in the following be compared to the
example of Wikipedia. Specifically they are to be analysed using the example of the
English Wikipedia policy on how to deal with ’vandalism’, the deliberate attempt
to disrupt the integrity of Wikipedia, for example by placing false information
with malicious intention into articles. This specific set of procedures was chosen
because it demonstrates the way the community protects the resource knowledge,
as any information displayed in the articles of the online encyclopaedia should be
as accurate as possible. Without safeguards to protect the knowledge, the existence
of the encyclopaedia would be at risk, because too many disruptions in the articles
would make any information within Wikipedia too unreliable to use.
This article will attempt to follow Ostrom’s call for further research into how the
design principles can be analysed in the knowledge commons. The thesis followed
here is that Wikipedia’s anti-vandalism policy shows characteristics comparable to
the design principles Ostrom found for long term resource regimes in the traditional
commons. It will be shown that there are other general characteristics displayed in
Wikipedia’s organisational structure which can be interpreted by using the design
principles as well.
Wikipedia can be interpreted as a system of collective action to govern the
knowledge commons. As such rules and decision making processes needed to evolve
to back the community of users upholding the online encyclopaedia. Specifically,
the intent of this article is to verify if Elinor Ostrom’s findings are applicable to the
case of Wikipedia and therefore valid as parameters to research and explain the way
Wikipedia’s community governs itself and the knowledge commons. Following up
on these thoughts, one could argue that according to Ostrom’s theory the features
of Wikipedia which are reflected by the design principles support the longevity of
the community.
Concerning the studying of Wikipedia and collective action in the internet, there
is much research in progress. Stegbauer’s detailed study of the German Wikipedia
using empirical methods and network analysis models holds very useful insights
1 Special thanks to Ernst Nordtveit, University of Bergen, for providing valuable insight into Elinor
Ostrom’s theories and helpful advice.
How Design Principles can Govern the Knowledge Commons 245
in regards to the structures and rules of Wikipedia (Stegbauer, 2009). Koniecny
wrote an article about whether there are oligarchic tendencies to be found in
the community of the online encyclopaedia (Konieczny, 2009). The ’International
Symposium on Wikis and Collaboration Systems’ is an annual conference taking
place since 2005.2 Here, the internal development of Wikipedia is also often a
topic of discussion. The conference is open to participants from various scientific
disciplines.3 The possibilities of Wikipedia’s success for new economic models
has been discussed in Tapscott’s and Williams’ book ’Wikinomics’ (Tapscott and
Williams, 2007). These are just some of the more recent examples on research in the
field.
First, in the theoretical part of this article, Ostrom’s thoughts on collective action
and the evolution of rules and norms for common-pool regimes will be discussed.
This will be accompanied with a short discourse on rivalrous and nonrivalrous
resources, as Ostrom’s original model was derived from regimes on limited forms
of commons and will be used on the unlimited resource knowledge. Then Ostrom’s
design principles on long term self-organised regimes will be explained in detail.
As a practical application of the theory the case of the Wikipedia user structure
and the basic forms of arbitration will be described in the following. Further on
they will be put into context with the English Wikipedia’s anti-vandalism policy.
Finally, the design principles will be analysed for the case of the Wikipedia policy
and Wikipedia’s user structure, as far as it is outlined here. It will be discussed in
how far they are suitable for researching the case of the online encyclopaedia.
2 Elinor Ostrom’s Findings on Collective Action
2.1 Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
Elinor Ostrom’s contribution to the research of collective action and the efficient
and non-detrimental usage of the commons among her other work has earned her
the Nobel Prize in 2009. In 2000, she wrote a paper on the collective action and
the evolution of social norms in which she outlines the theoretical, experimental
and empirical background of the research of collective action explained on the
background of evolutionary theories on social norms. These ideas she expands to
the resource of knowledge in her and Charlotte Hess’ book on the ”Understanding
of Knowledge as a Commons” (Hess and Ostrom, 2007).
Ostrom asks why voluntary organisations and adherence to social rules and
norms work in general, even if traditional economic theory tends to understand that
rational individuals tend not to act for common interests if it negates their personal
gains (Ostrom, 2000, p.137). Her research is based on an experimental approach
founded on game theory as well as on field studies on smaller communities using
common natural resources. On this background, Ostrom derives several design
2 See (WikiSym, 2010; WikiSym ’09, 2010).
3 Compare (Suh et al., 2009).
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principles on self-organized resource regimes which have the potential to survive
for long time periods (Ostrom, 2000). According to her, these principles hold
certain possibilities to be compared to regimes trying to coordinate the resource of
knowledge (Hess and Ostrom, 2007, p.7).
Within the game theoretical approach, Ostrom found in controlled experimental
conditions that the players tended to behave more cooperatively if they developed
their own strategy rather than when a cooperative strategy was imposed upon them
from outside and then taken away. When the players were able to communicate
directly, cooperative strategies occurred more often than in anonymous games. Some
players would choose to reward cooperative strategies and sanction uncooperative
behaviour in others. These results were then compared to real world examples on
the evolution of rules and norms in communities collectively managing limited
natural resources. (Ostrom, 2000, p.145ff)
In the field research, there are many contextual variables to be considered from
case to case, ranging from the type of resource disputed to the leadership model
used to the heterogeneity of the group. Other variable elements could be the scarcity
of the good, the level of cooperation, the possible financial benefits, the history
of the group or the cultural background, among others. Many of these aspects
varied in the groups researched. However, Ostrom found certain consistencies
when comparing differing kinds of various field studies on communities organising
common-pool resources. In those systems it was found that communities who
develop and enforce norms and rules within their group have a higher probability
to use the resource in a sustainable and efficient way for long time periods than
communities where the rules were imposed externally. (Ostrom, 2000, p.148)
As common-pool resources Ostrom understands natural or artificial systems
where benefits are created up to the limit set by the amount of the resource. This
means a participant’s consumption reduces the resource and it is often hard to keep
beneficiaries away from the resource (Ostrom, 2000, p.148). Therefore she uses the
term ’commons’ for the resource knowledge later in her work, as it more generally
fits the unlimited character of this good (Hess and Ostrom, 2007, p.5).
2.2 Design Principles for Long-term Resource Regimes
Ostrom understands the emergence of rules and norms for self-organised collective
actions on a basis of evolutionary theories, where reciprocity plays an important
role in forming the behaviour of at least some individuals (Ostrom, 2000, p.149).
Collective action, according to Ostrom, is when two or more individuals cooperate
to achieve a certain outcome (Hess and Ostrom, 2007, p.5). Members of a group
are likely to restrict their own use of the given resource as long as other members
in the group are willing to do so as well. This behaviour has a high probability to
result in a process of cooperation. When the group has relatively clear conditions
on membership and the group boundaries are definable, the trust among the
members and the incentives for cooperation will most likely rise. As a consequence,
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some individuals within the group might take greater responsibility and initiate
improvements for the effective use of the resource (Ostrom, 2000, p.149).
Basing on these underlying thoughts Ostrom proposes eight design principles for
long-term resource regimes organised through the collective action of their members
(Ostrom, 1990). The first design principle is the presence of group boundaries that
are accepted by the members and effective externally. ”If a group of users can
determine its own membership - including those who agree to use the recourse
according to their agreed-upon rules and excluding those who do not agree to
these rules - the group has made an important first step toward the development
of greater trust and reciprocity.” (Ostrom, 2000, p.149) This means that within
the community, boundaries can serve to maintain trust and reciprocity which are
essential for the members to work efficiently together to govern the commons they
collectively use. Externally, the boundaries will work as a defining factor on who
belongs to the community and who does not.
The second principle is about the rules that actually restrict, organise or manage
the resource that is to be used by the collective action. This principle is based on the
fairness of the sharing system. (Ostrom, 2000, pp.149f) In the case of the knowledge
commons, it could be adapted to the rules that actually manage the gathering,
creating, archiving or maintaining the information resources as well as organising
the work and input of the members of the group to do so in an efficient way.
The third design principle refers to the ability of the individuals partaking in
the collective action to jointly create and modify the rules and norms they wish all
the members to adhere to. In various field studies concerning the natural common-
pool resources, it was found that the members were more willing to follow rules
developed within their group than to adhere to rules at least partially set from
outside forces such as elites or government institutions independent from the group
using the resource. Rules derived from within the group are also often perceived as
more fair. (Ostrom, 2000, p.150)
Norms can only be complied with for long time periods if there are certain
enforcement mechanisms in place and the members are aware of the consequences
for not following them. Consequently, the fourth design principle describes that
the groups select monitors, either accountable to the members or participants
themselves, to check on the resource conditions and the usage behaviour of the
individual members. The fifths design principle is related to this and says that
there should be an enforcement mechanism with graduated sanctions based on how
serious the community perceives an offence to be. The community legitimates the
monitors who can point out a case of possible sanctioning and enforce it. The initial
sanctions are often a form of warning and not necessarily on the same level as the
occurred loss. (Ostrom, 2000, p.151) In a sense they work as an educational system
for the rules within the community.
The sixth design principle demonstrates the need to have efficient, easily to enter,
low cost arenas where disputes among the members and with external actors can be
settled. These arbitration forums must be transparent to the community and equally
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accessible. Within them, the rules and norms themselves can also be discussed and
adjusted if necessary. This leads to the seventh design principle on the decision
making procedures on rule making mechanisms. Many common-pool resources
in the physical world in local arenas rely on unanimous decision, according to
Ostrom. However, the consequences of this are high transactions costs on the
decision making processes, paid for either in the members’ time and effort. This
can lead to a situation where norms are not adjusted and improved in time. These
processes do not have to be backed by official institutions such as governmental
bodies. As long as the members of a community accept them, they are functioning.
For large common-pool regimes, Ostrom also recognizes an eighth design principle
that allows different groups dealing with differing functionalities to be nested within
the greater structure of the collective action in question. (Ostrom, 2000, pp.153f)
These basic design principles can be found in variations in most common-pool
resource regimes in the physical world. It can be argued that they are inherent
in all forms of democratic organisations. Yet, democracy is not an easy term
to define. In political terms it includes broad concepts such as equality, liberty
and human rights. The communities researched by Ostrom were often organised
on local levels and therefore limited in the number of members. She sees these
principles as possible guidelines on how collective actions concerning the commons
can be efficient for long time periods. The combining factor is that the members of
these communities organised themselves and their actions this way, irrespective of
the systems surrounding them, for example the governing structures or the legal
frameworks of states.
Ostrom also points out certain threats to the long term viability of such regimes.
These threats maybe indigenous or exogenous and can affect the trust and reciprocity
within the groups. A major threat is the migration into or out of the community,
which can change the balance by either influencing the effectiveness of a community
when it loses members or when too many new participants join who do not
know or wish to adhere to the norms already established and cannot create an
equivalent system balancing the members’ interests. Other threats occur when
official institutions impose rules where they had not before concerning the general
dealing with the resource. (Ostrom, 2000, pp.153f)
The term ’rule’ needs more explanation in regards to Ostrom’s design principles
on self-organised resource regimes. Defining the meaning of ’rule’ is a matter of
many discussions, so the article will follow her ideas on what a rule may be from
one of her earlier works. (Ostrom, 1986) There, she defines rules as prescription
which are created and adhered to by a group of participants in order to serve as
a framework for their relationships. Within this framework certain actions must
be taken, are allowed or can be prohibited. These prescriptions are the implicit
or explicitly set rules by individuals who need to organise their actions within
their group and create a predictable environment. They do so by: ”(1) creating
positions (e.g., member, convener, agent, etc.); (2) stating how participants enter or
leave positions; (3) stating which actions participants in these positions are required,
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permitted, or forbidden to take; and (4) stating which outcome participants are
required, permitted, or forbidden to affect.” (Ostrom, 1986, p.5) Therefore the rules
can be adapted, discarded or changed by the majority of individuals within the
group or by external entities.
Rules emerging in groups can also be explained through the emergence of social
structures. According to a social science definition by Stegbauer, social structures
emerge within the complex interaction of differing actors with each other (Stegbauer
and Rausch, 2006, p.19). Have these interactions been well established through the
course of history, they are largely defining what we understand as social structures.
They are made up of interconnections and within them norms are formed and
gradually accepted as the usual behaviour within a group. Norms correspond to
the expected behaviour and conduct of individuals within the group and will be
mirrored in the rules which the members are supposed to follow. Within virtual
groups existing in the internet, often certain positions or roles are formed which
constitute the social structure. As in real life, their functionality could possibly lead
to hierarchies, as often some participants within a group are more experienced than
others exercising certain functions. (Stegbauer and Rausch, 2006, pp.59-61)
Stegbauer’s theoretical explanation to the norm building aspect within groups in
the virtual as well as the natural world is similar to Ostrom’s understanding how
rules evolve. According to this line of thought, rules and norms emerge within
groups parallel to their establishment. For a group to survive, it needs certain
aspects which make it distinguishable to other groups, which means there must be
at least certain understandings in place who belongs to the group and who does
not, which essentially establish the boundaries of the group. Ostrom sees this as
the starting point for self-organised collective action which has the potential to be
continued for a long time within the community committed to it.
2.3 Rivalrous and Nonrivalrous Commons
As mentioned above, Ostrom’s design principles relate to the collective action of the
physical forms of commons, which are limited in nature. Yet she also writes about
the possibility to adapt them to the knowledge commons. These have changed
drastically through the emergence of the internet. Knowledge becomes far more
accessible and can also be spread at far lower cost as it was possible before the
new technologies allowed information to be distributed globally (Hess and Ostrom,
2007, p.9). Lawrence Lessig also discusses the new way to access and distribute
immaterial forms of commons digitally (Lessig, 2002).
Lessig focuses on the idea of the internet as a commons, independent from which
form of digital content and as a scarcely limited resource. He defines the possible
circumstances on usage on the internet as a commons in terms of an ”opportunity
for individuals to draw upon resources without connections, permission, or access
granted by others. They are environments that commit themselves to being open.”
(Lessig, 2002, p.85)
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At this point Lessig points out two important differences between rivalrous
and nonrivalrous resources. The term nonrivalrous was already used by Thomas
Jefferson in respect to the resource of ideas, which are in themselves not depleted
by another’s use, as Lessig elaborates. Is the resource rivalrous it calls for a
control mechanism that prevents the overuse of the good while ensuring that is it
produced at the same time. If the resource is nonrivalrous, then only the creation of
the resource has to be guaranteed and maintained, as nonrivalrous resources are
unlimited to use. Lessig refers this to Ostrom’s understanding of a provisioning
problem. (Lessig, 2002, pp.94f) His interpretation of a nonrivalrous resource might
fit the broader concept of the intellectual good knowledge well. This shall be used
here as a definition of the knowledge commons.
In the case of Wikipedia, the resource knowledge is the one distributed and
managed. The main concern of Wikipedia is not the space needed to hold that
much data, as this is technically possible at relatively low cost, but rather the
organisation needed to archive and sort out what knowledge is to be maintained
and delivered. The organisation and the people involved in it are the scarce resource
which Wikipedia needs for its survival. While the knowledge is freely available in
general, the effort needed to archive and maintain the knowledge is not and comes
at the cost of time and work of the members.
This factor changes also the main dilemma Ostrom discusses. In the case of
physical resources the use of the resource will deplete it. That means it is in
the interest of each participant that the other participants involved restrain their
use. At the same time, like in the gaming situation mentioned, their immediate
outcome is often the highest when not cooperating in the beginning. In the case
of Wikipedia the most probable dilemma is free riding, as it is much easier to
just access the knowledge displayed than actively contributing. Most people will
access the information on the online encyclopaedia and not add to it. However,
when people lose interest in spending time and effort to write articles, correct
mistakes and keep the information up to date, then the point of Wikipedia as a
reliable knowledge base becomes more and more obsolete. It is not necessary for the
majority of readers of Wikipedia pages to become involved, but a certain amount
of people will be necessary to uphold the system. There are no numbers which
point out how many members need to work on the information exactly, but a loss of
editors is of great concern for the longevity of the project as a whole (Angwin and
Fowler, 2009). Therefore, free riding can become a problem if it leads to dwindling
numbers of editors to the point where the information in Wikipedia cannot be
updated and archived properly.
Another variation of the commons of knowledge being undermined is the pos-
sible sabotage and misuse of the common good for purposes other than the ones
originally benefitting the community. Sabotage is not part of the tragedy of the
commons in Hardin’s sense (Hardin, 1968), but a disruption to the successful work-
ings of a community using a common good, though this problem is certainly not
specific to those. In the case of Wikipedia, the knowledge displayed in the articles
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is meant to be as accurate as possible and should be able to be referred to valid
sources. To use Wikipedia for other means to intentionally spread personal opinions
or propaganda; or to discredit and insult individuals, for example, is contrary to
the original aim of the community. This goal has remained unchanged as it would
diminish the worth of the encyclopaedia. Therefore policies and internal rules
exist to weed out disruptions placed in bad faith to the validity of the information
displayed. The counter-vandalism policy, which will be discussed in detail below,
is one such tool. As Ostrom’s design principles focus on the outline of governing
common resources successfully, measures against sabotage are also a means to
ensure the longevity of the collective action. Consequently it will be discussed in
the following how Ostrom’s ideas can be applied as an analytical framework to the
practical example of Wikipedia.
3 The Example of Wikipedia
3.1 Access Levels of Users in the English Wikipedia
Several characteristics of Wikipedia have to be described to outline how the com-
munity upholding the online encyclopaedia works against the posting of content it
does not find suitable to its goals. First of all, the official positions of participants
within Wikipedia will be lined out by describing the access levels they hold within
the online encyclopaedia. Then a general definition of what is understood by ’van-
dalism’ in Wikipedia will be given followed by the measures and processes to react
upon it. This article looks at the policy and access levels for users of the English
Wikipedia version.
The English Wikipedia was launched in January 2001 by Jimmy Wales and Larry
Sanger. With the help of thousands of participants willing to post articles and
correct the content it became the most widespread, accessible and miscellaneous
source of knowledge in the world with 14 million articles (3.1 million in English) in
various languages. (Wikipedia: About, 2010)
The visitors and participants of Wikipedia, who read, create, add on and correct
content are distinguished through the access levels they receive which vary in the
degree of the change they are allow to exert on the Wikipedia pages. According
to their access levels they take certain official responsibilities within Wikipedia.
The main difference between the positions lies between normal users and the
more influential roles of so-called ’administrators’, ’bureaucrats’ and ’stewards’.
(Wikipedia: User access levels, 2010)
There are four types of regular users. Anonymous users do not hold an account,
can read all regular Wikipedia pages and edit pages which are not protected in
any way. While they can create ’talk’-pages where they can discuss and write
comments, they cannot upload files or images. They must make themselves known
as human beings and not computers by answering a Captcha, a picture test using
deformed numbers and letters which cannot be recognized automatically. New
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users have their own account and can start new pages and fill them with content,
yet cannot upload files either. Autoconfirmed users are generally recognized by the
Wikipedia software as users who have upheld their account for four days and made
10 edits. They can then also edit semi-protected pages, move pages and upload
files or pictures. They are no longer required to pass the Captcha test in most cases.
Confirmed users have the same rights as autoconfirmed users, but are granted their
status manually by administrators. (Wikipedia: User access levels, 2010)
To become an administrator in the English Wikipedia, the community must
confirm this right to the user requesting it. There must be a discussion taking place
among fellow editors about the contributions of the applying individual. Seven
days into the discussion a ’bureaucrat’ will decide upon the consensus reached for
granting administrator rights to do so. Generally, 70% to 80% of the comments in the
discussion should be in favour of the promotion of the applicant, which means there
is not a clear vote or numerical measurement involved. (Wikipedia: Administrators,
2010) Only then does the new administrator gain control over certain tools and
special functions in Wikipedia. For example, they can delete, protect, block or
release pages. An administrator can remove or grant rights to users and can access
and modify protected pages and the Wikipedia interface. They are also called
’sysops’, standing for system operators. (Wikipedia: User access levels, 2010)
’Bureaucrat’ rights are granted by the community and are allowed certain actions
on other users’ accounts, for example handing out administrator rights. ’Stewards’
are the highest rank within the Wikipedia network itself. They are elected globally
and can evoke and renounce the rights of individuals in the groups below them.
They can hand out the special rights to exercise the control mechanisms of ’Oversight’
and ’CheckUser’ to other users and implement them themselves. (Wikipedia: User
access levels, 2010) These functions are mentioned here as they have the highest
enforcement level. ’Oversight’ means that the user exerting this right can hide
revisions of all other users from pages permanently. This tool is among the highest
control instruments. (Wikipedia: Oversight, 2010) ’CheckUser’ enables the holder
to view the IP addresses of user accounts in case of infringements. These rights are
only granted to those who have identified themselves to the Wikimedia Foundation
and are at least 18 years of age. (Wikipedia: Checkuser, 2010)
If disputes arise among the members of the community, about the communication
between members and about the handling of the content, there is the possibility
to create ’talk’ pages concerning the single articles. These are the most basic level
forums. If disputes cannot be settled, they can be brought towards the Mediation
Committee, whose solutions are not binding but rather suggestions. New members
to the Mediation Committee are selected by the Mediation Committee itself. An
open discussion by members of the Mediation Committee and non-members alike
will take place beforehand. The Mediation Committee was established next to the
highest ranking Arbitration Committee by Jimmy Wales in 2004 to create bodies
that can settle disputes. (Wikipedia: Mediation Committee, 2010)
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The Arbitration Committee is elected and can enforce rules and decisions when
disputes cannot be settled otherwise. It will only get involved if the Mediation
Committee could not resolve the issue. Its members are elected in an open vote
throughout the community. After a certain time period of open discussion about
the nominees the vote will take place yearly. Apart from settling disputes and
handing out major sanctions the Arbitration Committee also can decide upon
which members hold the ’Oversight’ and ’CheckUser’ abilities mentioned above.
(Wikipedia: Arbitration, 2010; Wikipedia: Arbitration/Policy, 2010; Wikipedia: Ar-
bitration Committee/Procedures, 2010) Election modes in Wikipedia vary according
to the decision made. Often the simple majority of participants will be sufficient.
However, only users with an account can vote. In most cases, the users eligible to
vote must have a certain number of edits within a specified time frame, so that they
can be accepted as active editors. This was the case when a discussion took place
about the Wikipedia content to be migrated to another licence and a vote was held
on the issue. Content in the free encyclopaedia was originally placed under the
GNU Free Documentation Licence (GFDL). Now the Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Licence was approved of additionally to the GFDL for the
text base, since the majority of the eligible users agreed to the migration by vote in
2009. (Wikipedia: Licensing Update, 2010)
Wikipedia is supported through the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., which gains its
financial needs through donations. Some language versions of Wikipedia, like the
German one, have their own version of the Wikimedia setup.4 Wikimedia is lead by
a board of trustees, currently nine persons who are financed by the donations as well.
It also supports the other aligned Wiki projects, like, among others, Wikisource for
free source documents, Commons for free media files, Wiktionary for dictionaries
or Wikiversity for free learning tools. (Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2010)
These are only the basic access levels on the English Wikipedia. It already
shows that there are many differing roles and functions recognized users can hold
within the system. Looking at what the holders of these positions can do within
the Wikipedia community, one can certify a certain regime of rules, positions and
enforcement procedures which controls the process of the creation of content in
Wikipedia. It allows members of the community special forms of access to the part
of the knowledge commons within the encyclopaedia.
3.2 The Counter-Vandalism Policy of the English Wikipedia
Elinor Ostrom’s design principles will be compared here to a special process in
Wikipedia, when the community encounters disruption and has to deal with it
to maintain itself. The example of ’vandalism’ in Wikipedia is chosen because it
illustrates well how the community wishes to protect its way of creating the resource
knowledge in Wikipedia. ’Vandalism in Wikipedia ”is any addition, removal, or
4 Wikimedia Deutschland is legally organized as an incorporated association (Wikimedia Deutsch-
land e.V., 2010).
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change of content made in a deliberate attempt to compromise the integrity of
Wikipedia.” (Wikipedia: Vandalism, 2010) Examples for that could be the placement
of ill-considered humour, the blanking of articles or inserting intentionally false
and misleading information. There are many types of vandalism, but the defining
characteristic is that it is not done in good-faith. Any attempt to improve the online
encyclopaedia, even by accidentally placing false information, is not considered as
such. Therefore, there is a fine line to decide if something counts as deliberately
disruptive behaviour or not. Any user who finds an article being vandalized can
revert it into the previous state and warn the user, who they can identify under their
alias or IP in the edit page. However, these warnings should be done carefully and
there are special guidelines on when and how to issue them. When a user is found
to committing vandalism regularly, he or she can be reported to the administrators,
who are able to block users for some time or protect the article in question to a
certain degree. (Wikipedia: Vandalism, 2010)
4 Ostrom’s Design Principles and Wikipedia
As already explained above, Ostrom derived the design principles for self-organised
regimes on common pool resources from her research of the traditional physical
commons schemes. They can be summarized as follows: (1) Defined boundaries
are needed. (2) Rules are in place accepted by the community and adapted to
the circumstances. (3) Those people affected by the rules have the possibility
to participate in the modification of said rules. (4) External bodies respect the
communities’ members to create their own rules. (5) A recognized system is
effective to self-monitor the members’ behaviour. (6) There is a sanctioning system
for the enforcement of the rules in place with graduated sanctions. (7) All members
have the possibility to access an easily available conflict-resolution tool. (8) In larger
systems nested structures exit within the main frame for the single governance
mechanisms. (Hess and Ostrom, 2007, p.7)
The first design principle refers to the boundaries of the regime. In knowledge
commons, where the resource is nonrivalrous, the quantity of the resource does
not play a role. However, there is a discussion about whether Wikipedia is finally
reaching its growth limit, as most of the more easily achievable knowledge has
already been inserted into the encyclopaedia. (Suh et al., 2009) Some sources also
say that there are less editors active than before (Angwin and Fowler, 2009). In case
of the users and participants of Wikipedia the boundaries are more recognizable.
Though there are no real restrictions in place on who can access the wiki, everyone
who does and especially everyone who edits something will leave a mark which
can be traced at least on a digital level through the IP addresses or directly through
their account if they created one. Therefore, there are certain boundaries in place
through the fact that people actively decide which roles and responsibilities they
take through their involvement as users of the encyclopaedia. They follow the rules
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of the community and therefore one can argue that they accept the boundaries set
in place of the group.
The second principle states that the members of the community have developed
certain accepted behaviours which they see as commonly accepted rules. They can
exist as common practices or in written form. These rules should be adaptable to
the special situation of the regime. In case of Wikipedia, there are many policies
dealing with what is perceived to be good or bad behaviour within the community.
The case of the counter-vandalism policy of Wikipedia is in itself an example for
a rule in place to organize the resource, more specifically to protect it. For the
encyclopaedia to be working effectively and to be useful, its content needs to be as
accurate as possible and cannot be altered for the sake of individuals not interested
in correct articles but deliberately using them for other means, like promoting false
information or spreading insults. Such actions would go against the purpose of the
Wikipedia project as a whole and undermine its effectiveness, therefore lessen the
value of the knowledge commons contained within, whose main characteristic has
to be a high degree of reliability.
The rules are most effective, according to Ostrom, when they derive from the
community itself. Within Wikipedia, this third design principle is generally true.
However, because of the large amounts of participants it is not always easy for
single voices to be heard. Also, it is more likely that participants with high seniority
can initiate discussions on the policies themselves than new users could. Yet, in the
case of the anti-vandalism policy possibilities like talk pages exist to discuss the
policy. The policy page itself cannot be edited by normal users, as this would be
considered too much disruption and the rules need to be reliable until a majority
within the community attempts for their change.
This point goes along with Stegbauer’s analysis of the German Wikipedia, where
he found that the positions held previously do have an influence on the levels of
power single users can exert (Stegbauer, 2009, p.154). In his research, Stegbauer
analysed the German Wikipedia using network analysis models and positional
theories (Stegbauer, 2009). The later are linked to the position which individuals
can occupy in a social setting and are akin to sociological models about identities
and roles individuals can hold. The position within the setting can in turn influence
the individual to fulfil certain prerequisites, for example successfully accomplishing
certain tasks or acting in a certain way. What the position inclines is always bound
to the expectation other individuals have, who in turn derive their expectations
from their role, e.g. in a teacher-student relation. These relations are not static and
are bound within processes. (Stegbauer, 2009, pp.35f)
When analysing the reactions of individuals to certain kinds of vandalism,
Stegbauer finds his positional model verified in that different members of the
community act according to certain roles or positions, for example the perpetrators
and the hunters of creating a self-enforcing system that draws on peer supervision
(Stegbauer, 2009, pp.155-161). However, he realizes differences between the user
levels concerning their interactions and cooperation tendencies. On the level of
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administrators a relatively strong internal cohesion exists. The lower the level of
users the degree of heterogeneity increases. This might not necessarily be considered
surprising, as users with higher access levels in Wikipedia should be expected to
have more experience in cooperation and more connections with other users, which
is natural because the number of individuals within that group is also smaller. Yet it
might make it more difficult for someone on a lower level to exert influence within
the system and be acknowledged on the higher levels. (Stegbauer, 2009, p.154)
This does not lead inevitably to a form of oligarchy, as Piotr Konieczny observes
in his research on governance and democratic tendencies in Wikipedia (Konieczny,
2009). He sees many possibilities for individuals in Wikipedia to influence its rules
and policies. At the same time communication is facilitated both through its digital
character and the many opportunities to edit and comment on the content. The
Wikipedia community shares a dedication to its main goal, the creation of a reliable
online encyclopaedia, which is generally supported. Unlike Stegbauer’s indication,
Konieczny does not think that Wikipedia demonstrates significant power distances
and therefore can keep bureaucracy balanced to the open character in general. Still,
he does not negate that oligarchic tendencies could take over in the future if the
aforementioned characteristics change (Konieczny, 2009, p.189). This could happen
if the group of administrators exerted increasing control over the majority of users
of lower access levels and overrode their opinions, for example.
Back to the question at hand though, the tendencies for oligarchic behaviour
might counter Ostrom’s third design principle for long term self-organised regimes.
As she states that rules are most effective when derived and adapted by the members
of a regime itself, the dominance of a group of members over the others might prove
fatal to the long term reliability of the collective action. If that would be the case,
it could lead to a form of migration from one project to another. As knowledge is
a nonrivalrous resource and the Wikipedia community works on voluntary basis,
there are no restrictions on the creation of possible competitive projects. This
actually happened to Wikipedia when Larry Sanger, the co-founder of Wikipedia
next to Jimmy Wales, decided that he would create a fork to Wikipedia, the online
encyclopaedia ”Citizendium”. He felt the current Wikipedia community did not
work as efficiently as they used to and the policies are not as openly discussed as he
wished. He also felt that the maintaining of the quality standards of articles needed
improvement. His project did not yet become as successful in terms of the numbers
of users and articles. (Deterding, 2007) This could be due to the fact that not a large
number of users of the original Wikipedia migrated to the new platform. It might
also be the case that because of the increased expectations on the quality standards
the initial threshold for participation is higher.
In the fourth design principle Ostrom states that external authorities should
accept the community’s rules. Considering the global nature of the internet, there
are little restrictions in place by outside authorities on the Wikipedia’s internal
rules. The anti-vandalism policy refers directly to matters within the workings
of the community, and as such is not bound by external regulations. In general,
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though, there are areas where the laws and regulations of the different states have
an impact, such as the author’s rights and influences on the licensing regime of
Wikipedia. Also, the personality rights of living persons and their biographies
on Wikipedia are specially protected by internal rules, (Wikipedia: Biographies of
living persons, 2010) which in itself are not necessarily because of external pressure,
though personality rights are also part of external legal frameworks. In states where
censorship exists, the access to Wikipedia might be limited for political reasons.
In case of Wikipedia in general, it basically survives on peer review. Only by the
correction of the content by the users is the encyclopaedia able to create reliable
knowledge. Therefore self-monitoring as the fifth design principle is an integral part
of the system as a whole. In case of the anti-vandalism policy, all users should be
aware of possible disruptive behaviour and have the possibility to warn perpetrators
according to guidelines which are expected to be used. In case the vandalism
needs to be stopped by actually blocking the trespassing individual’s account or
protecting the article in question, an administrator is at least needed to enforce this.
In the English Wikipedia there is even a group of members who see their main
responsibility within the system to counter vandalism. They do not hold special
rights other than the ability to edit articles that basically any user can gain. Yet they
still can issue warnings or convey the problem to an administrator if nothing else
works (Wikipedia: Counter-Vandalism Unit, 2010).
As to the sixth principle, the sanctions for causing vandalism are gradually
increased. Possible first sanctions are rather seen as a reminder or a slight warning.
Considering the anti-vandalism policy itself, which considers only deliberate acts of
vandalism as such, it is not always easy to tell if someone acted intentionally in a
disruptive way or not, therefore the sanctions need to be low in the beginning. The
sanctions can reach much more severe levels than a posted reminder, though, as has
been described above with the ’CheckUser’ or ’Oversight’ abilities, which normally
are only exerted after discussion and wielded only by very high ranking members.
Any system where disputes can arise and where disruptive behaviour is sanc-
tioned needs certain possibilities for arbitration, Ostrom states as the seventh design
principle. As already described above, the English Wikipedia has both a Mediation
Committee and an Arbitration Committee, which can settle disputes at the highest
level. Requests for arbitration can be entered through the Wikipedia system and
are generally open to all users. Discussants on lower levels can create pages to the
articles to communicate about diverting opinions.
The eighth design principle underlines the possibility of nested structures within
the whole framework of the community. In larger successful systems using the
commons, Ostrom often observes ”the presence of governance activities organized
in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom, 2000, p.152). Enterprises in this
case are understood as organised forms of collective action. Within Wikipedia, there
are many projects where many users participate. The general access levels and
major rules are the same throughout the system, but an inherent characteristic of
subsidiarity can be observed, meaning that problems are to be solved at the lowest
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levels if possible. Users can warn other users of their infringements, talk pages
allow users to communicate over disputes on the content of articles, for example.
Arbitration should come only into play at the last possible level. Therefore one can
say that many projects within Wikipedia are nested in the overall structure.
5 Conclusion
On the whole, the case of the anti-vandalism policy and many traits of Wikipedia
hold structures and processes that can be considered applicable to the design prin-
ciples Elinor Ostrom set out for long term self-organized regimes for traditional
common pool resources. Even in the case of Wikipedia, where the resource in ques-
tion is knowledge, which is nonrivalrous and where possibly everyone can access it
through the internet, the principles are adaptable or their main characteristics can
be found. Therefore Ostrom’s model could set valuable parameters for new studies
on other forms of knowledge or information commons in the digital world.
One of the major factors in deciding if the design principles reflect successful
collective action regimes is the longevity of them. In case of Wikipedia, the system
has been functioning since 2001, which can be considered a long timeframe in
internet history. It also shows that the community has proven resilient to major
disruptions so far. An indicator for this is the amount of knowledge bundled in
Wikipedia. Following Ostrom’s indications one can argue, that a possible reason for
this might be based on the dispute settlement and arbitration system and the fact it
has so far managed to resolve conflicts within the community successfully.
There are many forms of collaborative actions in the virtual sphere of the internet,
which could be of interest for future research. Apart from wikis for all kinds of
topics, there are other collaborative actions such as Open Source projects and other
virtual communities sharing and creating intellectual goods. Some of them are
closely linked with commercial interests, something also often happening with Open
Source Software, or by the advertising marked they provide. These influences could
also change the dynamics for collective action within some groups. It would open
up questions on how Ostrom’s understanding of the commons can be adapted to
other virtual communities as well. It might also be worth comparing the parameters
singled out by Ostrom to communities which have not explicitly evolved around
one form of content, such as social community websites, which still need to organise
their members’ interactions through rule settings and guidelines.
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